In Memoriam: Bruno Amoroso 1936-2017:Bruno Amoroso: a Man for all Seasons by Jespersen, Jesper
Roskilde
University
In Memoriam: Bruno Amoroso 1936-2017
Bruno Amoroso: a Man for all Seasons
Jespersen, Jesper
Published in:




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Jespersen, J. (2017). In Memoriam: Bruno Amoroso 1936-2017: Bruno Amoroso: a Man for all Seasons. The e-
Journal of Economics & Complexity, 2(1), 9-11.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Dec. 2021
            Volume 2 (2016) Number 1 May 2017
The e-Journal of
Economics & Complexity
An Interdisciplinary Journal on 
Mundialization, Development and 
Social Change
ISSN 2354-1318 (Online) 
                                 e-Journal of Economics and Complexity
Thematic issue:





In Memoriam: Bruno Amoroso 1936-2017
Thematic Issue
Ahmed Driouchi
Evidence and prospects of shortage and mobility
of medical doctors. A literature survey 
Mohamed Saib Musette, Hocine Abdellaoui, 
Ahcène Zehnati
Medical Brain Drain from Maghreb 
to Northern Countries: for a new social dialogue ?
Paola Abenante
Essentializing Dierence. Text, knowledge 
and ritual performance in a Su brotherhood in Italy
Books & Reports Review
Sara Hassan and Alberto Mazzali
Regular article
Mahmoud K. El-Jafari 
Palestinian Household Willingness and Ability
to Pay for Public Utilities in The West Bank: 
The Case of Electricity and Water
Long-form article
Marco Zupi
Beyond traditional measures of productivity. 
Dening, Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Sustainable Productivity
EDITORIAL TEAM
Sara Hassan, Alberto Mazzali (Book and Report Reviews)
CeSPI (Italy)
This e-journal adopts a multi-disciplinary approach 
to development studies, by proposing dierent and 
alternative views, perspectives, ideas and analyses 
on local, national and international development, by  
highlighting the lessons learned from dierent 
experiences, with a focus on social change.
Our goal is to learn from one another, that is a process
of mutual learning by strengthening links among 
members of a community of academic scholars from 
dierent countries spread mainly in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America.
In other terms, we hope to set an example of 
academic community among African, Asian and Latin 
American scholars who are interested in being 
involved in an international dialogue, exchanging 
ideas and facilitating mutual dissemination of 
research and its results, creating a forum for them and
providing a dedicated publication.
This is a refereed e-journal that is distributed 
electronically: the primary means of distributing 
this e-journal is over the internet with the aim 
of guaranteeing free access to the articles.
The e-journal is organized into volumes and issues. 
Our idea is to publish the bound volume annually or 
semi-annually. Every issue is devoted to a specic 
topic, which will take into account the importance of 
having dierent perspectives on the subject and 
reviews, and to regular research articles.
This e-journal is published by the Economics Faculty 
at the International University of Bac Ha and CeSPI.
EDITOR
Marco Zupi
International University of Bac Ha Hanoi 
(Vietnam) and CeSPI (Italy)                            
EDITORIAL BOARD
Bruno Amoroso 
University of Roskilde (Denmark) 
Zine M. Barka 
Université de Tlemcen (Algeria)
Mongi Boughzala 
Université de Tunis El Manar (Tunisia)
Ana Célia Castro  
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
Young Rak Choi 
Korea Research Council of Public Science 
& Technology (Republic of Korea)
Meseret Desta 
Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia)
Latif Dramani 
University of Thiès (Senegal) 
Mahmoud Eljafari 
Al Quds University of Jerusalem (Palestine)
Dang Huu 
International University of Bac Ha Hanoi
(Vietnam)
Tonatiuh Guillén López 
Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Mexico)
Mohsin U. Khan
Zaheer Science Foundation of New Delhi (India) 
Thida Kyu
Yangon University of Economics (Myanmar)
Fouzi Mourji 
Université Hassan II of Mohammedia
Casablanca (Morocco)
Saïb Musette 
Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée 
pour le Développement (Algeria)
Inês Macamo Raimundo 
Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo
(Mozambique)
Venkatesh Seshamani
University of Zambia (Zambia)
Alvin Y. So 
Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology (Hong Kong SAR, China)
Ali Soliman 
The British University in Egypt (Egypt) 
Abye Tasse 
University of Nouakchott (Mauritania)
Juan Triana Cordoví
Center for the study of Cuban Economy (Cuba)
e-Journal of Economics and Complexity
An Interdisciplinary Journal on Mundialization, Development and Social Changes
†
  Volume 2   Number 1                              May 2017
e-Journal of Economics and Complexity
An Interdisciplinary Journal on Mundialization, Development and Social Changes




In Memoriam: Bruno Amoroso 1936-2017.....................................................................................................
Thematic Issue: MIGRATION AND ITS SURROUNDINGS
Ahmed Driouchi
Evidence and prospects of shortage and mobility
of medical doctors. A literature survey ..............................................................................................................
Mohamed Saib Musette, Hocine Abdellaoui, Ahcène Zehnati
Medical Brain Drain from Maghreb to Northern Countries: for a new social dialogue ? ....................
Paola Abenante
Essentializing Dierence. Text, knowledge and ritual performance 
in a Su brotherhood in Italy ...............................................................................................................................
Books & Reports Review
Sara Hassan and Alberto Mazzali .....................................................................................................................
Regular Article
Mahmoud K. El-Jafari 
Palestinian Household Willingness and Ability to Pay for Public Utilities in The West Bank: 
The Case of Electricity and Water........................................................................................................................
Long-form Article
Marco Zupi
Beyond traditional measures of productivity.  Dening, Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Sustainable Productivity .......................................................................................................................................



















International University of Bac Ha, Hanoi and Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale of Rome  




A friend, former mentor and colleague at Roskilde University (where he became 
Emeritus professor of economics), Bruno Amoroso, a kind and generous editorial 
board member of this e-journal, died January 20 2017. It was very sad. 
Bruno Amoroso was a formidable dissenting and kind voice, with a natural 
propensity to question, and his life was an incessant proliferation of projects, 
ideas and practice of liberation. He was convinced that we must take action to 
change conventional habits and methods of understanding the world, and this 
requires increasing awareness and thus critical thought, of which he was a 
champion. Those who knew Bruno Amoroso well know his unconventional look 
at the world around us, his ability and patience to persist in a repulsion for 
dogmas, his attitude to friendship and conversations. We should wish that kind 
of unquenchable curiosity for the world around us on anyone. 
Our tribute to Bruno takes the form of a memorial written by one of Bruno 
Amoroso’s colleagues and dear friends: Jesper Jespersen, professor of economics 
at the Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University, where he 
has been teaching and conducting research since 1996. 
 
This Vol. 2016 (1) issue is devoted to “Migration and its surroundings”.   
 
In general, there are various and intertwined short-term and long-term 
determinants of migration: response to economic conditions and perspectives, 
mass poverty, violence and war, political risks, population pressure, climate 
change and other factors. 
Economic development in countries of origin influence the extent and patterns of 
migration, as well as admission criteria of host countries. Human mobility 
depends on migrant characteristics and on policies of both host and sending 
countries (labor and credit markets, job opportunities, welfare system, systems 
of immigrants’ admission, civic participation and citizenship). 
Therefore, the idea of clearly distinguishing between economic migrants and 
refugees/asylum seekers is useful for policy prescriptions, but they cannot be 
fully separated, particularly when the condition of refugee and displaced people 
becomes structural and long-term. 
 
There is no shortage of relationships between migration and development. They 
are significant but at the same time complex and not conducive to generalization. 







growth tends to increase the propensity to emigrate in the short to medium-
term, while only in the long-term can development result in a reduction in 
voluntary and forced migration (the migration hump theory). Case studies and 
empirical analyses demonstrate how the sign and coefficient of the relationship 
between migration and development may change markedly, to the point of 
rendering migration a fundamental driving force or, on the contrary, an insidious 
obstacle to development. 
Outlining the fundamental points of the agenda for analysis and policy in relation 
to international migration, we can gain some useful insights in order to guide 
future reflection and choices, both in terms of objectives and policy instruments 
for action. 
 
Within the limits of simplification, we can talk of one approach focussed on the 
link between migration and development and of a second approach which 
centres on the notion of managing migration flows. Skimming through the items 
listed in the sub-agendas contained in the two macro-areas, it becomes clear that 
these approaches reflect two perspectives that are important yet different.  
In the first case, the interest and point of view of the countries of origin of the 
migration flows is emphasized and development is principally intended to refer 
to development of countries of origin, whose strategic objectives should be the 
guiding force for international cooperation policies.  
In the second case, it is the viewpoint of the countries of destination of the 
migration flows which prevails, and their interest in creating conditions for 
better managing and governing migration flows, with an increasing focus on the 
so called securitization of migration policies: in the last decade, an increasing 
fear of “illegal migrants” and terrorism has made internal security the key 
concept to re-orient external policies. 
These are two agendas which, when taken separately, appear to move in 
different directions, including in relation to the timeframe of reference. The 
migration management policy pursues short-term objectives, requiring 
immediate results, including because of the great difficulty involved in 
contemplating medium to long-term scenarios. On the other hand, development 
policies establish objectives fifteen to twenty years in the future, as in the case of 
the Sustainable Development Goals, in what is clearly a long-term outlook. 
The difference in the nature, content and objectives of the two agendas 
translates into a different emphasis on crucial elements of the migration 
“market”. 
 
Today a very serious risk is represented by the weakening or curtailment of 
long-term development policies to the short-term humanitarian crisis of 
refugees and security priorities.  
If one were to think that forced migration is a problem of the country of origin's 
own making that must be resolved in that country, or a security or humanitarian 
problem in a specific host country, then that is just shortsighted selfishness. 
International solutions are needed, and political, security, humanitarian, 







comprehensive response may represent a sustainable solution. And this implies 
significant investment. 
 
Despite theoretical and practical difficulties involved in separating out “forced” 
from unforced migrants, many categories of forcibly displaced people co-exist, 
demonstrating that this phenomenon is s very wide-ranging and contains 
different situations: 
  
1. Refugees according to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention,  
2. Asylum seekers whose claim to refugee status is not yet definitively 
evaluated,  
3. Stateless persons without a recognized nationality and not belonging to 
any country,  
4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Returnees. 
 
Nonetheless, these categories of “forced” migrants represent just a small part of 
those who migrate. 
The world population was estimated to have just reached 7.5 billion.  
In view of the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity in the types of data 
collected across countries, the UN Population Division of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs estimated the number of internal migrants 
(migrants inside of their country of origin) as a worldwide stock of almost 800 
million. Therefore, the percentage of internal migrants in the global population is 
over 10%. 
According to the Perspectives on Global Development 2017, published by the 
OECD Development Centre, some 243 million people were living outside their 
country of birth in 2015, accounting to 3.2% of the world population. 
By combining internal and international migrants, there is over a billion of 
migrants in the world. In other words, every seventh person in the world is a 
migrant. 
However, with regard to the movements of refugees and internally displaced 
people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or 
environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development 
projects, the percentage is much lower. 
According to the UN Refugee Agency (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, UNHCR), we are now witnessing 65.3 million displaced people around 
the world who have been forced from home. Therefore, the percentage of 
“forced” migrants in the global population is just 0.87%. 
The majority are Internally displaced people (IDP), and among them are nearly 
21.3 million refugees. There are also 10 million stateless people who have been 
denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, 
employment and freedom of movement. 
Syria remains the world’s largest source country of refugees during 2015 with 
over 4.9 million people, followed by Afghanistan with over 2.5 million and 
Somalia over 1 million. Around four-fifths of the world's refugees have fled from 
the crisis areas into neighboring countries. Turkey is the largest refugee-hosting 







Today we witness to a dramatic increase in refugee and migrant flows across the 
Mediterranean. These flows are the combined result of outflows from 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria due to political and security conditions, and from the 
Horn of Africa and Western Africa due to poverty and conflict. 
From a worldwide and historical perspective, today developing countries host 
most of the displaced and current stock of refugees in the EU is not an 
unprecedented phenomenon: current total number of almost 2.4 million is just 
below the early-1990s peak. 
 
As a direct consequence of these stylized facts, we can confine ourselves to 
addressing certain fundamental points about migration policies.   
 
First, it is crucial to clarify that urgent focus on short-term crisis responses 
cannot be detached from medium-term socioeconomic dimensions of forced 
displacement. It is essential to define emergency solutions as well as rights-
based protection agenda and sustainable development strategies. Otherwise, any 
solutions you may have is doomed to fail. Reception and (political, social, 
economic and financial) integration/inclusion policies for refugees should, 
therefore, be linked and mainstreamed in general, confirming that, if ever there 
were the boundaries between forced and unforced migration, they are surely 
fuzzy and blurred.  
 
Second, interventions should help reduce—even eliminate— vulnerabilities: this 
implies a priority to help the most vulnerable people among the refugees, but 
also to support host communities who should manage the shock caused by an 
inflow of forcibly displaced persons. Policy solutions become sustainable and 
effective when we are overcoming a supposed trade-off or inevitable conflict of 
interests between host communities and forcibly displaced persons. If, and only 
if, significant political and financial investment is made in recognizing both these 
priorities, then the result could be a lasting solution. The objective must be a 
win-win solution for both host communities and forcibly displaced persons and 
they must be actively engaged. All the risks and negative effects on host 
communities (in particular, some segments of host communities) must be 
minimized, as well as all the potential positive opportunities for those segments 
of host communities must be promoted. This is not just a good omen: the 
development response should also aim to help reduce problems, poverty and 
unemployment among the hosts (that already existed), as they adjust to a 
transformed context. 
 
Third, we can say that the scale and complexity of the refugees crisis affecting 
Europe is new, but the crisis of forced displacement is not new and we can 
manage it if we approach this as both a humanitarian and a development 
challenge (development in countries of origin, transit and destination), also 
because it is not a European emergency crisis in terms of numbers. The 
management of this crisis requires adequate effort and collective action. If 
someone presumes that it is a problem of a country of origin's own making that 







and not at regional and global level, or just as a security or humanitarian 
problem, then that is just shortsighted selfishness. International solutions are 
needed, and political, security, humanitarian, development and diplomatic 
dimensions must be all addressed. Only a comprehensive response may 
represent a sustainable solution. It is not just a security issue or a humanitarian 
issue. It is a comprehensive political challenge and the nexus between security-
humanitarian and development dimensions must be properly addressed at 
political and diplomatic levels. This means complexity and this imply significant 
investment. 
 
Based on such premises, the purpose of this thematic issue is to present and 
discuss three different disciplinary theoretical and empirical approaches to 
understanding migration issues that transcend the current emergency of 
refugees and asylum seekers in the Mediterranean region, whilst focusing on the 
same region. 
 
In fact, the first two articles take stock of the general state of art and analyze the 
North African characteristics of the same phenomenon that is the mobility of 
medical doctors. 
 
The first article by Ahmed Driouchi presents the conceptual and theoretical 
framework of the research on the migration of medical doctors, from an 
economic perspective. 
The article analyzes the phenomenon of this specific type of high-skilled 
migration comprehensively from a variety of different angles, with a brief review 
of many contributions on the field. Besides those who migrate, the migration of 
high-skilled workers affects both sending and receiving countries and the article 
shows how migration of medical doctors is critical to all countries. 
A combination of shortage of health-care providers and poor distribution of 
providers within the same country affects developing countries, with additional 
stratifications due to the disparities between urban and rural areas. 
Shortages and imbalances of medical personal are seen as an international 
problem, and this shortage includes more than physicians and nurses: it includes 
also pharmacists, dentists, laboratory technicians, emergency medical personnel, 
public health specialists, health sector management, and administrative staff. 
All over the world, the needs for medical doctors have been increasing through 
time and countries under the effects of the changes occurring in health 
technologies and the increasing demand for health care. The implied shortages 
have been growing while accounting for new niches related to the expression of 
the demand for health and improvements in the welfare of the populations. The 
shortage of medical doctors could be also related to the nature of the labor 
supply curve that may not respond positively to new incentives. And the deficit 
of medical doctors is also affecting the universal health care coverage. Therefore, 
a resulting competition for attracting high-skilled migrants occurs among rich 
countries and very serious problems are faced by the poorest countries that are 







Empirical evidence on labor supply determinants as well as on the different push 
and pull factors leading to the emigration of medical doctors shows how 
migration of medical doctors involves many costs and legal barriers and could be 
managed by cooperative policies to generate further benefits with win-win 
outcomes to both Northern and Southern economies. 
 
The second article by Mohamed Saib Musette, Hocine Abdellaoui and Ahcène 
Zehnati is an overview of medical doctors’ migration from Maghreb through the 
sociology of migration lenses. An analysis of Maghrebian skilled migrants shows 
the significant concentration in France and Canada. To quantify this 
phenomenon, the authors use and cross multiple data sources: those of the 
Health Ministries of the three Maghreb countries, the employment survey and 
other sources collected in France and at international level. 
An empirical evaluation of the "brain drain" rate involving particularly 
physicians migrating to France shows that the different specialties are not 
affected to the same extent by the phenomenon of medical specialists born and 
trained in the Maghrebian countries of origin. Psychiatry remains the specialty 
registering the highest migration rate, and half of Maghreb anesthesiologists 
practicing in France have graduated in their origin country. 
The authors underline the fact that an expected decrease of remittances in the 
long run and that high skilled workers contribute far less to remittances than 
those who are less skilled. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the theories 
according to which countries of origin do benefit from a deal in with the losses 
caused by the departure of skills are compensated by migrants’ remittances. The 
classical sociological vision of migration as a social success for social mobility 
needs also to be revised.    
In the third section, the authors suggest to open a new social dialogue with a 
multi-faceted view on migrant’s integration. According to the authors, the 
current context calls for a revision, if not a break with past visions of integration, 
laying new foundations for social dialogue aimed at the prosperity of countries of 
both shores. In particular, three tracks are suggested to initiate a renewal of a 
social dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean on integration 
through migration: relationships between migration and development, 
harmonization of the models of governance of migration flows from Maghreb, 
building bridges between the shores. 
 
The third article, by Paola Abenante, provides some insights from an 
anthropological and cultural studies’ perspective, as shown by the title reference 
to cultural essentialism. This concept refers to “a system of belief grounded in a 
conception of human beings as ‘cultural’ (and under certain conditions territorial 
and national) subjects, i.e., bearers of a culture, located within a bordered world, 
which defines them and differentiates them from others”, to cite Ralph Grillo, a 
relevant social anthropologist who has had a long-standing concern with 
transnational migration and ethnicity in Africa and Europe. The arrival of 
migrants and asylum seekers on the shores of the Mediterranean basin is giving 








Culture can easily lead to essentialism by “preset[ting] people’s individual 
behavior as entirely defined and constrained by the cultures in which they live so 
that the stereotype becomes the essence of who they are”, as Adrian Holliday 
reminds us in his 20’10 volume on Intercultural Communication and Ideology.  
Based on these premises, the article helps to understand the different and 
competing understandings of ‘proper Islamic praxis’ between Egyptian Muslim 
immigrants and Italians converts to Islam within the Italian branch of an 
Egyptian-Sudanese Sufi brotherhood, in Rome.  
As a confirmation that culture may lead to uncountable misunderstandings (or a 
series of miscomprehensions between a migrant and his hosts in the country of 
destination, in a case study), the Italian brethren foreground intellectual 
engagement with texts and scriptures over ritual performance and the role of the 
body, elements to which immigrants instead give prominence. The author 
suggests that such polarization and the reasons of its persistence may be best 
understood by focusing on the performative role of cultural essentialisms against 
immigrants and of stereotypes concerning the definition of ‘orthodox’ Islam 
circulating in Italy and beyond. The author argues that two different forms of 
knowledge, one intellectual, the other practical have a role to play in these 
phenomena that generate subject positions and relations of authority. 
 
The e-journal also contains a Book & Report Review section, by Sara Hassan and 
Alberto Mazzali, CeSPI, Rome. This section covers many recent publications 
across the whole field of migration studies: from the theoretical to the policy-
focused and from the regional to the global. In this issue, new works published 
by academic experts, international organisations and practitioners are reviewed 
as clustered as referred to both international migrations as a global issue (on 
migration and development nexus, distress migration and protracted crisis, 
migration within the SDGs framework, migration and rural-urban relations, and 
migration’s perceptions) and the regional level.  
 
A regular article by Mahmoud K. El-Jafari aims at investigating the determinants 
behind the Palestinian households willingness and ability to pay bills for water 
and electricity services. 
The author uses primary data, which were gathered on household expenditures 
and consumption of water and electricity in the West Bank, to investigate the 
determinants of household decision to pay for consumption of public utilities. 
Through the application of an econometric model to analyze the personal, 
economic, social and legislative variables as the major determinants behind 
households’ behavior toward payments of bills for the consumption of water and 
electricity. 
Based on the results of data analysis, the author suggests that areas of 
cooperation, between providers of water and electricity on one hand and 
customers on the other hand, should be enhanced to improve the situation. 
The article casts a critical eye over living conditions in Palestine, and that is what 
makes it very interesting. 
The Palestinian society and economy have been struggling for years, due to the 







consequent closure policies the latter put in place, which restrict the movements 
of Palestinians.  
Gaza and the West Bank (whereas East Jerusalem is still annexed by Israel) each 
undergo periodic cycles of collapse and recovery, usually driven by Israeli 
retaliatory measures for Palestinian attacks, reactions and invasions as well as 
international aid inflows. 
Everyday life is dramatically affected by bloody armed conflict and violence, the 
Israeli military occupation, settlements and closures (including the "separation 
barrier" along and inside the West Bank border, checkpoints and roadblocks), 
structural dependence on international aid, acute fiscal crisis, huge 
unemployment and internal political tensions between and within Fatah 
(governing in Palestinian-administered areas of the West Bank), Hamas (in 
control of Gaza) and other groups such as the Salafi organizations in Gaza. 
Population numbers clarify the unsustainable conditions of daily life after 
decades of instability, violence and occupation. The Palestinian population of 4.5 
million have troubles in getting to their destinations: children have problems 
getting to school, parents to work, the sick and injured to hospitals, while 
between 420,000 and 470,000 Israeli settlers – encouraged by settlement 
expansion policy but illegal under international law (as reaffirmed by the UN 
Security Council resolution 2334, passed in December 2016) – live in the West 
Bank and these settlements complicate efforts for a two-state solution. 
 
A final long article by Marco Zupi can be counted among the preliminary 
proposals aimed at offering a starting point to advance the beyond-GDP debate. 
In particular, there is an urgent need for a change of approach where the 
measurement of (sustainable) production and correlated productivity is 
concerned. 
The article outlines the meaning and role of productivity, in terms of its 
definition and conceptualization, presents some debated points on the various 
components of productivity (labour, capital and total factor productivity) and 
underlines the importance of contextual conditions (political context, 
institutions, geography and market integration).  
To go beyond the narrow GDP measurement should mean to rethink 
productivity as a measure of the developmental process of production. 
Development is conceived as a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of the nested concept of sustainable development: economic growth, 
social development, environmental sustainability, conducive to political 
transformation. Al that implies a critique extended to economic productivity as 
the very and narrow principle and process of translating inputs into outputs and 
results. 
Some key questions are specifically presented and discussed with reference to 
agriculture and, adding usual caveat, general concluding remarks can be 
deducted from various measures as possible sources of inspiration on 
sustainable productivity. 
Jespersen 
















I met Bruno for the first time back in 1985. I had just come back from one year of 
doing research in Italy – being a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University 
Institute (EUI) in Firenze. During my stay at EUI I had been working on a book 
called 'Imbalances of the Danish economy: What to do?' It was an academic work 
with a number of policy suggestions of how to reduce unemployment. I sent a 
copy of the book to colleagues, which I thought would take an interest into the 
'political economy of Denmark'. The only one who responded spontaneously was 
Bruno. He invited me without hesitation for lunch in his lovely house in the 
centre of Copenhagen. It was a sunny spring-day we sat at first floor, and Bruno 
listened more than he spoke – at that occasion. He was already at that time 
deeply involved in research into the political and economic aspects of the Danish 
society with special reference to the functioning of the Scandinavian welfare 
states.  
 
Bruno's life-long academic interest was to understand the dynamics of the 
present political economic systems at the national level, the European level and 
the global level. My book could help him to get more insight into the dynamics 
(and macroeconomic implications) of the Danish welfare state within a European 
context.  
 
Quite quickly, we started to collaborate on his project of organizing a yearly 
conference and collection of papers, called 'social economics year book' 
(socialøkonomisk årbog). This project was running for 4-5 years with the aim of 
bringing mainly young scholars together by asking them to contribute to the 
conference with themes from the real world, which cause social concern.  
 
Bruno was docent at Roskilde University. His realist view on society was quite a 
challenge (and novelty) to a number of his colleagues at these days. At Roskilde 
University the theoretical view on political economy was by most scholars during 
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the 1970s and further on into the 1980s taken from a rather strict Marxist 
orthodox viewpoint. Bruno's aim was different. From the very beginning of his 
academic carrier the focus point was on the understanding of the dynamics of 
the real society, not a hypothetical one and the conditions for a 'good society'. He 
saw the Danish welfare state as a practical and functional case of class 
collaboration rather than class antagonism (and struggle). For him this real 
outcome of political economics did correspond with his study of economics at 
Rome University la Sapienza under the supervision of Frederico Caffé, an 
internationally well-known post-Keynesian scholar.  
 
Theoretically, Bruno and I shared common ground. At that time I was teaching 
international economics at the Copenhagen Business School and had been 
trained in conventional Keynesian economics – one could call it orthodox ISLM –
economics with a very mechanical view on (macro-)economics, hardly taking the 
political perspective into consideration. I learned a lot from conversations with 
Bruno. I can easily recall his wise eyes, when he with a smile on his face could say 
«How can you be so naive, Jesper? Look at the real world, the economy does not 
function as your models tell you». To Bruno the conventional economic arguments 
were much too often dominated by an unhappy mixture of ideology and naive 
academic thinking: people (with power) saying one thing, but with another 
intention, which the neoclassical economists supported by the use of 
mathematical models detached from the real world. Bruno was always sceptic 
when he heard arguments dressed up with phrases like: this is a 'necessary 
politics' although causing hardship to ordinary people. He always double-
checked such arguments. Other examples of his often-used phrases were: «There 
are at least two sides of any case» or «don't fool yourself by a single number». 
 
Bruno directed me to a number of seminal works by political economists that, in 
fact, often were more philosophers than economists: Keynes, of course, we 
already shared, but Karl Polanyi, John Kenneth Galbraith and Gunnar Myrdal I 
learned to appreciate from him. I learned to be a critical realist from working 
with Bruno.  
 
Fortunately, I got the opportunity to move from Copenhagen Business School to 
Roskilde University in the early 1990s. The tide was changing in political 
economics even at Rokilde University. Marxism was in decline. Unfortunately, at 
the benefit of neoclassical economics. Therefore, Bruno and I had to stand up 
against this change of political fundamentalism within political economics from 
one dogmatism to another. We had to insist on pluralism in teaching economics 
at Roskilde University. It took quite some years and struggle to establish a 
critical realist position and to write the needed textbook. Without Bruno's active 
support we would not have succeeded in creating and get acceptance for this 
pluralist breathing space in political economics, which we managed to establish 
Jespersen 





at Roskilde University.  
 
During the years, we wrote a number of books together on political economy 
mainly with a shared focus on European Economics and with an 
institutional/post-Keynesian analytical out-set. For instance, we developed an 
analytical argument against the introduction of the Euro as a single currency in 
Europe (and especially in Denmark). The outcome of our analysis was already in 
the late 1990s that the euro could be a disaster to the weakest nations and to the 
most vulnerable part of the population in any euro-country, because of increased 
macroeconomics imbalances and lack of national policy instruments. The 
conventional neoclassical economists of course rejected this analysis. They only 
saw reduced transaction costs, safeguard against inflation and, hence, increased 
growth by all participating countries. They could not see in their models that the 
euro easily could be a highway for increased German hegemony, and hereby sow 
the seed for future antagonism and rising nationalism. This is just one example of 
how our work benefited from being critical realists: one cannot state an 
affirmative conclusion about the future; but analyses supported by real world 
arguments are more often than not also the most realistic ones.  
This life-long collaboration with Bruno was very fruitful to me. I learned to 
consider methodology as an important discipline in social science. Research 
without deliberate methodology could easily lead the conclusion astray in an 
unreal direction. This heritage of how to undertake research I have benefited 
from ever since during my academic carrier leading up to my doctorate 
dissertation on Macroeconomic Methodology in 2007. It is not only ideology; but 
also methodology, which has an underestimated impact on the outcome of social 
sciences. This is one of the lasting conclusions from my conversations with 
Bruno during more than thirty years.  
 
Bruno had many more interests than theoretical political economy. He had 
contacts with politicians, trade unionists, academics and organizations all over 
the world. He travelled a lot. China and South East Asia became increasingly his 
main concern. Setting-up a home for street-children in Hanoi was just one of his 
many outstanding initiatives to create a real 'good society'. For obvious reasons 
his best-known book had the title 'On Globalization' (from 1999). To Bruno the 
world was, after the cold war had ended, opening up, but also becoming smaller 
for good and for bad. He saw the opportunities and the risks; but he was never 
naive and therefore seldom disillusioned. 
 
Bruno was a wise man: A man for all seasons. Fortunately, his thoughts and 























This paper focuses on the shortage in health workforce, its causes and its consequences. The 
implied mobility is also introduced.  
Series of issues are introduced to better capture the global prospects facing the health system. A 
literature review survey on the above dimensions is the main source of information used in this 
paper. The attained outcomes confirm the existing increasing current and future trends of 
shortage and mobility of the health workforce with emphasis on medical doctors.  
The expected consequences on developing countries are discussed in relation to the increasing 
demand for healthcare but also to the technological changes taking place at the level of the sector 
and in its environment. 
 







This paper shows how migration of medical doctors is critical to all countries. 
While the literature on brain-drain has had pessimistic policy outcomes, the 
relatively new literature on both brain-gain and brain-drain suggests new 
avenues for further promising policies. The global health systems as well as the 
specificities of health care require further collaborative actions and global 
strategies between migrant receiving and sending countries. The present paper 
builds on previous contributions by Driouchi, Baudassé, Zouag and Boboc (2009) 
besides the research on the migration of medical doctors (Driouchi & Kadiri, 
2011). It also accounts for the contributions of Driouchi, Zouag and Malki (2011) 
and Driouchi (2014). 
Issues are discussed with first, the introduction of shortage of medical doctors. 
This is followed by a focus on some factors that could lead to this shortage before 
discussing migration and then by the on-going related approaches and policies. 
Such components are likely to allow for an overall understanding of the links 
between shortage and migration besides the overall policies governing 
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education, migration and health. 
This is part of the challenges faced by health workforce and that has been 
identified and excessively discussed with the publication of the WHO report 
(2006) with the analysis of the patterns, issues and trends related to the human 
resources operating in the health systems. Among the background papers in this 
report, there is the one by Dal Poz, Kinfu, Drager and Kunjumen (2006) that 
deals with counting health workers through data with showing the global results. 
But, the most promising publication on labor markets for the health workforce is 
the book edited by Soucat, Scheffler and Ghebreyesus (2013). While the book 
focuses on Africa, it provides important insights about the analysis of the health 
systems. 
Ranson, Chopra, Atkins, Dal-Poz and Bennett (2010) argue that since human 
resources account for approximately 70% of recurrent expenditures in most 
health systems, inadequate human resource training, regulation, distribution and 
management can have enormous implications. To the authors, poor developing 
economies suffer from shortage of health-care providers and from the poor 
distribution of providers within the same country. These concern disparities in 
the distribution of health workers between regions, between rural and urban 
areas, and between public and private sectors. In Algeria with 8 % of the 
population in Algiers, 24% of specialist physicians are located in this city. 
Similarities are found in other countries (Argentina, Egypt, Uganda and 
Tanzania). The working time, the levels of efficiency in private and public sectors 
are also discussed as expressions of implicit discriminations. But, to the authors 
this is a more general trend that is exaggerated in poor developing countries. 
Ranson et al. (2010) have discussed the priorities for research on human 
resources for health in low and middle income countries. The authors use 
interviews of different stakeholders to find out about the major problems facing 
health workers and the type of research priorities needed. Twenty-one research 
questions are identified with some having never received attention in the 
reviewed literature. They include incentives for retention and attraction of 
health human resources to underserviced areas, the impacts of multiple 
employments and the use of optimal incentives to enhance quality of health care. 
A clear consensus about the type of policy problems faced by different countries 
and the nature of evidence needed to tackle them. 
Humphreys, McGrail, Joyce, and Scott (2012) analyze the use of recruitment and 
retention incentives with applications to the targeting of rural areas in Australia. 
They suggest this new geographical classification that provides a better basis for 
equitable resource allocation of recruitment and retention incentives to doctors 
based on the attractiveness of non-metropolitan communities, both 
professionally and non-professionally, as places to work and live. These means 
are proposed as alternatives for reducing the current levels of disparities 
between urban and rural areas but also different rural regions of Australia. 
These disparities are also observed in other developed countries including those 
Driouchi 





of OECD (2013). Different papers have been devoted to the situation in many 
countries. They all insist on the procedures to generate more incentives to 
attract and value the health services with a major focus on the importance of 
research. This latter needs to address health human resources as they are major 
needs to know the best ways of ensuring local and global policies for a better 
access to health. 
Sheikh, Boerma, Cometto and Duvivier (2013) consider that the availability, 
distribution, capacity and performance of human resources for health varies 
widely, and many countries have fewer health workers than needed for coverage 
of essential health services. The authors say that signs of progress are emerging, 
though several countries that are successfully addressing their problems in the 
area. Signs of progress resulting in improvements in health outcomes are 
observed. But these new gains are not sustainable as shortages and inequitable 
access to health workers may jeopardize the implications of these efforts. 
Love (2012) discusses the means for the promotion of R&D in health as a way to 
reduce shortages in the medium and long terms. The author considers that the 
primary mechanisms to support such research are an obligation on convention 
members to invest a certain percentage of national income in R&D in addition to 
a fraction in a new multilateral pooled funding mechanism. The proposal for a 
convention also included several other norms, such as a requirement to delink 
R&D costs from product prices, to enhance the innovative capacity of developing 
countries and transfer technology to such countries, and to expand access to 
scientific knowledge. 
Schweitzer and Synowiec (2012) are examples of authors that count on the role 
of new health and also information technologies to ensure better solutions to 
health care. They focus on m-health (or mobile health) and e-health (i.e. is the 
use of information and communication technologies for health). These are 
considered to have the potential to overcome traditional obstacles to the delivery 
of health services to the poor in lower and middle-income countries— issues 
related to access, quality, time, and resources. But, to the authors, there is little 
evidence as to whether the expected benefits and savings can be actualized on a 
large scale. As a first step to developing investments on m-health and e-health, 
the paper outlines some of the key economic and financial questions that need to 
be answered in the context of developing economies. 
Telemedicine (Njikang, 2012), is concerned with the provision of clinical services 
at distance. It could be also considered as ways to reduce shortages in medical 
doctors. Remote areas could be targeted to use these technologies and 
compensate for the reduction of local medical services. 
The above contributions show that shortage of medical doctors besides their 
migration but also research related to human resources and new technologies 
are important interdependent elements that need to be searched form different 
publications. Six interdependent sections form the core of the present paper. 
They successively deal with shortage, its causes, the patterns of migration 
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besides migration policies and the positioning in relation to the literature on 
brain drain with the specificity of brain drain in the health system. 
   
 
 
2. The increasing shortage of medical doctors 
 
  
There are very important reports by international organizations and mainly by 
the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006) that address the global and country 
shortages in health workforce. O’Brien and Gostin (2011) produced a good 
report dealing with health worker shortages. These authors consider that the 
world is experiencing a critical and growing shortage of health workers 
particularly in the poorest countries. They claim that the global human resource 
shortage is certainly much greater than 4.3 million health workers. To the 
authors, this shortage includes more than physicians and nurses. It includes also 
pharmacists, dentists, laboratory technicians, emergency medical personnel, 
public health specialists, health sector management, and administrative staff. The 
WHO estimates that there is a shortage of about four million health workers 
needed to deliver essential health services, and has called for immediate action 
to resolve the accelerating crisis in the global health workforce. 
Shortages and imbalances of medical personal have been seen as an international 
problem with the works of Mullan, Politzer and Davis (1995), Health Canada 
(2005) but also by Miller, Langesen, Lee and Mick (1998). Zurn, Mario, Dal Poz, 
Stilwell, and Orvill (2004) suggest that economic theory considers that a skill 
imbalance occurs when the quantity of a given skill supplied by the work force 
and the quantity demanded diverge at the existing market conditions. These 
authors emphasize that labor market supplies and demands for occupational 
skills continuously fluctuate implying labor market imbalances or shortages. 
In theory, all economies are facing shortages in medical doctors as these deficits 
relate not only to aggregated needs of growing populations, but also to the 
coverage of specific demands in well defined areas and in particular medical 
domains. Since shortage of medical doctors is universal, it is directly affecting the 
reforms aiming at making universal health care. The deficit of medical doctors is 
also affecting the universal insurance health care coverage. On the other hand, 
the boosting of universal health care and health insurance lead to further 
shortages in medical doctors. Smith (2008) among others, talks about global 
shortage in health care professionals and that Governments and health rights 
movements are both responsible of this global shortage. Other authors such as 
Noree, Chokchaichan and Mongkolporn (2008) have been insisting on the 
unequal distribution of human resources of health that can generate abundance 
for some but shortage for others. The spatial distribution of medical doctors 
between regions in the same economy and between urban and rural areas can 
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also show important deficits of medical doctors. 
If health emergencies can be easily included in the identification of shortages, the 
needs of some specialties and the waiting time of patients are among the factors 
that can also express acute shortages in medical doctors. Seward (2007) has 
claimed that the waiting time for medical doctors can be more than seven weeks 
in the Boston area, in the USA. Other studies show that waiting can lead to the 
progression of diseases, which leads to further social and economic burdens. 
Abdullah (2005) investigates the possible operational problems that may lead to 
excessive waiting time for patients in Malaysia. He shows that 73.2% of the 
patients spend between 4 and 5 hours waiting to obtain a treatment from a 
doctor. He also demonstrates that this long time gives a negative perception on 
the quality of services in hospitals. Merritt Hawkins and Associates (2009) 
examine patients waiting times in fifteen states in the USA, with a focus on five 
medical specialties. This study shows that waiting times differ depending on the 
medical specialty and also from one city to another. In addition, this study 
underlines that despite the high number of physicians per capita in the cities of 
USA; many of the patients experience very long waiting times. For instance, the 
average time in Philadelphia is 27 days and in Los Angeles is 24.2 days. Another 
contribution based on OECD countries suggests that while the waiting time is a 
serious health policy issue in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom, it is not 
that high in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
and the United States. The main reasons for this, reside in registration time and 
the limited medical staff (Abdullah, 2005). 
The growing progress and the new discoveries in health technologies are also 
likely to increase the demand for new medical areas implying an enhancement of 
the level of shortages. While all countries are concerned with these shortages, 
developing economies are likely to suffer the most from their implications 
relative to developed countries. These latter economies have better planning and 
management of their medical human resources in both public and private health 
sectors. The limited planning and management is itself among the sources of 
emigration of medical doctors from developing to developed economies even 
under a most pronounced shortage in the first types of economies. Besides that, 
developed economies do attract with their overall working and living conditions. 
But there are also differential incentives between developed countries. For 
Skinner (2002), the design of Medicare in Canada is considered as generating a 
monopoly provider of publicly-financed health insurance and as a coercive 
regulator of the health services industry. The author considers that this creates 
incentives to reduce labor wages in order to contain costs. The wage differentials 
between Canadian and American health professionals create a powerful 
incentive for Canadian medical personnel to emigrate to the USA. To the above 
author, this is continuing to produce loss of medical doctors and nurses 
contributing thus to a labor shortage in the health care system and reductions in 
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public access to health services that may be negatively affecting health outcomes 
in Canada. 
In practice, each country has plans for its medical human resource needs and 
also programs for their fulfillment. But, these plans are contingent on risks and 
uncertainties that take place locally and at the aggregate levels. Medical 
education is among the sources that are assumed to help cover these needs. But, 
risks related to emigration are likely to be limiting the realizations of these plans. 
At the same time, compensations of the eventual losses from emigration cannot 
prevail unless possibilities of attraction of immigrant medical doctors are 
embedded in the staffing plans, both at the public and private health sectors. This 
attraction can take place in developed countries and under some co-operation 
and bilateral arrangements in some developing economies. Richer developing 
countries can proceed to covering their shortages through open, co-operative 
and direct hiring of medical doctors. But, most developing countries may not be 
capable of offering the latter options. For these countries, emigration of medical 
doctors is synonymous to real shortages as increasing population health needs is 
not covered under a decrease of health staffing. Further shortages in medical 
doctors can be observed in these economies placing thus more risks on the 
health of their populations. 
The above descriptions and trends are supported through the use of aggregate 
information about world shortages and density of medical doctors. The world 
map of shortage of medical doctors (largely available on the Internet) highlights 
the fact that the shortage of medical doctors is present all over the world, but can 
be described as critical in most developing countries and poorer regions such as 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. It is also highly expected to be occurring in 
countries such as Morocco, Indonesia, Costa Rica, and Peru. 
When referring to the density of medical doctors per country and region, this 
shows an overall high numbers of inhabitants per doctor. This is larger in 
developed countries but also in some developing parts of the world. In sub-
Saharan Africa, it can attain 50,000 inhabitants for one doctor. 
Besides the above, shortage of medical doctors is more sensitive at the individual 
and aggregate levels as it affects human lives in comparison with deficits in other 
services that can either be compensated for, or have limited short run effects. 
This can be the case deficits in engineers and in teachers and faculty members 
but shortages in medical doctors are more critical to any economy. The 
emigration of medical doctors is consequently more critical than that affecting 
other types of skills. 
While the development in international trade in services is promising as it can 
provide solutions to local and national deficits and as it can cover series of 
domains that need expertise and access to skilled labor, the area of medical 
doctors can be hardly concerned with this trade. Special arrangements and 
requirements are needed in this area even with the development of advanced 
technologies. 
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The statistics about total health workforce, health service providers and health 
management and support workers as provided by World Health Organization 
(WHO, 2006). The claim is that the total health workforce is estimated to be 
59,220,000 people among whom 64.76% are in Europe and Americas. The health 
service providers are estimated to be 3.45% in Africa as compared to 31.57% in 
America. The percentage of total health workforce is estimated as 17% in Africa, 
compared to 43% in America. These figures highlight the prevalence and 
universality of health care shortages, but their exaggeration in most developing 
economies. 
These shortages are certainly among the causes of mobility of health workforce 
and especially of medical doctors as there are countries that can offer better 
incentives and thus better conditions to reduce their deficits. 
Other authors and publications are still addressing the issue of shortage in the 
health workforce with its implications on the provision of health care. 
   
 
 




The obvious source for the reduction of shortage in medical doctors is in relation 
with the outputs of medical education. Any shortage in the number of medical 
doctors, leads to deficits in the number of medical doctors through time. Apart 
from this, other factors have been discussed in the literature. Besides that, the 
labor supply of medical doctors has appeared to follow the normal trend 
expected relative to changes in incentives. Andreassen, Di Tommaso and Strøm 
(2012) focus on a longitudinal analysis of the labor supply of married physicians 
in Norway from 1997 to 1999. The model utilized for estimation considers that 
physicians can choose among 10 different job packages which are a combination 
of part time/full time, hospital/primary care, private/public sector, and not 
working. Their current choice is influenced by past available options due to a 
taste persistence parameter in the utility function. The estimation accounts for 
the budget constraint, including all features of the tax system. The results imply 
that an overall wage increase or a tax cut moves married physicians towards full 
time job packages, in particular to full time jobs in the private sector. The overall 
and aggregate labor supply elasticities in the population of employed doctors are 
rather low compared to previous estimates. Such a role is not all the time 
observed as discussed in the following papers. 
In a very interesting recent book by Barnow, Burt, Trutko and Pitak (2013), 
employment shortage and occupations are discussed in different book chapters. 
Many concepts tried to explain the term “labor shortage” but are finally judged 
irrelevant to the study of occupational shortages. These refer to series of 
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approaches defined as based on sustained market disequilibrium between 
supply and demand in which the quantity of workers demanded exceeds the 
supply available besides the willingness to work at a particular wage under 
specific working conditions. The causes of labor shortage are attributed to the 
geographic scope of the shortage, the period of the shortage, its severity and the 
subspecialty of shortages. This is the key determinant of whether there can be 
shortages for some parts of an occupation besides the consideration of the 
substitution effects. If not, a shortage can exist within an occupation while other 
subcategories are in equilibrium or even in surplus. According to the book, 
analyzing the causes of labor shortage is important because it helps in awareness 
of the appropriate market signals to look for in assessing whether or not 
shortage exists and to identify and assess potential public and private policies for 
dealing with shortages. Among the factors that are cited to cause labor shortage, 
there is the phenomenon of backward bending labor supply that occurs in 
situations where workers are free to allocate their time between the professional 
and other alternatives. 
There are two main effects related to determining labor supply. The substitution 
effect states that a higher wage makes work more attractive than leisure. 
Therefore, supply increases. The income effect states that a higher wage means 
workers can achieve a target income by working fewer hours. Therefore, because 
it is easier to get enough money they work less. When the wage is low, the 
substitution effect may dominate. As wages increase, the income effect can start 
to dominate for a worker, when there is a choice between work and leisure. If 
wages increase, then work becomes relatively more profitable than leisure 
(substitution effect). However, with higher wages, he/she can maintains a decent 
standard of living through less work (income effect). The substitution effect of 
higher wages means workers will give up leisure to do more hours of work 
because work has now higher rewards. The income effect of higher wages mean 
workers will reduce the amount of hours they work, because they can maintain a 
target level of income through fewer hours. 
These effects can be translated into other economic activities where labor has 
more choices to ensure economic activities, such as in the paper by Gautam, 
Strandand and Kirkley (1996) on leisure/labor tradeoffs in fisheries. Economists 
have understood that the open-access nature of fishing grounds can cause the 
long-run fishery supply to bend backward. There is also increasing speculation 
that fishermen respond to falling output price either by increasing or decreasing 
effort, depending on the circumstances. This suggests a short-run backward-
bending supply of fishing labor. A dynamic, utility-theoretic model of fishermen's 
behavior is developed to address this possibility. The model highlights both 
contemporaneous and inter-temporal tradeoffs between labor and leisure. The 
model is tested and the results indicate that the short-run labor supply in 
fisheries may exhibit backward-bending properties. In addition, changes in 
current prices may trigger changes in expectations of future prices, causing 
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potentially greater counterintuitive behavior. These results challenge many 
traditional regulatory strategies that address problems of open access. 
Brown and Lapan (2007) introduce a model of the supply of physicians' services 
based on the assumption that physicians are price-taking utility maximizes. The 
paper assumes that physician’s services are produced using physicians' labor 
and purchased inputs. It shows that the impact of changes in final product or 
input prices on the supply of physicians' services depends on the physicians' 
labor-leisure choice and on the degree of substitutability between physicians' 
labor and purchased inputs. The empirical results presented indicate that the 
physicians' labor supply curve is backward-bending, but that the supply curve of 
physicians' services is positively sloped. 
Green (1978) addresses the theoretical models designed to ascertain the 
existence of a variable level of physicians' activity in shifting the demand of their 
patients. Two basic approaches are followed: equilibrium models of the demand 
for health care, and disequilibrium models. Within the former category, both 
competitive and monopolistic behaviors are studied. Using the monopolistic 
model, a statistical test of the hypothesis of "no induced demand" is constructed, 
and fails to reject it. The disequilibrium analysis of other writers is analyzed and 
an alternative specification of such a model is set out. 
Keher (1976) looks at the income differences between men and women 
physicians. These are analyzed using data from the American Medical 
Association's 1973 Eighth Periodic Survey of Physicians. While women tend to 
possess less favorable professional characteristics in terms of income-earning 
potential, the returns too many characteristics associated with higher incomes 
are greater for women than for men. Additional evidence on differences in 
weekly hours worked is presented in an effort to explain the lower incomes of 
women doctors. The woman who becomes a physician gains entrance to one of 
the highest paid of all professions. Yet, even within medicine, women's incomes 
are considerably lower than those earned by men. This paper reports on an 
analysis of incomes from medical practice earned by men and women physicians 
based on data obtained from a recent American Medical Association (AMA) 
survey. 
Boulier (1979) investigates the supply decisions of medical practitioners while 
many previous studies have examined the relationship between hours worked 
by dentists and physicians and net income per hour. There are two important 
short-comings to previous approaches and estimations. First, variations in net 
income per hour among self-employed practitioners (the majority of dentists and 
physicians) are caused not only by variations in the price of output but also 
variations in hours worked, quantities of other inputs employed, and the prices 
of those inputs, so that the relation between hours worked and net income per 
hour is complex and not analogous to that between hours worked and wage rates 
for employed persons. Second, the results of these studies provide only 
inferential evidence about the supply of one of the inputs into the production of 
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medical services-not output. It is conceivable, for instance, that an increase in the 
price of output might result in a decrease in the number of hours worked by a 
dentist or a physician, yet result in an increase in output if the practitioner is led 
to substitute a sufficient quantity of other inputs (e.g., auxiliary personnel) for 
his own time. The next section of this chapter outlines a theoretical model of a 
dentist's practice which describes the relations among the price of output, the 
prices of inputs, hours worked by the dentist, the quantity of inputs used, and the 
supply of output. The succeeding section presents the results of an empirical 
investigation of the determinants of hours worked and the supply of output by 
non-salaried dentists. 
Brown and Lapan (1972) comment the article of Feldstein (1970) who attempts 
to explain the pricing of physicians' services in the United States between 1948 
and 1966. In his attempt to measure the demand for physicians' services, 
Feldstein (1970) finds a positive price coefficient. Further, since his estimates 
imply a backward-bending supply curve for physicians' services, the infers that 
government policies to reduce price inflation, may increase excess demand but 
will not decrease and may even increase the quantity of physicians' services 
provided. 
Ellis (1981) introduces the debate over the last several decades about the 
backward-sloping supply curves of labor in Africa. This debate has occasioned 
much confusion not only as to what has in fact been observed, but confusion 
within and without the discipline of economics as to how the behavior might best 
be interpreted. Vahovitch (1977) looks at how physicians do as they tend to cut 
down on their work hours and weeks, and, if they do, how this will affect the 
supply of services available to their patients. These questions open up an 
important area of research, because the information gained can be extremely 
useful in estimating accurately the future supply of physicians' services and in 
determining government policies directed at affecting that supply. The 
hypothesis that an individual will choose an extra hour of leisure over an extra 
hour of work, once he/she reaches a certain wage level, is tested empirically by 
Vahovitch (1977). If the supply curve for a physician's market time is backward-
bending, the supply of services offered may be dramatically reduced as a 
consequence of rising affluence. 
Jeon and Hurley (2010) show that an effective solution to the problem of access 
to physician services in Canada must extend beyond an over-exclusive focus on 
the number of providers to consider the behavior of physicians in greater depth. 
The amount of labor and associated services supplied by physicians depends 
importantly on their attitudes regarding work, on practice and non-practice 
income opportunities, and on the policy environment in which they practice. 
Hence, the amount of labor supplied by a given stock of physicians can change 
over time. Only by considering the full range of factors that affect the labor 
supply of physicians can we effectively plan for physician resources. 
Mitchell (1984) considers that because of the large public investment in medical 
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education, it is important to understand why women physicians work 
significantly less than men physicians. National survey data on office-based 
private practice were used to estimate (using two-stage least squares technique) 
hours and weeks worked for men and women physicians separately. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, shorter work weeks for women physicians are not the 
result of child care responsibilities. Nor would higher earnings encourage 
women physicians to work longer hours. Instead, we found significant work 
reductions among married women physicians (but not men), implying 
subordination of careers by women where combined family incomes are high. 
Chanel, Paraponaris, Protiere and Ventelou, (2010) devote their paper to the 
analysis of the General Practitioners’ (GPs) labor supply, specifically focusing on 
the physicians’ labor supply responses to higher compensations. This analysis is 
mainly aimed at challenging the reality of a ‘backward bending’ form for the 
labor supply of GPs. Because GPs’ fees only evolve very slowly and are mainly 
fixed by the National Health Insurance Fund, the authors design a contingent 
valuation survey in which hypothetical fee increases are randomly submitted to 
GPs. Empirical evidence from 1,400 French GPs supports the hypothesis of a 
negative slope for the GPs’ labor supply curve. Therefore, increasing the supply 
of physicians’ services through an increase in fees is not a feasible policy. 
Kleven (2009) wants to see if there have been any changes in the labor supply of 
hospital physicians after the implementation of the hospital reform in 2002. 
Several studies have shown that physicians spend less time on patient related 
work and that the productivity has decreased. 
The data material in this thesis is based on second handed data. Two surveys 
were conducted in 2001 and 2006 on randomly collected hospital physicians by 
the Physician register. The total respondents were 1131 physicians in 2001 and 
1298 physicians in 2006. 
Hospital physicians have decreased their total working time with approximately 
1 hour in 2006. This may be due to a shifting trend in the society where people 
are valuing more leisure, and less working time. While decreasing the total 
working time, the hospital physicians have increased their amount of patient 
related work by approximately 3 % (1 hour) in 2006. 
There have been modest changes in working time, with approximately 1 hour 
decrease in total working hours in 2006, and approximately 1 hour more on 
patient related work in the same year. 
It cannot be concluded that the hospital reform have had any effect on working 
hours and time allocation, but there are indications in the study that trends and 
tendencies towards more family life and leisure are influencing the labor supply 
among physicians. 
Clerc, L’Haridon, Paraponaris, Protopopescu and Ventelou (2010) present an 
adaptation of the labor supply model applied to the independent medical sector. 
First, the authors model simultaneous decisions on both the leisure time and the 
consultation length for two payment schemes that are fixed and unregulated 
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fees. The objective of this econometric study is to validate the theoretical 
prediction that doctors under unregulated-fees may make choices about the 
length of patient consultations independently of their personal leisure decision. 
Indeed, according to the empirical results, the bidirectional link between leisure 
choice and consultation length are verified with fixed fees but does not hold any 
longer under unregulated fees. These findings can be seen as a necessary but not 




4. Mobility of medical doctors 
 
  
Migration of highly skilled labor is an area of interest to policy makers all over 
the world. Historical records show that this phenomenon represents the concern 
of many countries and is subject to different interpretations, disputes and 
expressions of fear (Bhorat, Meyer, & Mlatsheni, 2002). International migration 
among skilled workers shows a trend of noticeable growth in last decades: 
globalization, economic growth and the explosive growth in information and 
communication technologies are some of the reasons suggested by Bhorat et al. 
(2002). In addition, data from OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) countries indicate that the medical doctors initially trained 
abroad make up a significant percentage of the medical doctors. Most them are 
(21%) in Australia, (23%) in Canada and (9%) in Finland. 
An  interesting  map  could  be  extracted  from  the  2009  Human  Development  
Report (HDR). It illustrates international migrants’ movements. The map shows 
important intra-regional movements within Europe, Asia and Africa; whereas 
this movement is less important in the Americas and Australia. It also highlights 
important migrants outflow from countries with medium to low human 
development index toward countries exhibiting high human development index. 
Incentives to migrate differ from an individual to another. Some migrate looking 
for better financial conditions; others seek higher standards of living, better 
education (visa and immigration services, 2011). These can be grouped into push 
and pull factors between the origin country and the country of destination. 
However, in the case of highly skilled labor, the salary gains are noticeable. Data 
from the 2009 HDR show the gaps in average professional salaries for selected 
country pairs for different specialties, namely engineers, physicians, nurses and 
professors. Physical doctors earn over 100 thousands US dollars in Canada per 
year compared to about 10 thousands per year in Zambia. Immigrant doctors 
from Ivory Costs to France can have up to 60 thousands US dollars of annual 
salary gain. 
Salary gains can be at the origin of remittances. In fact, as salary gains are 
considerable for skilled workers, part of the income tends to be expatriated to 
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worker’s home countries. In fact, data from the Human Development Report 
show flows from international remittances in the years 2006-2007. These data 
highlight the presence of intra-regional remittances especially at the level of Asia 
and Europe. In addition, remittances from North America totaled 30.1 billion US 
dollars toward Asia, 17.3 billion toward and 36.3 billion toward Latin and South 
America. Other income outflows happen between Europe, Africa and Asia. The 
2002 World Bank report highlights that countries in MENA region are among the 
most important countries to receive remittances. However, it is argued in the 
literature that remittances from skilled labor are relatively smaller as shown in 
Faini (2006), but also in Siddiqui and Chowdhury (2003). Skilled individuals are 
more likely to spend longer time periods in the host country and are more likely 
to bring their family members to the host country, as found in Faini (2006). 
Therefore, salary gains and possibility for remittances among other incentives 
that encourages doctors and other health care professionals to emigrate from 
their home countries to other places. Ryan (2011) has looked into the different 
push and pull factors leading to the emigration of medical doctors. The push 
factors include low salaries, job conditions, risks, and limited implementation of 
human rights. For the pull factors, they include economic reasons (better pay & 
improved socio-economic status), access to professional development 
opportunities, furthering of career, easy access to communication and 
technology, promise of better education for children, job security, and aggressive 
recruitment by other countries. 
Pull and push dynamics between developed and developing countries have 
historically generated disparities between stocks and flows of health care 
professionals in and between these countries. In fact, Mejia and Pizurki (1976) in 
their WHO study looked at the global flows of physicians and nurses and showed 
increased disparities between developed and developing countries. Existing data 
indicate the total stock of physicians and nurses in both classes of countries 
while distinguishing the inflows and outflows. The above study shows that 89% 
of total inflows of health care professionals migrants are into the developed 
countries; whereas, 56% of total outflows are from developing countries. In 
addition, the same authors argued that between, 1960 and 1970, about 16% out 
of the total stock of physicians were on the move, mostly migrating to the US and 
UK from countries like Ireland, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippine, Korea and Latin 
America. 
Despite the important migration among health professionals around the world, 
the flows are far from being free. There are direct and indirect costs that 
migrants face in the process of settling in their new destinations that can be 
considered as a barrier to migrate. In fact, Beine, Docquier, and Özden (2011) 
argue that migrants face significant legal barriers, social adjustment costs, 
financial burdens and many uncertainties while they are trying to live in their 
destination countries. The authors distinguished two main costs: assimilation 
costs that include time and effort needed for the migrant to adjust to new social 
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and cultural norms, in addition to the new linguistic and economic environment. 
“Policy” costs include all the legal entry barriers as well as the work 
requirements the migrant needs to deal with before arriving to destination 
(Beine, Docquier, & Özden, 2011). Some might argue that legal requirements 
might be less tough on skilled migrants, but they are still significant enough to 
hinder their free movement. 
Even when considering that immigration policies in receiving countries are tilted 
in favor of skilled migrants (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport 2003) compared to non 
skilled, the legal and professional requirements of the medical profession can be 
real barriers for the medical doctors to exercise in a developed country. The 
entry restrictions are justified in order to assure the quality of professional 
services as argued by Garoupa (2006). In Germany for example, it is very difficult 
for a foreign doctor (from non EU countries) to get a work permission to work 
with a German heath institution. Foreign doctors need to have a residence 
permit, working permit, and the license to practice medicine. This license can 
only be given if the doctor/applicant works with a preliminary permit between 
12 and 18 months in a hospital. In addition, doctors have to demonstrate 
sufficient knowledge of German language (German Medical Association, 2011). 
Therefore, despite the promising incentives of migrating to Germany, doctors 
face legal and professional constraints that make it extremely difficult if not 
impossible to be a practitioner in developed countries. 
Studies suggest that physicians move abroad for training purposes to seek out 
additional professional qualifications or to gain experience with innovative 
techniques in the medical field (Mejia & Pizurki, 1976). For Ryan (2011), medical 
doctors emigrate from developing countries to acquire skills that are available in 
more developed economies. According to this study, doctors initially leave as 
students, but after few years, they become established emigrants for different 
reasons. This creates a cycle where more skilled workers from the home country 
are disposed to join them (Ryan, 2011). 
Trade in higher education services has known a considerable growth in volume 
and value (Bashir, 2007). This trade is taking two main forms: students moving 
to universities abroad and foreign universities are providing higher education 
partnership with local institutions, through in country presence or virtual 
presence, as presented by the author. Statistics by World Bank show that 
between 1999 and 2004, Sub-Saharan African countries showed a strong 77.8 
percent increase, MENA and Eastern and Central European states had increases 
of 57.9 and 58.3 percent respectively, while both North and Latin America had a 
50 percent increase in students studying abroad (Bashir, 2007). Trade in 
education services combined with higher incentives and work opportunities can 
push international students to become recognized emigrants. In the UK for 
example, doctors who came to attend postgraduate training make up 37.3% of all 
physicians in National Health Service (NHS) in the year 2000. Migrating while 
being a student in a medical school the elimination of the professional 
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constraints foreign doctors are subject to in host countries. 
The elements discussed above among others, provide evidence about medical 
doctors’ emigration to different parts of the world. Following the increasing 
trend of this phenomenon, the concept of trade in health services emerged. In 
fact, Chanda (2004) pointed out that in OECD countries only, health care sector 
generates about 3 trillion US$ per year, and this amount is expected to raise in 
the following years as the demand for health care services increases (Bureau of 
labor statistics, 2010). The economic globalization in addition to the revolution 
in information technologies have urged and encouraged international trade in 
health services. Therefore, as any traded service, there are modes of service 
supply used in the estimation of trade in health services. Chanda (2004) has 
looked into these modes and summarized them as follows. Cross-border delivery 
of health services (Mode1) concerns the shipment of laboratory samples, 
diagnosis, clinical consultations and second opinions via traditional mail 
channels and electronic ones. The author argues that tele-health services are 
popular among countries, for example, Indian doctors provide tele-pathology 
services to hospitals in Bangladesh and Nepal whereas some hospitals in the US 
provide tele-diagnosis and consultation services to other hospitals in the Central 
America and Eastern Mediterranean (Chanda, 2004). 
The second mode of interest to trade in health services is medical tourism. This 
phenomenon occurs when people from developed nations travel to other 
countries around the world seeking medical treatments, due to the high costs of 
the same medical service in their own countries. Chanda (2004) argues that, in 
addition to the high costs of health care in countries like the US and UK, the 
convenience of international travel via air, the rapid advancement of medical 
technologies in less developed nations all around the world, the exotic and the 
fun experience of traveling abroad have all contributed to the growth in medical 
tourism. Herrick (2007) pointed out the main destinations for tourists seeking 
health services. He claimed that most Americans look for treatment in Latin and 
South American countries, namely Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. India and 
Thailand are popular destinations for serious medical procedures as they benefit 
from high tech facilities. Other popular destinations especially for Europeans 
include East and Central Europe, Singapore, and South Africa. 
Mode 4 concerns temporary movements of health care professionals. For Chanda 
(2004), this area of international trade is gaining importance in developing 
countries. This mode is about the outflow of qualified medical personnel from 
their home countries, usually seeking better living standards and carrier 
development opportunities in industrialized and rich countries. The author 
argues that this migration alleviate the shortage at the level of developed 
countries and benefits the source countries in terms of remittances. The 
movement is not limited to South/ North, but can occur within developed 
nations. For examples, given the shortage of medical doctors in Portugal and the 
high number of doctors in Spain, many Spanish doctors have moved to work in 
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Portugal (Garoupa, 2006). 
Facing migration and the global shortage in medical doctors, many countries 
have been reacting around the world to put in place global policies that will help 




5. The role of migration policies 
 
  
The related literature suggests that migration is not a free process since it 
involves many direct costs, indirect costs, social and legal barriers that migrants 
are exposed to while settling in the new destination. As migration engages 
human capital, it is of a great concern to policy makers. High skilled emigration 
benefits from special attention as it is believed to be bringing gains to the 
destination country while having important direct and induced negative effects 
in the country of origin. Beine, Docquier, and Özden (2011) confirm that there is 
evidence of policy effect on migration; although this effect is larger for unskilled 
labor and those originating from low income countries, it is still significant for 
skilled individuals. Bhargava, Jamison, Lau, and Murray (2001) argue that 
emigration of medical doctors deserves special attention from policy makers as it 
involves connections between population’s health and economic growth 
especially at the level of developing countries. 
In fact, Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan (2011) argue that the supply of medical 
doctors in developing countries is highly linked to the improvement of human 
development indicators. 
Stark and Fan (2001) found that when developing economies open up to 
migration of skilled workers, unemployment is exacerbated. Their study 
demonstrates that government policies with regard to employment affect 
policies to restrict or open up to skilled labor migration, medical doctors 
included. The reasons discussed above give strong arguments of the extent to 
which migration of medical doctors and critical and how it affects development, 
global heath, and unemployment. Policy makers around the world have raising 
concerns about this issue and strive to define a health system that alleviates the 
shortage while taking into consideration medical education as the supply 
mechanism of physicians. There is a prevalent need for alternative policies. 
Bourgain, Pieretti, and Zouand (2008) consider that substitution policies are 
strategies sometimes chosen for curtailing the shortage of health professionals 
especially caused by the outflow of medical personnel. 
In this regard, the EU is suggesting the new policy approach of “chosen 
migration”. As the EU is experiencing a clear economic need for high skilled 
immigrants, its members are embracing policies to promote job dependent 
migration (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2011). In other words, EU members are 
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allowing labor market to select immigrants according to its needs. 
Those authors argue that the selection is based on skills or education while 
giving preferences to immigrants with university degree or professional 
qualifications. On the other hand, those policy projects are still in their infancy 
phase. In fact, there is still ambiguity about immigration policies and how they 
are handled between the different member states. There is a lack of an effective 
and generalized immigration policy that allows for the alleviation of shortages 
and the mismatches between supply and demand of migrants. Therefore, in the 
case of medical doctors and taking into consideration the fact that shortages and 
migration seem to be irreversible facts; policymakers have to define an economic 
model that will allow for a win-win situation between the parties involved. The 
model has to capture the different incentives at all levels and get to a kind of 
balance between developed countries willing to overcome shortages and 




6. Mobility in relation to the brain drain and brain gain debate 
 
  
Brain drain in relation to emigration of already trained skilled labor or as 
potential candidate to be trained abroad with possibilities of not returning to the 
home country after graduation, has been considered for a long time as a major 
source of losses to the economy of origin. Major debates have been taking place 
on this issue and its related impacts. Most of the discussions that have been 
developed at the level of countries and at the level of regional and international 
organizations have been considering the emigration of skilled labor as a major 
engine for human capital flights in relation to the number of skilled emigrants 
leaving or not returning to their countries of origin. These discussions recognize 
the importance of skilled labor for an economy besides recognizing the negative 
impacts of their departure and non return. They also underline the likely massive 
flows of departures and non return, but later on the stocks of skills that are away 
from the economy of origin. While the emigration flows might be considered as 
having limited effects, countries may start wondering under massive 
accumulations of skilled labor abroad. 
Different publications, such that of George (2006), refer to the historical 
background of skilled migration. This author emphasizes the role of political 
unrests, wars and natural hazards besides policies that have also contributed to 
forced brain drain to other countries that offer more favourable conditions of 
life. This author cites the movements developed in 1930s, 1940s and even 
recently in some countries. He also refers to major destinations such as USA and 
UK. Different books and reports besides a large set of papers have been produced 
to underline the negative effects of brain drain. 
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Dugger (2005) considers that 'Brain drain' is damaging the poorest countries in 
Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. These are losing sometimes high 
portions of their college-educated workers to wealthy economies as shown in a 
World Bank study (World Bank, 2005). The findings are based on an extensive 
survey of census and other data from the 30 countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, which includes most of the world's 
richest countries. In contrast, less than 5 percent of the skilled nationals of the 
developing world, like India, China, Indonesia and Brazil, live abroad in an OECD 
country. These patterns suggest that an extensive flight of educated people is 
negatively affecting poorer countries, with the largest developing countries 
better able to have relatively smaller losses of talents. They can even benefit 
from them when they return or invest in their countries of origin. 
The book by Adams (2003), entitled "International Migration, Remittances & the 
Brain Drain," found that from a quarter to almost half of the college-educated 
nationals of poor countries like Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda and El 
Salvador live abroad in an OECD country - a fraction that rises to more than 80 
percent for Haiti and Jamaica. 
Another book by Schiff and Ozden (2005) looked at different aspects of 
international migration with its enormous economic, social and cultural 
implications in both origin and destination countries. This book examines also 
the determinants of migration, the impact of remittances and migration on 
poverty, welfare, and investment decisions, and the consequences of brain drain, 
brain gain, and brain waste. 
Jun (2010), in his article about attracting talent from abroad, considers that these 
are the fiercest of times in the competition for talent. China has issued a Medium 
and Long terms Talent Development Plan (2010-2020) in response to the rapid 
economic growth and the large needs for skilled labor. The number of Chinese 
returning from overseas has been growing in relations to the series of incentives 
provided. The author insists also on the great changes that have taken place in 
the global economic. The high competition among countries and that has shifted 
toward emerging strategic industries and a talented person is recognized by the 




7. Mobility of medical doctors and brain drain in healthcare 
 
  
Torres and Wittchen (2010) consider that healthcare is generally under-
provided in developing economies and its accessibility also tends to be biased 
towards urban and relatively privileged patients. Several authors have been 
addressing the issues related to the deficits of medical doctors in developing 
economies. 
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Chen and Boufford (2005) insist on the detrimental nature of the movement of 
physicians from poor to rich countries. To the authors, the existing statistics do 
clearly address the extent of this problem for series of countries. They refer to 
Mullan (2005) who emphasizes that 25 percent of U.S. physicians are 
international medical graduates, with higher figures for the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia. 
Apart from the economic losses (investment in education of doctors and nurses, 
their service and tax collection from their incomes), Kirigia, Gbary, Muthuri, 
Nyoni and Seddoh (2006) identified other losses of a social and moral nature. 
This loss of role models and guardians of human rights occurs particularly in 
rural areas. 
Hooper (2008) refers to the reports by the United Nations and the World Health 
Organization to emphasize that the brain drain of healthcare professionals from 
the developing to the developed world is decimating the provision of healthcare 
in poor countries. The migration of these key workers is driven by a combination 
of economic conditions and the policies pursued in the rich world. The author 
assesses the impact of the healthcare brain drain and argues that wealthy 
countries have a moral obligation to reduce the flow of healthcare workers from 
the developing to the developed world. 
Mills, Schabas, Volmink, Walker, Ford, Katabira, Anema, Joffresg, Cahn, and 
Montaner (2008) introduce statistics showing the shortages of healthcare staff in 
sub-Saharan Africa. They find on average that one physician serves 8,000 people. 
According to Clemens (2009), the level of medical care provided by doctors in 
Africa depends on a vast array of factors. 
Other publications have looked at the links between development issues and 
migration of medical doctors. Moullan (2009) analyses the impact of foreign 
health aid on the emigration rates of physicians using a panel data to investigate 
the emigration of physicians from 192 source countries to 17 destination 
countries between 1995 and 2004. Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan (2011) 
analyze the effects of physician emigration on human development indicators in 
developing countries for the period 1991-2004. They find that reducing medical 
brain drain may likely only induce small benefits for child mortality and 
vaccination rates as they are other variables that affect the attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goals. But a large number of publications insist that 
medicine has a strong tradition of international collaboration, with high mobility 
of medical doctors moving around the globe to gain further training and different 
clinical experiences. Some authors such as Johnson (2005) said that “We gain in 
the North, but developing countries lose out by losing their doctors 














The above survey of literature shows that the needs for medical doctors have 
been increasing through time and countries under the effects of the changes 
occurring in health technologies and the increasing demand for health care. The 
implied shortages have been growing while accounting for new niches related to 
the expression of the demand for health and improvements in the welfare of the 
populations. The shortage of medical doctors could be also related to the nature 
of the labor supply curve that may not respond positively to new incentives. 
These needs and processes have been leading to the acceleration of the 
migration of physicians to economies where higher expected benefits and better 
working conditions. Developing countries appear to be mainly sources of this 
migration but developed economies have been also concerned.  
The overall picture that has been developed by different researchers is that 
brain-drain is the consequence of the on-going trend of migration. This has had 
implications on both international and national debates and policies. Series of 
contributions in different disciplines related to social sciences have been 
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Medical Brain Drain from Maghreb to Northern Countries: for a new social 
dialogue? 
 
Mohamed Saib Musette, Hocine Abdellaoui, Ahcène Zehnati* 
 




Migrant seems to be a threat for the security of many European countries. However, there is a 
global war to attract the most talented migrants, particularly for health care. Skilled migration 
from the Maghreb countries has become a hot issue since the beginning of this millennium.  
Combining different recent datasets, this paper reveals two key profiles of migrants with high 
level of education: engineers and medical doctors. 
The results indicate a high rate "medical brain drain" from the Maghreb countries and a low 
educational progress of migrants in France. The authors also reveal the profiles of specialists. 
Algeria registers a higher rate than its neighbours in three fields: psychiatrists, ophthalmologists 
and radiologists. The expenses for medical training are very heavy: this drain is a "deadweight 
loss" for the benefit of advanced economies without any compensation. Finally, the authors 
suggest the opening of a new social dialogue across the Mediterranean shores, enlarged to Sub-
Saharan Countries. 
 







This analysis of the brain drain is quite different from more classical studies 
based on the push-pull theory. This is not so much an analysis of the low 
retention capacity of countries of the South; rather, it calls for the adoption of an 
active attractive policy of scientific migration.  
This paper is structured on three levels. First, an overview of migration from 
Maghreb shows the current trend of scientific migration. Secondly, a thorough 
analysis of Maghrebian skills, particularly in France where there is a high 
concentration of Maghrebian migrants, with an empirical evaluation of the "brain 
drain" rate involving particularly physicians migrating to France. In the third 
section, the authors suggest to open a new social dialogue with a multi-faceted 
view on migrant’s integration. 
Finally, some proposals are put forward for a dialogue for a 3-Win policy and for 
a real strategy for skills mobility hitherto exclusively practiced among the 
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Northern countries. The dream of a transition from brain drain to brain 
circulation in the Mediterranean is also shared by Maghreb analysts, but the 
means of achieving it are different. 
These results come timely in the climate of deep fear surrounding the “crisis 
migration” not only in Europe but also in the USA, where migrants are seen more 
as “devils” than “angels”. Global talents like medical practitioners, but also 
engineers and artists from third world countries, are in fact a “blessing” for 
Northern countries which lack high-end skills to sustain their growth rate and 
the wellbeing of their aging societies. 
 
 
2. Overview of migration from Maghreb countries 
 
 
The issue of "brain drain" is not new in the literature on international migration. 
Indeed, there is a rich literature on this phenomenon. There is also a need to 
update the scientific views of brain drain in the era of globalization. 
What do we know about this phenomenon? Some answers are sufficient to point 
out the need for renewal. A synthetic review of the literature has been produced 
by Gaillard & Meyer (1996) focused on the evolution of the perception of the 
"brain drain" phenomenon. Some years later, the World Bank analysts (Bollard et 
al, 2011) also revisited the links between brain drain and remittances. 
The transnationalism theory nevertheless insists that the Diaspora should not be 
addressed only from the point of view of remittances. Peggy Levitt (2006) argues 
that the relationships between migration and development are not only financial 
but must also include social remittances. 
Among developing countries the phenomenon was raised by the African Union, 
particularly in the NEPAD program. At the country level of the Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA), some thoughts have been advanced by researchers (Bouklia, 2010) 
without however developing a synthesis of the Maghreb countries. 
Our approach builds on the progress made in the study and knowledge of the 
phenomenon. It also brings a new vision. It considers scientific migration as a 
potential resource which can be mobilized in order to contribute to the 
economic, technological, scientific and social development of the country. 
Drawing on a strategy designed for migrant remittances, this "resource" is not 
exclusively material but it is also immaterial (Musette, 2011). 
Central Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) registered just over 
80 million population in 2015, more than double the 27 million in 1960 
(UNDESA, 2015). These countries are also known to be emigration countries 
particularly since their independence in the 1960s. It must also be recalled that 
they have long been a land of immigration from Northern countries, particularly 
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from colonial France. 
By now there is a stock of 5 million migrants abroad - nearly 90% in Europe 
according to the same UN data - representing 6.2% of Maghreb population. The 
quantity of North African highly educated migrants is estimated at around 
800.000 in OECD countries, an average rate of 20% in 2010 against 10% in 1990 
(OECD, 2014). The rate has doubled over the last two decades. It should be noted 
that Maghrebian migrants are not located exclusively in OECD countries. 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Growth rate of Maghrebian Highly-Educated Migration to OECD countries from 
1990 to 2010 
 
 
DZA: People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on OECD data 
 
 
These data show that the growth rate is different for the three countries. Algeria 
registered a higher growth from a rate of 5% in 1990 to 21% in 2010, four times 
higher than Tunisia (2) and Morocco (1.5). This raises a few questions. Does this 
growth mean brain drain, as put forward by OECD analyst? An in-depth analysis 
is necessary to distinguish non migrants from migrants. Moreover, measuring 
the brain drain rate requires to differentiate people who have been trained in the 
country of origin from those having graduated in host countries.  
Maghreb high skills migrants (over 25 years old) in France are estimated at 
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Tab. 1 - Distribution of Maghrebian High Skills Migrants in France by countries of origin 
Graduation MAR DZA TUN TOTAL 
High level graduate 87.294 95.630 26.782 209.706 
Of which medical doctors 5.106 17.658 5.106 27.870 
Of which BA level 4.961 21.034 4.961 30.956 
Of which engineers 6.787 14.115 6.787 27.689 
Bachelors 52.407 44.255 17.325 113.987 
Of which technicians  8.891 17.762 8.891 35.544 
Total High Skills 139.702 139.885 44.107 323.694 
Employed Migrants (25-64 years old) 640.046 453.395 230.402 1.323.843 
High Skills Migration Rate (%) 21,8 30,9 19,1 24,5 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on INSEE - LFS 2012 data - France 
 
 
These data show a number of details so far little known. Let’s focus particularly 
on engineers and doctors. The supply of these two profiles is almost the same as 
a whole. Algeria is still the exception, originating three times as many doctors 
and twice as many engineers than the two neighboring countries. If the 
phenomenon of North African engineers is fairly well-known, the second profile, 
that of doctors, is quite unknown. What are the profiles of the doctors? Are all 
Maghrebian doctors migrants? Have they have been trained in the countries of 
origin? These data do not consider “citizenship” as a criterion and include also 
nationals, whatever their date of departure from the Maghreb countries. From a 
historical outlook these data can be questioned. However, the Human 
Development Report (CNES, 2015:27) shows that 73.3% of doctors from Algeria 
have graduated in the home country, while the rate is only 3.8% for Tunisians 




3. The medical brain drain from Maghreb countries 
 
The medical brain drain (MBD) phenomenon is not exclusively Maghrebian. It 
affects many countries in the world: Caribbean and Pacific islands, Ireland and 
sub-Saharan African countries register the highest emigration rate of doctors. 
The economic size of island countries and their limited absorption capacities 
largely explain the high emigration of doctors from these regions. These high 
emigration rates can be explained by other factors too: The official language of 
these countries is English; their geographical proximity to the United States, to 
Europe or even to the Arab Gulf countries, which represent a large area of 
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physician recruitment (Moullan and Bourgueil 2014).  
The Sub-Saharan African countries (South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria in particular) 
are severely affected by the MBD penalizing their weak health systems. They 
have the lowest medical densities in the world. Half their doctors have emigrated 
during the period of the structural adjustment policies. A study of Bhargava and 
Docquier (2008) shows that the medical emigration rate in Sub-Saharan African 
countries has increased significantly between 1990 and 2004. This has 
contributed to the weakening of the health systems of these countries in the face 
of major pandemics. WHO data show that about 57 countries are suffering from 
an acute shortage of doctors, and 36 of them are in Sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 
2006).  
At the Maghreb level, the medical density in Tunisia is similar to that registered 
in Algeria. Morocco registers a lower density. Overall, the medical density in the 
Maghreb countries has improved significantly over the last three decades, even 
though regional differences persist. The pace of physician training is much 
higher in Algeria than in Tunisia and Morocco. This latter shows a deficit of 
doctors to meet the needs of its population. The WHO classified Morocco, among 
the 57 countries worldwide, as a country with acute shortage of medical staff. 
Aware of this situation, Morocco has launched a training program to improve the 
rate of medical density by 2020.  
Despite their need for medical staff, the Maghreb countries seem to face to the 
MBD phenomenon. They lose each year many doctors who prefer to go abroad, 
mainly to France and Canada.  
To quantify this phenomenon, we have used and crossed multiple data sources: 
those of the Health Ministries of the three Maghreb countries, the employment 
survey conducted by INSEE (2012) and data from the Council of the Medical 
Association (CNOM, France). 
 
 
Tab. 2 - Global Medical Brain Drain rate in the Maghreb (country of birth) 
 Employment Status of Physicians Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Doctors born in the Maghreb, settled in France 
 (INSEE Survey,2012) 14.847 6.230 3.846 
Active physicians workforce in native country 
(Countries Data) 48.184 19.770 13.640 
MBD rate 24% 24% 22% 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on data from MSPRH, MSM, MST, CNOM and INSEE 
 
 
The average emigration rate is 23% in 2012 for the whole Maghreb.  
This rate takes into account all the doctors born in North Africa, whatever their 
Musette, Abdellaoui, Zehnati 





place of training (France and Maghreb countries) and practicing as a doctor in 
France. The emigration rate is even more important if we include all doctors 
established in France and engaged in the medical or other sector: it reached 
almost 30%. Like other developing countries or Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb 
countries are experiencing a remarkable MBD phenomenon. The rates in these 
countries are not far from those registered by sub-Saharan African countries: 
Ghana and South Africa show 38% and 24% rates, according to data provided by 
Bhargava et al. (Bhargava, Docquier, Moullan 2011). 
The majority of North African doctors migrate to France for historical, cultural, 
geographical reasons and because of a training system inspired by the French 
model and the existence of inter-university agreements. The number of North 
African doctors registered in the French Physicians Order (TOM) was 16.821 in 
20141. Almost 92% of doctors held a regular job. 
 
 
Tab. 3 - Medical workforce according to the type of activity 
  Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Temporary  274 159 73 
Substitute 484 250 169 
Regular activity 9.561 4.598 2.662 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from CNOM, 2014. 
 
 
The recent survey of CNOM (Le Breton-Lerouvillois 2014) indicates that the 
number of doctors born outside the European Union and working in France rose 
by 10.4% between 2007 and 2014 and will very likely continue to grow in 2020. 
More than one out of two doctors born outside the EU was born in a Maghreb 
country. The specialties are differently affected by MBD. The following figures 




                                                          
1 Not all practicing doctors in France enrolled in TOM. The number of practicing physicians is 
therefore higher. 
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Fig. 2 - Brain Drain Rate of medical specialists born and trained in Maghreb countries and 
migrated to France (%) 
 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on data from CNOM, 2014. 
 
 
This figures show the emigration rate of doctors born and trained exclusively in 
the Maghreb. Psychiatry remains the specialty registering the highest migration 
rate: 30%, 19% and 12% respectively for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. North 
Africans represent in total 63.9% of psychiatrists trained outside the EU and 
working in France, and Algeria topped the list with 41%. Anaesthesiology comes 
second with an emigration rate of 24%, 23% and 13% respectively for Tunisia, 
Morocco and Algeria. Half of Maghreb anesthesiologists practicing in France have 
graduated in their origin country. Radiology is in third position with 16% coming 
from Algeria, 10% from both Morocco and Tunisia. Almost 50% of Algerian 
radiologists graduated in their native country. One third of Moroccan 
radiologists established in France have graduated in their native country. Finally, 
25% of Tunisian radiologists arrived with their diplomas in France. 
Ophthalmology ranks fourth with an emigration rate of 13% for Algeria, 4% for 
Morocco and 3% for Tunisia. 37% of Algerian ophthalmologists established in 
France have been trained in Algeria, 12% in Morocco and 13% in Tunisia. 
Obstetrics and gynecology shows a brain drain rate of 6% for Morocco, 3% for 
both Algeria and Tunisia. The percentage of North African gynecologists 
established in France who obtained their degree in their home country is 41.4% 
for Algeria, 57.5% for Morocco and 45.8% for Tunisia. 41%, 23% and 6.5% of 
gynecologists have been trained respectively in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
General surgery shows the lowest rate at 4%, 3% and 1% respectively for 
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Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.  
These data show that the specialties are not affected to the same extent by the 
MBD phenomenon. This craze for emigration matches with health personnel 
needs in host countries that will register a significant growth in coming years. In 
the absence of qualitative surveys, it is difficult to identify the rationales of the 
MBD. The reasons are certainly multifaceted. In a recent research conducted in 
the Algerian context (Zehnati, 2016), we tried to check whether the public sector 
doctors were underpaid. Our results show that doctors (regardless of their 
grades) are relatively better paid than the rest of the socio-professional 
categories. Thus, the MBD is not related to financial constraint. New tracks are to 
be explored together within a broader social dialogue. 
Our results suggest that a decrease of remittances is to be expected in the long 
run. It is related to the continuing brain drain. How to avoid the end of the 
transfers and how to turn the brain drain into brain circulation? 
First, it is necessary to reconsider the theories according to which countries of 
origin do benefit from a deal in with the losses caused by the departure of skills 
are compensated by migrants’ remittances.   
Then new actions need to be taken at the level of the Maghreb countries, 
although these countries are relatively better endowed with human resources 
than the rest of Africa, with a few exceptions. 
The theory of remittances as compensation from abroad was reversed for the 
Maghreb countries already some years ago by the MIREM (2007) study. High 
skilled workers contribute far less to remittances than those who are less skilled. 
However, intangible gains are possible but cannot be measured and weighted. 
Further detailed analyses are needed on remittances to reduce informal flows. 
The thesis of the "brain gain", inspired by the human capital theory, is quite 
attractive for the Maghreb countries, with some nuances. The human capital gain 
proceeds from a migration desire of new generations who strive to acquire 
"exportable" skills. The negative image created by the failure of high skills 
because their diplomas cannot be validated needs a new dialogue with Northern 
countries.  
The classical sociological vision of migration as a social success needs also to be 
revised. Migration is expected to represent a mechanism for social mobility, but 
often such is not the case, as doctors who are not allowed to practice overseas 
become taxi drivers. Qualitative studies are needed on the image of qualified 
North African migrants abroad. The renewal of the European Blue Card in 2015 
could shed more light on the quality of new Maghreb skills, as these countries 
have recently adopted the LMD system.  
The theory of the role of intellectual Diaspora networks should be an asset for 
Maghreb authorities. Its potential is confirmed by studies conducted in Algeria 
and Morocco, despite the lack of very detailed data (due to the advent of new 
communication technologies, more precise big data set would be necessary for a 
correct analysis and monitoring). Continuous observation of network activities 
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should first distinguish the demographic data (birth and death), the legal aspects 
of different actions implemented and then assess eventual forms of 




4. New Social Dialogue towards the integration process 
  
The integration of the Euro-Med countries by means of international migration is 
rooted in the political, economic, social and cultural context. The concept of 
integration has taken on new dimensions since the beginning of the new 
Millennium. Today we witness an accelerated process of globalization and the 
intensification of geopolitical conflicts around the Mediterranean. Globalization 
requires strong economic ties for the prosperity of the countries of the region. 
The intensification of geopolitical conflicts tends to the dissolution of societal, if 
not civilizational links, with risks of violence endangering the security and 
stability of all countries of the two shores of the Mediterranean. 
The current context calls for a revision, if not a break with past visions of 
integration, laying new foundations for social dialogue aimed at the prosperity of 
countries of both shores. This social dialogue requires, in turn, taking into 
account the dimensions of the environment. Regional and international 
organizations will continue to push with all their weight towards the desired 
integration. It is in this sense that the integration of peoples on both sides should 
be revisited through North-South but also South-South Societal Dialogue. 
Integration through international migration is not new in literature. The 
European Union has set up an observatory for the integration of migrants, with a 
set of indicators aimed at assessing and monitoring the strategies of EU member 
states. This observatory is backed by the border security system (FRONTEX) and 
a large-scale information system. 
Similarly, the EU has funded a series of studies and programs (I-MAP, EUROMED 
migration ...) in the region. It should also be remembered that migration was an 
early subject of consultation in the region (such as the 5 + 5 Group, the Barcelona 
Process, UPM Initiative Rabat) and recently the Europe-Africa Valletta Summit 
(2015). Despite these efforts, the Mediterranean has become a "graveyard" of 
migrants and refugees, with increasing numbers. On the one hand, fear is settled 
in several countries of Europe, fueled by sensational press which demonizes 
migrants. On the other hand, all demographic indicators confirm the need for 
immigration in order to maintain the level of economic growth and "wellbeing" 
of European countries. 
Several questions arise from these remarks: How can we revisit integration 
through international migration in the light of new realities? Is economic 
integration a prelude to shared prosperity? By reducing economic inequality, can 
we bring on a growth of "wellbeing" for all peoples of the Mediterranean? 
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Integration, in the Durkheim sense of "living together", is compatible with the 
plurality of models of migration governance? Can integration - often opposed to 
assimilation - lead to interculturalism? 
Three tracks are suggested to initiate a renewal of a social dialogue between the 
two shores of the Mediterranean on integration through migration. 
 
 
 (i) Relationships between migration and development 
 
Despite the restrictions imposed on both sides of the Mediterranean, the 
migration flow cannot be interrupted. The movement patterns (regular, 
irregular, mixed ...) will continue. Prospective studies should be constantly 
updated in both the North and the South, especially as far as the needs of the 
international labor market are concerned, which currently operates without 
rules or ethical basis. If for the mobility of skilled people head hunters are 
engaged in a war for talent, for the less skilled the informal economy without 
borders exploits a workforce made vulnerable by the illegal working conditions 
which are often imposed on them. Studies undertaken on remittances indicate 
that migrant remittances will be decreasing in the long run. Moreover, initiatives 
are undertaken through the networks of the North African Diaspora for 
investments in the countries of origin. 
 
 
 (ii) Harmonization of the models of governance of migration flows from 
Maghreb 
 
Migratory movements are powered by population displacement caused by 
cyclical crises created by geostrategic issues in the Mediterranean region, both in 
the Sahel and the Middle East. The investments made by countries to secure their 
borders with the construction of "walls" are heavy and unsustainable in the 
medium and long term. The costs of humanitarian protection of forcibly 
displaced people require a strong contribution of the civil society that could 
dwindle over time. Other forms of "migration crisis" are expected as climate 
changes affects the countries of the region. The different Maghreb countries have 
undertaken a review of their migration management strategies while excluding 
to serve as a tool of European externalization of migration control policies.  
 
 
 (iii) Building bridges between the shores: Mediterranean as an area of 
wellbeing 
 
Migratory movements, considered in their two dimensions (economic and 
political), call for a new social vision for the peaceful coexistence of peoples on 
Musette, Abdellaoui, Zehnati 





the two shores of the Mediterranean. A perspective grounded on 
interculturalism is a wealth of the Mediterranean: the market for global talent 
(medical practitioners, engineers, artists, sportsmen ...) deserves greater 
visibility to build social dialogue in this region. Transnational migration, and the 
correlated assets and capabilities embedded in binational individuals, can be the 
bridge between the two shores. 
Around these three dimensions, a new outlook on integration through migration 
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Essentializing Difference. Text, knowledge and ritual performance in a Sufi 








The paper explores the different and competing understandings of ‘proper Islamic praxis’ 
between Egyptian Muslim immigrants and Italians converts to Islam within the Italian branch of 
an Egyptian-Sudanese Sufi brotherhood, in Rome.  
The Italian brethren foreground intellectual engagement with texts and scriptures over ritual 
performance and the role of the body, elements to which immigrants instead give prominence. I 
suggest that such polarization and the reasons of its persistence may be best understood by 
focusing on the performative role of cultural essentialisms against immigrants and of stereotypes 
concerning the definition of ‘orthodox’ Islam circulating in Italy and beyond. Whereas these 
prosaic essentialisms and binaries do not actually map socio-cultural realities, they are on their 
turn performative: essentialised discourses orient everyday praxis, make sense of experience and 
support forms of empowerment and of domination within the brotherhood. 
 







In March 2004, the Italian converts to the Tariqa Burhaniya, a Sufi brotherhood 
of Egyptian-Sudanese origin2, read an article I had written about my research, 
carried out for my master thesis, on the Italian branches of the Tariqa (Abenante 
2004).  My text sparked off an animated discussion among the Burhani disciples 
attending the zāwiya (lodge) in Rome, led by Abdel Ghafour, – an aged 
intellectual man belonging to the high Italian bourgeoisie who had encountered 
Islam some twenty years earlier through a group of intellectuals and academics 
devoted to the study of mystical texts. According to Abdel Ghafour, I had placed 
                                                          
1 in I. Weinrich (2016). 
 
2 Founded in the middle of the 20th century by Shaykh Muḥammad ʿUthmān ʿAbduh al-Burhānī 
[henceforth Shaykh Mohammed Uthman] in Atbara, Sudan, the Tariqa Burhaniya [arab. al-Ṭarīqa al-
Burhāniyya] spread rapidly from Sudan to Cairo during the 1960s, achieving great success among the 
middle classes and a certain visibility among foreigners. In the 1980s the Burhaniya concentrated its 
efforts on its European branches that had been thriving since the 1970s, especially in Germany. See 







far too much stress on the role of bodily practice and ritual performance on the 
journey of mystical progression, thereby devaluing the intellectual and spiritual 
engagement required by the Sufi path. I went through an informal trial that 
finally judged me guilty of misunderstanding the real core of Sufism. The Italians 
decided to further submit my case to an expert, namely to Safwat, ‘the’ 
international Burhani teacher, so that my presence in the Tariqa could be 
reconsidered. I met Safwat on ‘hostile’ territory, Abdel-Ghafour’s living room, 
one spring afternoon in Rome. To my great, and Abdel-Ghafour’s even greater, 
surprise, Safwat praised my insight. The body and the performance of rituals had 
an indispensable role within the Burhani spiritual journey, he maintained. His 
verdict was that the European converts, and especially the Italians, were overly 
influenced by their study of Islam and by their previous Catholic education, to 
the point that they did not acknowledge the importance of the body on their 
spiritual journey and the material efficacy of Burhani ritual performances, be it 
the ḥaḍra (the weekly collective ritual), the awrād recitation (the individual 
litanies), or the singing of qaṣāʾid (the odes written by Shaykh Uthman, the 
founder).  
 
I was thus reintroduced into the community. However, following this episode, 
my presence was looked upon with some suspicion. Safwat’s decision continued 
to generate gossip and some dissatisfaction among the converts for some time. 
His decision, together with my article circulating among the milieus of Italian 
Islam, was held responsible for stoking the reformists’ fire against Sufism by 





This episode familiarized me with a tension present within the Burhaniya 
concerning the proper way of practising Sufism, informed by an alleged 
opposition between intellectual engagement with the scriptures and the bodily 
performance of ritual. This opposition was framed by my interlocutors in terms 
of the Sufi/anti-Sufi debate, a prominent and enduring issue among Muslims, 
that has gained momentum with the rise of Islamic reformism and according to 
which Sufi ritual life is coupled with backward practices and set against an 
allegedly ‘orthodox’ scriptural Islam (De Jong and Radtke 1999; Sirriyeh 1999).  
As scholars have noted, Sufism and Islamic reformism are not opposed realities, 
and many studies have described how reformist ideas and practices, scripturalist 
tendencies, as well as popular ecstatic rituals, charismatic leadership and 
supererogatory ritual praxis are all elements that belong to both Sufi and non-
Sufi movements. By the same token, in Islam as in many other religious settings, 
reading and performance, the work of the intellect and that of the body, are not 







contains Revelation both in the semantic dimension of the words and in the 
sound of its performance. Iqraʾ, “read out loud”, is the imperative given to the 
Muslim who is invited to vocalize the prescription of the Qur’an in order to both 
apprehend the manifest meaning conveyed by the propositionality of language – 
the ẓāhir in Sufi vocabulary – and perform its inner, symbolic meaning – the 
bāṭin –, conveyed by the sound of the Arabic letters (Nelson 2001).   
 
From an analytical point of view, scholars of Islam, anthropologists and linguists, 
beyond confuting the existence of a concrete doctrinal and socio-cultural 
distinction between Sufis and non-Sufis, rightly insist on breaking down the 
binary between the semantic/propositional and the embodied/material 
dimensions of language, showing how words (and texts) call into play the human 
being as a whole, his/her moral physiology, and how the embodied and 
emotional dimensions are one with reason and reflection (Csordas 1997, 
Hirschkind 2006, Hodgson 1974, Metcalf 1993, Weinrich 2009).  Whereas I agree 
with the analytical importance of this insight, at the same time I also  stress the 
importance of acknowledging the fact that people actually, if more or less 
consciously, employ these binaries in making sense of their way of living Islam.  
As ethnographers, we should not overlook people’s prosaic use of essentialisms 
and oppositions. On the contrary, we should make them the object of 
ethnographic analysis, as I set out to do in this paper3.   
  
By looking at the dynamics of the polarization between text/ritual, 
reading/performing, intellect/body within the Italian branch of an Egyptian-
Sudanese Sufi brotherhood, I suggest that such a polarization, together with the 
reasons for its persistence, may be understood through the ways in which it 
blends and overlaps with other discourses  and dynamics of Islam in Europe, 
particularly in Italy, and the work these discourses4 do in the practice of Islam 
and in people’s lives. 
  
                                                          
3 I use ethnographic analysis in the sense employed by Pnina Werbner (Werbner 1997) and Bruno 
Riccio (Ricco 2004). 
4 By 'discourse', I mean a group of statements which provide a language for talking and thinking about 











The Tariqa Burhaniya arrived in Italy more or less 40 years ago, brought by an 
Egyptian migrant and murshid (spiritual master), Jalal, who had moved to Rome 
with his wife in search of a job. Until 1984 the disciples of the Italian branch were 
very few, in the number of two or three immigrants. They met for the weekly 
ḥaḍra in a specific mosque on the outskirts of Rome, on piazza Pitagora.  
 
The first Italian to approach the brotherhood was a man, Matteo Abdel Haq, a 
secondary school philosophy teacher, with an academic background in 
philosophy and history of religion. Some years before meeting Jalal, in 1980 to be 
precise, Matteo had converted to Islam under the guidance of his academic 
friends. He recounted his experience as follows:  
 
My path towards Islam has been very long and complicated. I have always been 
interested in the mysteries of the world, in the search of truth, beauty and wisdom. 
Following my BA in philosophy I continued my studies but with much 
dissatisfaction, so I started studying, all alone, Christianity, its history... I embarked 
upon the path and I spoke with a number of monks, I visited many monasteries, 
even in Greece. After that came my interest in Hinduism – it was fashionable then 
in the sixties – and I practised yoga... but also this path was not satisfying for me. 
Concerning Islam... well I had avoided it altogether because I had many 
prejudices... when I discovered that an ‘inner’ Islam existed beyond ‘exterior’ Islam 
I understood that it was possible, also for Westerners, to become Muslims. I had 
some friends from university who knew a lot about Islam because of their studies, 
and had already converted to Islam. I asked them to help me to approach it and 
they introduced me to the study of the religion5.  
 
It was at this moment that Abdel Haq met, by chance, Jalal, in the mosque on 
piazza Pitagora where he used to pray, and had been fascinated by the practice of 
the ḥaḍra ritual.  
 
Soon after, in the mid-eighties, three other Italians joined this pioneering group: 
Abdel Ghafour, Abdel Rahim and Leila. Before encountering the Burhaniya they 
had tried out several other Sufi brotherhoods. Abdel Ghafour and Abdel Rahim, 
just like Abdel Haq, had converted to Islam through their studies, having read 
much about Islam and Sufi spirituality. Abdel Rahim’s wife Leila had followed 
him on his Sufi tours from brotherhood to brotherhood until they both stopped 
and became affiliated with the Burhaniya in 1986. After their divorce, Leila 
stayed in the Burhaniya, while Abdel Rahim changed brotherhood once again.  
 
                                                          







Starting from the above four cases of conversion, we can draw the contours of 
the first generation of Italian Burhanis and gather the threads of their 
representation of Islam and the expectations they linked to the practice of 
Sufism. Abdel Haq, Abdel Ghafour, Abdel Rahim and Leila had all joined the 
brotherhood at the beginning of the 1980s, their journey towards Islam 
burgeoning from their academic studies or from their intellectual engagement 
with Islamic texts. The intellectual and the spiritual discovery of Islam 
overlapped, following a pattern of conversion common to a broad generation of 
Italian (and more generally European) converts to Sufism (Allievi 1999, Allievi 
1999b, Marchi 1999).  Indeed, many of these converts, including the first Italian 
Burhani constituency, accessed Islam through the door of Traditionalism 
(Sedgwick 2004, Sedgwick 2004b, Marchi 1999), a syncretic philosophy 
postulating the loss of a spiritual tradition in the West and the necessity of 
seeking it in an allegedly spiritually superior Orient. In this sense, the converts’ 
intellectual approach to Islam is associated with a quest for ‘Oriental 
philosophies’ and with a fascination for Oriental meditation practices and exotic 
styles of life6.   
 
On the basis of its first constituency, the Italian branch of the Burhaniya could be 
classified as belonging to an elitist group of brotherhoods spread across Italy and 
mainly composed of converts coming from a university education background 
and equipped with an intellectual knowledge of Islam7. Within these 
brotherhoods the study of Islamic and mystical treaties is given primacy over 
ritual practice and the converts enjoy a sense of distinction because of their 
knowledgeable approach to Islam, their leaning towards spiritual matters and 
their neglect of worldly religious engagements. Such an approach to Islam is 
considered more adaptable to Italian society than the approach proposed by 
other brotherhoods and Sunni movements, the latter two often being criticized 





                                                          
6 Traditionalism was a loose movement of people in Europe between the 1920s and 1960s, without 
formal structure, connected by a common debt to the work of René Guénon. Guénon (1886-1951) 
was a French author and intellectual working and writing on Eastern metaphysical doctrines 
considered to have a universal character and to be the last heirs of spirituality in the modern world. 
Having converted to Islam during his youth, he saw in Sufism the best route towards universal 
spirituality. A number of European intellectuals were inspired by his writings and example; in some 
cases European branches of Sufi brotherhoods were based on his teachings. See Mark Sedgwick 
(Sedgwich 2004b). 
7 On the Italian panorama of Sufi brotherhoods see in particular Fabrizio Speziale (Speziale 2000), 







3. Burhaniya in 2002: beyond traditionalism 
 
  
By the time I started my fieldwork in 2002, the Italian branch owned an 
apartment of roughly 50 square metres in the north of Rome, in Valle Aurelia. 
Approaching the location, the repetition of the awrād and the singing of the 
qaṣāʾid could be heard from the street and upon entering the apartment the 
visitor was met with the intense smell of Sudanese bakhūr (incense) and the 
kindness of the disciples. A pair of curtains was drawn, roughly dividing the one-
room apartment into two spaces on the occasion of the ḥaḍra, the weekly 
collective ritual, for men and women to sit apart. The walls were decorated with 
photos of Medina and Mecca and several other photos of the maqām (tomb) of 
Mohammed Uthman, the founder himself, and of his son and grandson, and of all 
Shaykhs of the Tariqa. A green moquette covered the floor and at the far end of 
the room stood a small console, holding a Qur’an, that functioned as miḥrāb, 
pointing in the direction of Mecca. On the right of the entrance stood a closet, 
containing the Burhani rosary, Italian translations of books on Sufism and 
spirituality by René Guénon, Titus Burckhardt and other Traditionalists (Nelson 
2001), the awrād booklets and several copies of the Baṭāʾin	al-asrār (The Hidden 
Secrets), that is, the book containing the collected qaṣāʾid of the founder.  
 
In 2002 the branch in Rome counted approximately 30 disciples, a group which 
consisted of different types of converts and an equivalent number of immigrants, 
mainly Egyptian and Sudanese murshids (teachers) and munshids (singers) 
belonging to the Tariqa. After the phase of its first converts, beyond the 
increasing number of immigrants, the Burhaniya progressively witnessed a 
change among its Italian constituency: a wave of new converts, ignorant about 
Islam, approached the Tariqa as a consequence of professional or personal 
troubles (illness, family quarrels, work problems etc.). Leila, Abdul Rahim’s 
(former) wife, who had followed the Tariqa since the beginning, commented on 
the progressive change of the constituency and its orientation: 
 
The idea of Islam came upon me because during that period reading René Guénon 
was really in fashion. In fact all the old disciples who are now in the brotherhood, 
the men I mean, come from that school. I was married to Abdul Rahim and I was 
the only woman taking part in the discussions. They were theoreticians who talked 
only philosophy, theology and philology ... I really felt that this was totally useless. 
Once I even said to them: why do you talk all the time instead of taking action and 
practising? Today only a few of these theoreticians are still in the Tariqa, the 
others have left. The Shaykh has taught us that the primary tool is the method, the 
individual awrād ritual path organized by the murshid8. 
 
                                                          







Leila’s words testify to the emergence of the polarity between an intellectual and 
a practical approach to Sufism, linked to the disciples’ different approaches to 
Islam and amplified by the progressive assertion of the Egyptian direction. In 
2002, the Italian Burhaniya qualified as a mixed brotherhood, and not only in 
terms of its diverse ethnic composition, but also because of its ambivalent 
ideology and praxis of Islam, caught between the need to include the immigrants’ 
specific culture of Islam and the converts’ more intellectual approach. In this 
sense, the comment by Abdul Rahim, Leila’s ex-husband and one of the converts 
who left the Burhaniya, is revealing:  
 
The level that Shaykh Mohammed Uthman calls the maqām (stage) of liberation 
can be reached through two different paths: either following a regular path with 
regular awrād, or through an overabundance of ritual performance. This is why I 
think that the Burhaniya is a ṭarīq (path) and not a ṭarīqa (path organized by a 
brotherhood), because even if someone manages to reach the maqām of liberation 
through an excess of rituals and a good intention, he then anyway stops there and 
is not able to advance in his spiritual life. It is a fact that the Burhaniya has lost all 
of the intellectuals among its disciples. Just like all the other Guénonians, I too left 
the brotherhood9.   
 
Dissatisfied with the present-day constituency of the Burhaniya, Abdul Rahim 
emphasized that the Shaykh did not select his followers and was welcoming to 
anyone who wanted to approach Sufism, whether Muslim or not. Abdul Rahim 
added that many of the new converts did not know the Qur’an, they were 
ignorant about the Sunna and were not interested in studying religious matters, 
therefore they could not aspire to truly understand Islam. By accepting followers 
who lacked the elementary notions of Islam and Sufism, the Burhaniya, from his 
point of view, was not a proper Islamic Sufi brotherhood, and came close to 
heterodoxy. In Abdul Rahim’s words, the intellectualist tendency of the 
Traditionalist converts converges with the reformist approach of objectifying 
Islam (Starret 1998), that is to say, transforming Islam into an object of 
intellectual analysis, something to be understood. By criticizing the Burhanis for 
their lack of attention to texts, scriptures and intellectual engagement, Abdul 
Rahim was positioning the Burhaniya right in the middle of the Italian debate 
around Islam. 
 
The panorama of Islam in Italy is fragmented into different ideologically and 
politically competing parties, which make it impossible for ‘Italian Islam’ to 
acquire an identity and to have, even today, a coherent voice in its dialogue with 
Italian institutions10.  This range of different parties includes at one end of the 
                                                          
9 Interview with Abdul Rahim, Rome 2002. 
10 The Italian Constitution recognises freedom of religion and the right of all religions to 
self-organise. Their relations with the Italian state are regulated by law in the form of bilateral 







spectrum a conservative extreme, represented by the UCOII (Union of the Islamic 
Communities in Italy). Ideologically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, the UCOII 
has a reformist mindset that espouses a scripturalist approach, foregrounding 
individual critical reasoning about Islamic texts, before the role of ritual practice 
and mystical experience. At the other end of the spectrum come the Sufi 
brotherhoods that make up, themselves, a very inhomogeneous lot: there are 
brotherhoods consisting prevalently of immigrants, such as the Senegalese 
Muridiyya, as well as brotherhoods composed predominantly of converts, such 
as the COREIS (Communita Religiosa Islamica), an association of Sufi-oriented 
movements linked to the milieu of converts and Guénonians. In the middle of this 
wide range of movements there are other formations such as the so-called 
“nations’s Islam”, or the “Islam of the mosques”, an expression of the political 
orientation of the nations of emigration (Saint-Blancat 1999, Guolo 2004).  
 
In 2002 the Burhaniya did not fully fit into either of these parties and found itself 
in the position of confronting, on the one hand, the reformist/Islamist criticism 
against rote and ‘heterodox’ ritual practice, and the need to speak to the more 
universalizing and spiritualist tendencies of the COREIS and the converts’ 
approach to Oriental philosophies on the other. Early on in the course of my 
fieldwork, I realized that such an increasing polarization of the practice and 
understanding of Islam within the Burhaniya, together with the brotherhood’s 
idiosyncratic collocation within the ideological panorama of Italian Islam, 
mapped onto yet another discourse: a form of cultural essentialism played out in 
the difficult encounter between Italian converts and Egyptian immigrants. 
 
 
4. Cultural essentialisms: intellectualist versus embodied knowledge 
 
  
In the course of our interviews and conversations Jalal, the first murshid of the 
Italian branch, often mentioned that the Italians were yet unable to manage the 
Tariqa’s teachings and ritual life by themselves, because they were too young to 
Sufism, and he thus concluded that his guidance was indispensable. Because of 
his Egyptian background and his competency in the Arabic language, which 
allowed him access to the ‘secrets’ of the sacred language of the Qur’an, Jalal 
claimed for himself the exclusive entitlement to manage the Italian branch of the 
Tariqa and its pedagogical path. A year or so before my encounter with the 
Burhaniya, Jalal had been accused by the converts of wanting to seize control of 
the Tariqa, and of betraying the Shaykh and his rules. The news of this unhappy 
incident soon reached the brotherhood’s centre, in Egypt. The Shaykh 
immediately discharged the Egyptian murshid from his duties and assigned 
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Abdel Ghafour the temporary management of the irshād (spiritual guidance). 
Safwat, another and more highly qualified Egyptian murshid, was to arrive a few 
months later in order to take charge of the spiritual advancement of the Italian 
branch. Eagerly awaited, Safwat’s arrival in Italy, however, very soon thwarted 
the Italians’ expectations. 
 
Introduced by the Shaykh as an international teacher of the Burhaniya, Safwat 
was expected to be very knowledgeable in spiritual matters and mystical treaties 
and was welcomed by the Italians with open arms: the Italian brothers paid the 
expenses for his trip and Abdel Ghafour acted as his legal guarantor in the 
issuance of the visa. Safwat was well aware that his future in Italy greatly 
depended upon his performance as a teacher and upon his ability to gain the 
Italian brethren’s confidence. And, as he later told me, he had immediately felt 
inadequate to the role he had been chosen for:  
 
When Abdel Ghafour fetched me at the airport he wanted me to translate one 
qaṣīda. We spent the entire drive on just one verse. So he knew I did not speak 
English … My English was terrible. When explaining religion I could not talk in 
English. For 20 years I hadn’t spoken English, since secondary school … 11 
 
This episode was the first in a series of miscomprehensions between Safwat and 
his Italian hosts: miscomprehensions that sprang from the ambiguity of him 
being, at once, a teacher and an immigrant, the ambiguity between what the 
Italians expected from him as a teacher and the prejudices they held towards him 
as an immigrant. Soon enough Safwat discovered that his lack of competence in 
the Italian and English languages was but a first and superficial expression of 
what the Italian perceived as a deeper inadequacy which was rooted in the way 
he inhabited and used his body in religion and, notably, in his whole conception 
of Islamic knowledge. The converts expected Safwat to be a knowledgeable 
teacher who could help them navigate the sea of spiritual knowledge contained 
in mystical Sufi texts, helping them to fully master Islamic literature. To their 
great disappointment they had to cope with a man who could barely speak 
English and who mechanically practised his rituals. 
 
These miscomprehensions fed into a deeper tension that had been vexing the 
Italian branch since the beginnings and was linked to a form of cultural 
essentialism driving the converts’ attitudes towards their fellow disciples coming 
from abroad, the ‘immigrants’.  Shams, one of the first Italian converts, 
summarized this tension in an interview he held with me right after the scandal: 
 
Many of these, let’s call them extra-communitarians, come to Italy to work. They 
already belong to the Tariqa in Egypt before arriving, but they do not perceive it as 
                                                          







we do ... they are not at our level ... we, we are seeking a spiritual path, a spiritual 
lineage ... for them the Tariqa is a .. a natural thing .. they start the awrād and they 
are not conscious of what they are doing ... Many of them say: tell me what I have to 
do, I don’t want to know the theory ... they don’t want to know, understand ... For 
us instead understanding is the core of inner growth, for both spiritual and cultural 
advancement ... we may call it knowledge12.   
 
 
Shams speaks for all the converts: the priority of intellectual knowledge is 
beyond discussion, and hence the engagement with Islamic and Sufi treaties is 
deemed essential to being a proper Muslim. The dissatisfaction with Jalal, Safwat 
and their understanding of Islam easily slips into a form of cultural 
hierarchization in which ‘we’  becomes one with ‘knowledge‘, ‘high culture’ and 
the search for the ‘spiritual’, while ‘they’, the immigrants, the extra 
communitarians, are seen as driven by habit, nature and lacking in spirituality. A 
racial discourse on the ‘Oriental’s’ lack of consciousness and the disparagement 
of the racialized body as a symbol of irrationality are culturalized. Difference is 
reified and asserted on cultural grounds (Grillo 2003). The converts’ suspicion 
towards an approach to Sufism based on ritual performance is mapped onto a 
prejudice against an alleged Egyptian form of Islam, according to which Islamic 
practice is an unconscious habit driven by societal factors and associated with 
traditional, if not backward, customs. By contrast, the path of Sufism, from the 
Italians’ point of view, is a conscious striving for Knowledge, and Islam itself is 
understood as carrying a set of beliefs to be consciously learned rather than 
unconsciously apprehended. A ‘cultural’ hierarchy is established, and social 
difference is essentialized: by asserting authority on cultural grounds, the 
Italians’ at the same time reinforce the already existing relationships of power 
between converts and Egyptians brought about by the latter’s status as 
immigrants. Indeed, the inequality in the relationship between Safwat and the 
converts grew parallel to Safwat’s dependence upon the converts for financial 
and bureaucratic support.   
Falling in the middle of the wider debate on the position of Sufism in Italy (and in 
Egypt13), in which the Burhaniya needed to find its standpoint, this tension was 
                                                          
12 Shams, Rome 2002. 
13 Indeed, in those same years, in the face of the Islamic revival and the renewed focus of reform-
minded Muslims on Islamic scriptures, the main branch of the Burhaniya in Egypt found itself at the 
centre of a harsh debate concerning the heterodoxy of their cosmologies and practices. The critics 
raged against allegedly esoteric and heterodox doctrinal points within the Shaykh’s teachings and 
against Burhani practice, defined as backward and superstitious. Most importantly, the Burhani 
method was accused of keeping the disciples in a state of ignorance of the Islamic doctrines and texts 
and of promoting a totalizing submission of the disciples to the direction of the Shaykh, depriving 
them of the right to challenge the scriptures. The Burhaniya, which counted a vast constituency 
among the educated middle classes, was a hindrance to the reformist and Salafi movements. With its 
stress on the Shaykh-disciple relationship and ritual life, it conflicted with the reformist-minded 







soon framed in the terms of the anti-Sufi debate: the cultural stigmatization of 
rote performance and ritual body practice dovetailed with the fear of a possible 
critique coming from the reformist parties in Italy such as the UCOII, which at the 
time was leading the dialogue with Italian institutions. From the converts’ point 
of view, Jalal’s and Safwat’s approach to Sufism foregrounded ritual performance 
at the expenses of intellectual knowledge and the study of both mystical texts 
and Islamic scriptures, preventing the Burhaniya from legitimately positioning 
itself among the Italian ‘orthodox’ Islamic movements.  
 
 
5. Cultural essentialism reversed: the value of performance 
 
  
The same prosaic essentialism characterizing the converts’ discourse was 
deployed by the Egyptians themselves as a form of defence against the Italians’ 
hostile attitudes: on the one hand, by assuming and foregrounding an 
essentialized representation of Islamic knowledge as primarily an embodied 
form of knowledge, Safwat stressed his position as a proper Muslim. On the 
other, he asserted his authority by describing the Italians’ ignorance in matters 
such as ritual performance and the Arabic language. When I got to know him in 
2001, Safwat’s status had changed: he had just married Leila, an Italian convert 
to the Burhaniya and Abdel Rahim’s ex-wife, and he had finally given up his 
stressful search for work since his Italian brethren were now willing to sustain 
him economically. His authority had increased so much that thanks to his 
intervention I solved my first ethical conflict in the field. To understand how this 
inversion of status was possible it is necessary first of all to explore in depth the 
architecture of the Burhani awrād pedagogy, and the specific form it has taken in 
its journey to Italy. 
 
 
6. awrād pedagogy in Italy 
 
  
From my interviews with Shaykh Ibrahim, then Shaykh of Tariqa, on the subject 
of the irshād (teaching), I soon gathered that he considered the awrād practice to 
be ‘the’ method of spiritual growth and the foundation of irshād, the Burhani 
pedagogy. The awrād keep the Tariqa together, Shaykh Ibrahim told me in 
response to my questions.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
textual sources. A reflective relation of the believers to the texts was to substitute, according to the 
reformists, the practice of taqlīd, the ‘blind and rote’ imitation of living models. At the same time, the 
Burhaniya made official Islamic institutions, such as the National Sufi Council, particularly 
uncomfortable in their struggle to come to terms with the growing revival movement by curbing the 








As the Shaykh explained, awrād (sg.  wird), are a set of standardized litanies 
composed of Qur’anic āyāt (verses) rearranged by the Shaykh, which regulate 
the disciples’ individual paths through progressive spiritual stages (maqāmāt) 
towards the fanāʾ, annihilation in the Shaykh. Officially, a murshid (teacher) is 
responsible for assigning the awrād to his disciples and for their irshād 
(teaching). Every murīd (disciple) who has achieved the first three levels of 
initiation can, theoretically, become a murshid to someone else. Once the method 
of the awrād is established, the Tariqa grows all by itself, added the Shaykh. In 
practice, however, things are somewhat more complicated. Indeed the 
management and the performance of the awrād method within the Italian branch 
generate relations of authority which result in continuous tensions between 
Egyptian and Italian murshids.  
 
In its diffusion to Europe, in the 1980s, the Tariqa had to face the risk endemic to 
many Sufi brotherhoods of losing the charismatic power of its central authority. 
Alongside the extension of the brotherhood across the globe, which made 
gatherings more problematic to attend, an additional problem resided in the 
converts’ lack of knowledge of Arabic, which made them more difficult to guide. 
Translations, transliterations and a strict organization of the spiritual path were 
needed to keep the Tariqa going. The awrād themselves have been translated 
into the various languages of the converts and, most importantly, transliterated 
in various alphabets in order to be accessible to any disciple. All the Burhani 
branches have been provided with booklets collecting the awrād in their 
transliterated form, alongside an irshād handbook describing the main tasks of a 
spiritual guide and the management of the awrād repetition sequence in relation 
to spiritual progression. The converts themselves, independently of the time and 
the modalities of their affiliation to the Tariqa, are allowed to take up the role of 
spiritual masters by attentively following the rules of the irshād handbook. With 
the aim of obviating the converts’ ignorance of Arabic, particular attention has 
been redirected to the transliterations, provided with diacritical signs that 
establish the correct pronunciation of the corresponding Arabic letters and the 
correct prosody of the verses. The awrād booklets provide the non-Arabic 
readers with a rendition of the tajwīd style, i.e. the set of prosodic rules that 
define the pronunciation of the single letters composing the awrād, together with 
the tempo and rhythm, and that are normally used in Qur’anic recitation.   
  
This systematization of the spiritual path, pursued in order to organize the 
Tariqa in the absence of a daily direct relationship between the Shaykh and his 
followers, has actually deepened the cleavage between an embodied spiritual 
knowledge and intellectual knowledge of the texts. In the process of 
transliteration and the regulation of the repetition sequences, the awrād lose 







exclusively to performance, which calls into play the sonic dimension of the 
revelation, contained in the sound of the Qur’anic verses forming the awrād. The 
literal semantic meaning of the texts is backgrounded with respect to the 
symbolic knowledge contained and channelled by the material work of the 
sacred Arabic letters on the soul and the body. The significance of the tajwīd style 
and the correct pronunciation of the sacred texts are indeed supported by the 
‘ilm al-ḥurūf, the science of letters, established definitively by Ibn al-ʿArabī in the 
13th century, which presupposes a specific relation between Arabic letters, 
cosmology and bodies. On the grounds of this science, the Burhani Shaykh warns 
that an incorrect performance of the awrād is not only spiritually void but may 
even be dangerous for the performer, unleashing powerful spiritual forces. The 
value of performance for the spiritual path, and, precisely, the correct ritual 
performance, is foregrounded with respect to oral teaching, the reading and the 
study of texts and Islamic scriptures.  
 
The restructuring of the irshād method, working towards the decoupling of the 
performance of the sacred word from the semantic dimension of reading, 
changed the relationships of authority among disciples on the basis of their 
different intellectual and practical skills, and turned out to be a tool of 
empowerment for the immigrants within the Italian branch. 
 
 
7. Performance and embodied knowledge 
 
  
Between Jalal’s departure and Safwat’s arrival, the Italian disciples had been 
guided in their spiritual path by some of the oldest converts to the Tariqa who 
focused much of their efforts on the written lectures of the Shaykh, beyond other 
mystical treaties. Once enrolled as the Italian murshid (teacher), Safwat, with the 
Shaykh’s compliance, started implementing the awrād method within the Italian 
branch of the Burhaniya, gradually sidelining the importance of oral or written 
lectures. As a consequence, the role of bodily techniques became primary on the 
path of spiritual learning, backgrounding the ‘intellectual’ and textual knowledge 
of Sufi literature and mystics. Safwat’s ignorance of English and Italian and his 
difficulty in giving lectures became irrelevant to the successful outcome of his 
teaching. Conversely, his ‘natural’ fluency in Arabic and his embodied abilities in 
perceiving the spiritual power of the awrād letters and sounds were 
foregrounded: within the Italian branch Safwat was, by far, the most competent 
in teaching the tajwīd, the correct pronunciation and prosody of the awrād. 
During our interviews, Safwat eventually placed much stress on these embodied 
aspects of the awrād method, saying how essential it was for the Italian disciples 
to learn the proper body techniques in order to articulate the awrād’s sounds. 







tongue, the correct pronunciation of guttural letters, alongside a concentration 
on proper images and the ability to glide the rosary (Egypt. coll.: sibḥa) through 
one’s fingers in order to keep count of the repetitions. These are competencies, 
according to Safwat, that require practice in order to be acquired and naturalized 
as a habit. Abdel Ghafour was soon superseded in his role as Italian teacher, a 
role he had been holding – as the oldest and most erudite convert – since the 
very beginnings of the Burhaniya in Italy. All of Abdel Ghafour’s symbolic capital, 
based on his knowledge of Sufi literature, lost importance once confronted with 
Safwat’s embodied capital.  
 
This reorganization of the structure of learning – from intellectual and textual to 
embodied and practical – corresponded with a reconfiguration of the converts’ 
subjectivity, starting from a reordering of the hierarchy of the senses. The 
Italians had long been training themselves to read the transliteration of the 
litanies in Latin letters using a written aid. Once Safwat took over the teaching 
responsibilities, he asserted his competence by teaching the sound of sacred 
Arabic letters by means of oral repetition (as the tajwīd prescribes) rather than 
the importance of reading the litanies from the written aid. This implied as a 
consequence an increased attention to the bodily techniques of repetition. By 
preserving the oral and acoustic character of Qur’anic Revelation and its 
symbolic dimension implicit in the letters, the tajwīd is in the first instance a 
method that works corporeally through the art of listening and reciting (Nelson 
2001). By stressing the pre-eminence accorded to the sound (through 
pronunciation and prosody) of the awrād and the art of listening and reciting, i.e. 
the tajwīd, over the ability to visualize and read the written text of the awrād, 
Safwat, with his embodied capital, was once again challenging Abdel Ghafour’s 
leading position  which was based on his spiritual knowledge. Both intellectual 
knowledge of the Sufi texts and the competence in reading written 
transliteration were not comparable with the spiritual insight provided by the 
embodied knowledge of the secret science of the letters. Of all those who 
belonged to the Italian zāwiya, only Safwat possessed this knowledge capital, or 
better put: only his body possessed this knowledge as an embodied memory. His 
past life, his long-standing practice of Sufism in Egypt, the opportunity to live 
within the aura of the Shaykh and, not least, the opportunity to live in Cairo, the 
city of the ahl al-bayt (the prophet’s family), were all now present in his ability to 
recite with a perfect tajwīd.   
 
By virtue of the awrād performance, the Italians reshaped their hierarchy of the 
senses as well as their way of understanding knowledge. By changing the 
Italians’ horizons of perception, their understanding and practice of Islam, 
Safwat soon became an irreplaceable teacher, thereby also shifting the power 
relations between immigrants and converts. The relevance of this 







brotherhood was confirmed to me by many of my subsequent interviews. Most of 
the converts highlighted the importance of qaṣāʾid singing (the singing of 
mystical poems) and the beauty of the sound of the Arabic language as a 
determining factor in their spiritual engagement. Today the international offices 
of the Tariqa produce records of the best Egyptian and Sudanese voices of the 
Burhaniyya singing qaṣāʾid, and sell them to the disciples. Many Italians have 
replaced their music cassettes with cassettes of qaṣāʾid singing which have 
become the soundtrack of their car journeys or their ipods. In this case, too, 
Safwat’s embodied memory of the qaṣāʾid singing in Cairo was unmatched. The 
‘intellectual’ capital of knowledge owned by the converts was twice undermined 
and subverted: as a form of ‘textual’ knowledge, it was inessential to the 
appraisal of the bodily techniques essential to the practice of the awrād, as well 







“Existence is a letter of which you are the meaning” (Ibn al-ʿArabī 1997 [1329]).    
“… The realm of letters is endowed with  
the most pure of languages and the most evident of eloquence”   
Ibn al-ʿArabī Ibn al-ʿArabī 1997 [1329].  
 
 
In these Ibn al-ʿArabī quotations  the Arabic letters, and by extension the words 
and texts, reveal their full meaning, which invests the believer in his/her entirety 
with a meaning that is at once material, manifest, spiritual, intellectual, inner, 
bāṭin and ẓāhir. This ethnographic study has looked at how the act of reading and 
performing the sacred Arabic letters are set apart and perceived as two different 
practices within the Italian branch of a Sufi brotherhood. I have argued how the 
difference between the material and the semantic dimensions of letters and 
words, between text and performance, is polarized by the specific dynamics of 
Islam and conversion in Italy, and further articulated through cultural 
stereotypes.  
 
The point of view of the Italians converts, I have argued, is rooted in their 
exposure to two mutually reinforcing discourses which converge in 
foregrounding an intellectual engagement with the scriptures over the 
performance of rituals: on one hand a discourse that blends Sufism, Oriental 
philosophies and the Orient, informing certain Italian milieus of converts linked 
to Traditionalism, and on the other hand the long shadow of Islamic reformist 
discourse, which finds echoes in the debate on Italian Islam. Such a 







cultural essentialism current in contemporary Italian discourse about 
immigrants and that is embraced by both immigrants and converts in the face of 
the social problematics of a mixed brotherhood. Indeed, the Burhanis I met while 
attending the Italian zāwiya consciously overlapped the text/performance binary 
onto a reified cultural difference distinguishing ‘Italians’ from ‘Egyptians’. 
Whereas these prosaic essentialisms and binaries do not actually map onto 
socio-cultural realities, they are in turn performative: essentialized discourses 
orient everyday praxis, make sense of experience and support forms of 
empowerment and of domination. My interlocutors consciously uncouple the 
intellectual mastery of Sufi knowledge from the performance of the spiritual 
path, linking them with two different forms of knowledge, one intellectual, the 
other practical. In turn, these different forms of knowledge call into play different 
cultural competencies and configurations of subjectivity which are played out in 
the encounter, at times difficult, between Italians and immigrants, generating 
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Migrations in a changing world: global and regional perspectives 
 
Migrations are powerfully shaping globalization trends and national and 
international political debate of the second decade of the new millennium. The 
total number of international migrants in the world has been increasing and has 
reached 2441 million according to recent estimates, representing an increase of 
40% since 2000. They include 150 million migrant workers2. One-third of all 
international migrants are aged 15 to 343. The phenomenon of internal migration 
is even larger in scale with an estimated 740 million internal migrants in 20134. 
In addition, in 2015 an unprecedented 65.3 million people around the world 
have been forcibly displaced5, including over 21 million refugees, 3 million 
asylum seekers and over 40 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 
average length of displacement due to war and persecution is 17 years6. One-
fourth of all global refugees (mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) reside in 
Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey. In 2014, more than 19 million people were 
internally displaced because of natural disasters7. 
Forced migration due to conflicts and environmental and climate issues has 
anchored the debate on migration to the climate agenda on one side and to 
human security agenda on the other.  
In fact, data show new emerging challenges, due to migration’s increasing and 
multiple connections with global epidemics and conflicts, which offers a series of 
meaningful examples of its cross-border implications on development and on 
multidimensional wellbeing. Such analysis cannot avoid to deal with the 
implications of climate change, land and ecosystem degradation as key drivers of 
                                                 
1 UNDESA – United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015), Trend in 
International migration 2015. Population Facts, December 2015, no. 2015/4. 
2 ILO (2015), Global estimates on migrant workers. Results and methodology. Special focus on 
migrant domestic workers, Geneva. 
3 UNDESA (2011), Youth and Migration Factsheet, New York. 
4 IOM – International Organization for Migration (2013), Migration and the United Nations Post-
2015 Development Agenda. 
5 UNHCR (2016), Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015. 
6 OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and the World Bank, supported by the Center on 
International Cooperation (2015), Addressing protracted displacement: a framework for 
development-humanitarian cooperation, December. 
7 IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2014), Global Estimates 2015. People 
displaced by disasters. 
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migration, which is attracting particular policy attention on the challenges and 
opportunities that it poses for food security, sustainable agriculture and rural 
development. 
Although migration has grown further as a primary multifaceted challenge for 
the globalized world, it is tackled and discussed by public opinion and media 
mainly in terms of prevention and impact mitigation at the expenses of the 
Migration and Development topics that have been more and more overshadowed 
in the political debate. On the other side, the inclusion of migration in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development confirms and reinforces the important 
relation between migration and development8 and the thrusting of migration 
into the spotlight has been contributing to the flourishing of studies, 
investigations and estimates that enrich data availability and the scientific 
debate.  
Finally, increasing attention is paid to the fact that such complex scenario 
requires cross-border interventions to coordinate efforts in origin, transit and 
destination countries. Effective policy coherence is recognized as fundamental in 
guaranteeing the integration of migration into development at all relevant levels 
(regional, national and local), calling for a revised, widened and integrated 
approach, which will be better at dealing with present and future changes and 
challenges. Scholars and policy makers at all levels keep acknowledging that 
migration needs to work for development and that development needs to work 
for migration, while not underestimating the potential negative impacts and that 
in the future the unavoidable human mobility across the world will become more 
and more complex, thus presenting new challenges, risks and opportunities.  
The following selection briefly presents some of the most interesting volumes 
issued in the last years and includes reports based on data analyses, estimates 
and case studies, as well as policy-oriented surveys and historical overviews.  
The reviews are organized in two main sections. The first proposes some recent 
studies on the global phenomenon of international migration discussing trends, 
main topics, problems and opportunities. The second section considers 
migration movements, their potentialities and challenges in a regional 
perspective, suggesting openings for specific lines of research that distinguishes 
causes, effects, depending on the geographical range of human mobility and 
proposes the supranational regional policy level as the most appropriate to 
valorize potentialities and minimize risks. 
                                                 
8 Migration and human mobility are explicitly recognized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, which establishes a number of migration-related targets across the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals. The 2030 Agenda also recognizes that unemployment, especially youth 
unemployment, as well as natural resource depletion and adverse impacts of environmental 
degradation are major challenges to sustainable development. Empowering vulnerable people, 
including youth, refugees, IDPs and migrants is key to ending poverty in all its forms and 
dimensions, as they all make a positive contribution to inclusive growth and sustainable 
development. 
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A. International migrations as a global issue 
 
(i) On Migration and Development nexus: a new policy approach 
 
OECD, Perspectives on Global Development 2017: International Migration in a 
Shifting World, OECD Publishing, Paris (2016). 
 
The fourth edition of OECD Development Centre’s Perspectives on Global 
Development series continues investigating the increasing economic weight of 
developing countries in world economy, a phenomenon referred to as “shifting 
wealth”, focusing on the issue of international migration and development.  
The report builds on a body of research on the drivers and impacts of migration 
in developing countries, South-South migration and the interrelations between 
public policies, migration and development. It examines to what extent and how 
the shifting of economic activity to developing countries has affected migration 
patterns, and secondly the many ways in which international migration 
contributes to development. It aims at enriching the debate by steadily focusing 
on international migration from the perspective of developing countries, 
analysing the main trends, drivers and impacts of international migration on 
developing countries of origin and destination and discussing potential scenarios 
on the future of migration.   
Recommendations to governments in origin and destination countries, as well as 
to the international community incorporate the development dimension in 
migration and labour policies, fostering policy and institutional coherence also 
taking advantage of the inclusion of migration-related targets in the Sustainable 
Development Goals to establish commitments that can be monitored 
multilaterally, regionally and nationally and to find durable solutions that 
address the future challenges of an increasingly mobile world. 
 
Dilip Ratha, Supriyo De, Sonia Plaza, Kirsten Schuettler, William Shaw, Hanspeter 
Wyss, Soonhwa Yi, Migration and Remittances – Recent Developments and 
Outlook, Migration and Development Brief 26, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 
(2016) 
 
The Migration and Development Brief reports a comprehensive update on global 
migration and remittance flows.  
A first part features an outlook on migration and remittance trends with a specific 
chapter focusing on risks.  The refugee crisis is one of the main issues highlighted by 
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data. The conflict in Syria keeps producing refugees flows towards neighbouring 
countries and Europe and new refugee movements are also taking place in other parts of 
the world.  
Moreover, the international community currently lacks a common policy to cope with 
the crisis; a lack of consensus on burden sharing has prompted to a tightening of border 
controls in some countries and areas producing a further worsening of the legal and 
institutional framework.  
A relevant section of the report is devoted to the analyses of remittances trends with an 
interesting annex that explains the methodology applied for the forecast. The estimates 
evidence a slowdown in the growth of remittances to developing countries which have 
fallen from 3.2 % in 2014 to 0.4 % in 2015 due to the economic weakness in the major 
remittance-sending countries as well as the decrease of oil prices and currencies in 
some major remittance-source countries such as Russia.  
Forecasts indicate a rise to a 4% yearly growth rate in 2016–17, although fluctuation of 
oil prices may strongly influence the global trends and the widening of black market 
premia linked to capital controls could limit formal inflows in some countries.  
The monitoring of the remittance costs indicates a slight decrease in the global average 
cost while Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average cost of 9.5% on transferred amount, 
remains the highest-cost region.  
A last section considers the theme of the relationships between migration linked to 
natural disasters and epidemics on one side and remittances on the other.  Empirical 
country case studies and review of regional aggregates indicate that remittances to 
developing countries tend to rise moderately following a disaster while remittances role 
in helping people cope with natural disasters and epidemics can be diminished when 
disasters disrupt the money-transfer infrastructure.  
Therefore, the report suggests that the international community should engage in 
developing principles and agreements required to deal with migration due to natural 
disasters and favour diaspora assistance following disasters also by facilitating financial 
transfers. 
 
OECD, Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development, OECD 
Publishing, Paris (2017). 
 
The report is the result of a project carried out jointly by the European Commission and 
the OECD Development Centre in ten developing countries. The report empirically 
examines the links between four dimensions of migration (emigration, remittances, 
return migration and immigration) and five key policy sectors with most relevance 
accorded to migration and development: the labour market, agriculture, education, 
investment and financial services, and social protection and health.  
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It also looks at the impact of these five sectorial policies on some migration outcomes, 
such as decision to emigrate or return, remittances sent and how they are spent, 
migrants’ integration. Data were gathered from surveys of more than 20 500 households 
and interviews with 590 local authorities and community leaders and 375 stakeholders.  
The relationships between the migration dimensions, outcomes and sectorial policies 
are measured through regression analysis. The impact of policies and their 
interrelations strongly depends on context and implementation choices. There is 
therefore no one-size-fits-all solution to curb (or encourage) migration, turn remittances 
into productive investment or better integrate immigrants into host country societies. 
The fact that public policies often work in silos neglecting their potential implications on 
other areas, such as migration, is highlighted as one of the main issues at stake. Many 
examples are provided to show how the combination of different policies is more likely 
to influence the impacts of migration. A coherent policy framework and the inclusion of 
migration as a cross-cutting issue in the different sectorial policies are therefore 
recommended to enhance migration’s role in development. 
 
Elizabeth Mavroudi, Caroline Nagel, Global Migration: Patterns, processes, and 
politics, Routledge, London (2016) 
 
This textbook, aimed primarily at undergraduate and Master’s students, proposes a 
quite accessible view of the contemporary migration movements and on complexity of 
building local and international migration policies. After a comprehensive introduction 
to the main concepts and definitions, a first section provides a perspective on historical 
migration patterns and trends as well as an overview on the role of migration in the 
economy presenting examples and significant case studies. 
A second section examines the main challenges for policy makers and international 
community with a chapter on the complex issue of migration and development nexus 
followed by an interesting outlook on the more politicised topics and the main questions 
of inclusion, exclusion, and citizenship in the chapters dealing with refugees, border 
controls and flows management.  
The student-friendly feature of the work combines with a sizeable body of analyses and 
updated examples that make the book an interesting overview on the historical context 
of contemporary migration, introduces many debated and sometimes still not 
completely explored matters, including the role of gender, race and national ideologies, 
as well as the perspective of immigrants themselves, and provides the references for 
further readings on scholarly research at the end of each chapter. 
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Josefina Domínguez-Mujica (ed.), Global Change and Human Mobility, Springer, 
Berlin (2016) 
 
The volume offers a selection of studies developed by members of the International 
Geographical Union Commission taking into consideration both thematic and 
geographical perspectives and looking at a changing world from the focus of a new 
disciplinary approach. Migrations conceived as processes between points of origin and 
destination are transformed and analysed in terms of mobility, thus as fluidity of the 
relations between spaces, proposing new interpretations of old and new tendencies in 
the context of globalization.  
The book has a strong interdisciplinary character gathering contributions and points of 
view of diverse social sciences such as geography, sociology, economics, political 
sciences, anthropology. The 15 chapters cover a broad geographical spread with case 
studies on migration to and from developing, emerging and industrialized countries. 
Various topics recur and intersect within the volume, such as the new patterns of 
mobility, new policy challenges of border controls, refugee movements, marginalization 
and social empowerment of irregular migrants, integration issue, the environmental 
hazards and migration nexus, gender issues, social cohesion and access to employment. 
Moreover, interesting reflections on the “regional element” of transnationalism and 
mobility especially in the case of young generations connect this volume to the ones 
presented in the second section of the present selection that address the regional risks 
and opportunities of migrations in the building and shaping of regional social and 
economic systems. 
 
Douglas J. Besharov, Mark Hugo López, Adjusting to a World in Motion: Trends in 
Global Migration and Migration Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2016) 
 
The volume brings together a wide range of research on various topics featuring both 
academic and policy perspectives with the ambitious main aim of favouring a continued 
international dialogue of research and analysis on migration and of allowing readers to 
draw lessons for their own countries in the spirit of mutual learning. The base 
assumption of the book is that “there seems to be no turning back the clock”, and the 
problem for both sending and receiving countries is to “adjust to this continuing reality”.    
The book is structured in five main parts starting with an introductory description of the 
global trends and a summary of the key information about the pattern of migration and 
the causes of migration around the world.  
The following four parts contain thoughtful analyses of some of the most critical issues 
raised in both receiving and sending countries.  
The second, third and fourth parts include analyses on policies to control entry, 
encourage high-skilled immigration, develop refugee policy, and speed assimilation in 
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three important receiving regions: North America (with the title “The Western 
Hemisphere”, Europe and Middle East and Asia. South-South Migration, though being 
one of the main trends highlighted by recent data, is not one of the chapter topics.  
The fifth part considers the sending country “Diaspora Engagement Strategies” designed 
to encourage continuing cultural, economic, and sometimes political ties among migrant 
communities abroad and national development. 
 
(ii) On distress migration and protracted crisis 
 
FAO, Addressing Rural Youth Migration at its Root Causes: A Conceptual 
Framework, FAO, Rome (2016) 
 
Distress migration is particularly acute among rural youth, while agriculture and rural 
development are central to the rate of rural out-migration to urban areas.  
This study explores the main factors determining the propensity of rural youth to 
migrate, and also provides an assessment of the likely impacts of distress migration of 
rural youth in terms of rural development for local areas of origin. Finally it Illustrates 
some of the most promising policies and programmes to reduce distress migration of 
rural youth and maximize its developmental benefits for the communities of origin. 
This paper develops a conceptual framework about how agricultural and rural 
development policies can reduce the need for distress migration of rural youth; and how 
rural youth migration and remittances can contribute to sustainable agriculture and 
rural development, poverty reduction and food security in the areas of origin.  
Based on available evidence, it may be concluded that within the ongoing processes of 
sustainable agricultural intensification and structural rural transformation in SSA and 
North Africa, the root causes of distress migration of rural youth need to be addressed 
by offering more and better on-farm and off-farm employment opportunities. The 
subsequent reduction in rural poverty and improvement of food security can contribute 
to ease migratory pressures.  
This conceptual framework identifies a number of key areas for intervention at policy 
and programme levels. 
First, obtain a better understanding of the drivers and impacts of distress migration of 
rural youth, through improved data and increased evidence to subsequently inform 
policies and programmes.  
Second, ensure that agriculture and rural development (ARD) policies and strategic 
planning processes account for migration, labour mobility and remittances, while 
ensuring policy coherence. Third, implement ARD programmes explicitly targeting rural 
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youth to create viable on-farm and off-farm employment opportunities, which are 
productive, decent and in line with youth aspirations.  
 
OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WB, CIC, Addressing Protracted Displacement: 
A Framework for Development Humanitarian Cooperation A think piece drawing 
on collaboration between OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and the World 
Bank, supported by the Center on International Cooperation, CIC (2015) 
 
This paper is a think piece on how approaches to protracted displacement need to 
change if the world is to reverse the escalating crisis seen in recent times. It is not a 
prescriptive paper, but is designed to spur further thinking and to inform debates on 
policy and programming.  
The think piece drew on collaboration between the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank, supported by the Center 
on International Cooperation (CIC) to inform their own policy and practice, but it is 
hoped that the analysis will also be of interest to other development and humanitarian 
actors.  
The approach in the paper is based on four proposed shifts in how development and 
humanitarian assistance works in countries with significant numbers of refugees and 
displaced people.  
(1) From seeing the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons as a 
challenge separate from development and meeting them through short-term 
humanitarian strategies and appeals, to ensuring their welfare as a core part of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) commitment to “leave no one 
behind”, requiring joint analysis and multi-year planning and engagement from 
development and humanitarian actors to achieve collective outcomes;  
(2) from care and maintenance regimes targeted primarily at displaced people in 
camps, to localized systems that benefit both displaced people and host 
societies/communities;  
(3) from approaches that marginalize refugees and internally displaced persons, to 
ones where the legal, regulatory, fiscal and organizational actions necessary for 
them to contribute to economic and social life are in place;  
(4) from treating refugee-hosting situations as a short-term, country-specific 
resourcing problem and meeting the needs of IDPs through international 
humanitarian aid, to supporting refugee-hosting countries for the global public 
good they are providing and ensuring internal financial transfers are in place to 
help municipal, state and local governments absorb IDPs. 
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(iii) On migration within the SDGs framework  
 
IOM, International Dialogue on Migration No. 26: Follow-up and review of 
Migration in the Sustainable development Goals, IOM (2017) 
 
This publication contains the report and complementary materials of the two 
workshops held in 2016 under the overarching theme “Follow-up and Review of 
Migration in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” within the framework of the 
International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), IOM’s principal forum for migration policy 
dialogue. The two workshops were held in New York on 29 February and 1 March, and 
respectively in Geneva on 11 and 12 October 2016.  
The first workshop addressed the implications of migration being included in the 
Sustainable Development Goals. It discussed tools and mechanisms that could help 
Member States to measure progress on achieving relevant migration-related SDG 
targets, as well as it looked, inter alia, at options for “thematic review” of migration-
related SDG targets and at the role of International Organizations in achieving the 
migration targets.    
Building on the conclusions of the first workshop, the second workshop assessed 
progress in the implementation of the migration-related SDGs.  
It discussed the state of migration policies one year after the adoption of the 2030 
Agenda from the perspective of States and other stakeholders in the migration area. It 
also presented best practices in countries making progress on the migration-related 
SDGs, and looked at how can the institutional capacity of States to measure and report 
on progress on achieving the migration-related targets be improved.  
By dedicating its major policy discussion forum to discussions on implementation, 
follow-up and review of migration aspects of the SDGs, IOM wished to open a space for 
IOM Member States and relevant key players in migration and development area.  
The aim is to present strategies and measures that they are putting in place to achieve 
the migration-related targets, including good practices, challenges, lessons learned and 
areas that need support and shared experiences. 
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(iv) On migration and rural-urban relations 
 
IOM, World Migration Report 2015 – Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to 
Manage Mobility, IOM (2016) 
 
Nearly one in five of all migrants live in the world’s top 20 largest cities. In many of these 
cities migrants represent over a third or more of the population. Other cities have seen a 
remarkable growth in migration in recent years. In Asia and Africa, rapidly growing 
small cities are expected to absorb almost all the future urban population growth of the 
world and this mobility pattern to cities and urban areas is characterized by the 
temporality and circularity of the internal migration process. 
The fast rate of urbanization, and rising migration to cities, brings with it both risks and 
opportunities for the migrants, communities and governments concerned. The World 
Migration Report 2015 explores how migration and migrants are shaping cities, and 
how the life of migrants, in turn, is shaped by cities, their people, organizations and 
rules. 
The report contributes to the global debate on migration and urbanization in three 
ways.  
First, it documents how migration is shaping cities and the situation of migrants in cities. 
Much of the current discussion about migration trends and migration policy tends to 
focus on the national level. Taking the migration enquiry to the city level increases our 
understanding of the local political economies of migration and the close connection 
between migration and urban development.  
Second, the report draws attention to the livelihood of migrants in the cities of the 
Global South. The existing discussions on migrants and cities are inclined to concentrate 
primarily on the Global North and the integration of international migrants.  
Third, the report examines both internal and international migration with cities across 
the development spectrum having to manage growing mobile and diverse populations.  
The final part draws conclusions and makes recommendations for future initiatives to 
develop migrant-inclusive urban governance, with reference to the inclusion of 
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(v) On migration’s perceptions: 
 
Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, Anita Pugliese, Dato Tsabutashvili, Frank Laczko, Marzia 
Rango, How the world views migration, IOM (2015) 
 
This piece provides, for the first time, an insight into public attitudes towards 
immigration worldwide. The findings presented in the report – based on interviews with 
over 183,000 adults across more than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014 – 
represent the first steps towards understanding the lenses through which people view 
immigration at a global level. 
Adults surveyed in Gallup’s World Poll were asked two questions about immigration:  
(1) In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at its present level, 
increased or decreased?  
(2) Do you think immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country do not 
want (e.g. low-paying or not prestigious jobs), or mostly take jobs that citizens in 
this country want? 
One of the key findings of the report is that in every major region of the world – with the 
important exception of Europe – people are more likely to want immigration levels in 
their countries to either stay at the present level or to increase, rather than to decrease. 
This contrasts with the negative perceptions of migration often portrayed in the media 
in certain regions of the world. 
European residents appear to be, on average, the most negative globally towards 
immigration, with the majority believing immigration levels should be decreased. There 
is, however, a sharp divergence in opinions among residents in Northern and Southern 
Europe. 
The report also shows that certain sociodemographic characteristics are more 
consistently associated with favourable or opposing attitudes to immigration. For 
instance, adults with a university degree are typically more likely than those with lower 
levels of education to want to see immigration kept at its present level or increased in 
their countries. 
Another key finding is that people’s views about their personal and their countries’ 
economic situations may be the strongest predictors of their views of immigration: 
those who perceive economic situations as poor or worsening are more likely to favour 
lower immigration levels into their countries, and vice versa. 
In terms of perceived job competition between immigrants and nationals, there appears 
to be a clear divide based on national income: residents of high-income economies 
overall are much more likely to say immigrants take jobs citizens do not want than jobs 
that citizens want. In all other economies, residents are more likely to say immigrants 
take the jobs that citizens want. 
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The full results from this report were released for the first time at the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development summit in Istanbul, during a side event on 15 October. The 
presenters will also discuss the merits of how a regularly conducted global barometer of 
public opinion on migration could contribute to the dialogue about migration in relation 
to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
 
B. The regional level: reports and policy-oriented analysis 
 
 
Tony Fielding, Asian Migrations: Social and Geographical Mobilities in Southeast, 
East, and Northeast Asia, Routledge, London (2015) 
 
The textbook objective is to provide students with an understanding of the causes and 
consequences of the many types of contemporary migration flows in East Asia.  
The geographical boundaries of the phenomena taken into consideration are clearly 
defined with the aim of filling the knowledge gaps of both students and decision makers 
concerning East Asia societies and their changing caused by and causing migration 
movements.  
The author’s goal is to describe and analyse the extremely complex reality with a very 
strong interdisciplinary approach and methodological inclusiveness, combining 
theoretical debate and detailed empirical analysis.  
All forms of migration are considered, including labour migration, student migration, 
marriage migration, displacement and human trafficking in a region where some 
migrations within national borders imply far bigger social changes because of distance 
moved, cultural, social and legal barriers to be overcome – such as in China - than some 
short-distance international migrations among Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.  
The proposed case studies embrace the three main sub-regions of Southeast Asia, China, 
including Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Mongolia, and Northeast Asia that 
encompasses here Japan, the two Republic of Korea and the Far East provinces of Russia.  
The volume aspires to offer a comprehensive coverage of both broad structures 
influencing migrations and factors affecting the individual agency and behaviour of 
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Yuk Wah Chan, Heidi Fung, Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz, The Age of Asian 
Migration: Continuity, Diversity, and Susceptibility Volumes 1 And 2, Cambridge 
Scholars Publisher, Cambridge (2016) 
 
The book assembles the two volumes already published in 2014 and 2015 featuring the 
outcome of the Asian Migration Conference held in Hong Kong in September 2013, co-
hosted by the City University of Hong Kong and the International Organization for 
Migration and that resulted particularly helpful to understand the specificities of Asian 
migration and their evolution since the latter part of the 20th century and to stimulate 
academic discussion and analyses of migration-related policy-making in the region. 
War, politics and economic turbulence has caused mass migrations in Asia throughout 
the second half of the 20th century and the continent is presently the world region that 
produces the most of international migrants and the second migrant receiving area.  
The almost 700 pages provide a full span discussion of Asian migration from historical 
perspectives to updated analyses of current migration flows and diasporas, addressing 
an entire range of often heated debates on entry and exit policies, trans-border 
dynamics, host-migrant interaction, migrant governance, transnational identity, migrant 
integration, multiculturalism issues and relationships between arrival of new migrants 
and the adjustment experiences of former migrants.  
The first volume contains eleven chapters focusing on specific themes referring to six 
sub-regional areas and highlighting the especially crucial migration dynamics and the 
new issues that have characterised each of those regions over roughly the past half-
century.  
The eleven chapters of the second volume are differently arranged under three 
migration themes: the feminisation of Asian migration since the early 1990s, the refugee 
migration in the region with the cross-border movements between neighbouring 
countries and the transformation of many borderlands as temporary or permanent 
refugee settlements and migration economy and remittances that are significant factors 
for economic growth in a number of regions in Asia. 
 
Lamin O. Ceesay, From Intraregional West African Migration toward an Exodus to 
Europe.  A Case Study on Ghana, Anchor Academic Publishing (2017) 
 
The study highlights a neglected point of view on migration from developing countries 
on the basis of the case of Ghanaian skilled workers migration patterns.  The brain-drain 
issue is here considered in the more extensive regional perspective.  
The shifting towards Europe of the intraregional brain circulation that ensured skilled 
workforce to regional development is here identified as one of the main hindrances that 
are paralysing the social and economic development of Western Africa.  
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Core of the analysis is the review of existing investigations and documentations, where 
the author concentrates on surveys that feature the viewpoint of the migrants and their 
families.  
The dependency on secondary data partially limits the strengths of the research. 
Nonetheless, the book provides an original synthesis of data evidencing push factors for 
the skilled, semi-skilled, professionals and unskilled youth migration.  
Conclusions are focused on policy recommendations for African decision makers still 
pointing out the importance of worker’s mobility and brain circulation for development 
in a regional perspective.  
The European responsibilities in creating conditions that favour the African 
outmigration are also highlighted, e.g. the EU subsidises to its agriculture sector that 
make African agriculture, which is the largest employer, unproductive and thus 
unattractive to the local youth.  
Coherent policies that can change the migration trends are therefore suggested to both 
European and African countries for the benefit of both sending and receiving societies 
and economies.  
 
IOM, Assessing the risks of Migration along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
Routes: Iraq and Nigeria as Case Study Countries, IOM (2016) 
 
The purpose of this study is to give breadth to the concept of “safe migration” by 
analyzing patterns of migration and return from two case study countries: Iraq and 
Nigeria. IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre completed this research study for 
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development as part of a wider 
project entitled “Mediterranean Migration Response, Reducing the Risks of Unsafe 
Migration: Linking Research, Data and Policy”. 
The report is based on 147 in-depth qualitative interviews with migrants and key 
informants in Nigeria, Niger and Italy (for the Central Mediterranean route) and Iraq, 
Greece and Germany (for the Eastern Mediterranean route). It presents an update on the 
dynamics of migration through these two Mediterranean routes, looking specifically at 
routes and the risks that present on exit, during the journey, at destination and on 
return. It also provides a first insight into the experience of Iraqi asylum seekers in 
Germany, after the large number of arrivals in 2015. 
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Ayala Wineman and Thomas S. Jayne, Intra-rural migration and pathways to 
greater well-being: Evidence from Tanzania, Department of Agricultural, Food, and 
Resource Economics Michigan State University (2016) 
 
Migration between rural locations is prevalent in many developing countries and has 
been found to improve economic well-being in sub-Saharan Africa.  
This paper explores the pathways through which intra-rural migration affects well-
being in rural Tanzania. Specifically, the paper investigates whether such migration 
enables migrants to access more land, higher quality land, or greater off-farm income 
generating opportunities that may, in turn, translate into improved well-being.  
Drawing on a longitudinal data set that tracks rural migrants to their destinations, the 
authors employ a difference-in-differences approach, validated with a multinomial 
treatment effects model, and find that migration confers a benefit in consumption to 
migrants.  
Results do not indicate that this advantage is derived from larger farms or from more 
productive farmland.  
However, across all destinations, migrants are more likely to draw from off-farm and 
non-farm income sources, suggesting that even intra-rural migration represents a shift 
away from agriculture, and this is likely the dominant channel through which migrants 
benefit. The authors conclude that intra-rural migration merits greater attention in the 
discourse on rural development and structural transformation. 
 
Filiz Garip, On the Move: Changing Mechanisms of Mexico-U.S. Migration, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton (2016)  
 
The book is an in-depth investigation of Mexican migration to the United States that 
constitutes the great part of Northern American intraregional mobility.  
The author is mainly interested in describing and analysing the characteristics of the 
flow patterns and migrants profile and of their evolution over time.  
The use of a consistent body of survey data from over 145,000 Mexican migrants 
spanning from 1965 to 2010, substantiated with nearly 140 in-depth interviews, allow 
Garip to provide an accurate outlook of the migration dynamics revealing massive 
changes in the average migrant outline during the four major waves.  
A glaring true diversities emerging from the data analyses shows how the push and pull 
factors dynamics and, jointly, how the socioeconomic composition of migrant flows have 
been changing in the passages from one stage to the other.  
One of the leading thesis of the study is therefore:  “when we look at an average migrant, 
we dismiss such heterogeneity a priori”. Stereotypes considering typical Mexican 
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migrants as young male, poor, undereducated in search of any employment, still 
contribute to the narrative of undesirability that permeates the political debate and 
marketing.  
The proposed analyses orient the reader to correct this view capturing how different 
reasons underlying migration decisions are shaped on individual interests and how 
these are strongly influenced by structural and cultural context mobilising different 
groups of migrants and modelling their behaviours. 
 
Marek Okólski (ed.), European immigrations: trends, structures and policy 
implications, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam (2015)  
 
This book aims at providing a Continent-wide outlook on migration processes by 
addressing the long term transition of different European countries from net emigration 
to net immigration areas and by analysing the migrant inflow specificities, migrant 
integration patterns and related policies.  
Based on the single country migration history and migration cycle, three main groups 
are taking into consideration: the old immigration countries where transition occurred 
in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, the new immigration countries where the 
change occurred in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century and the future 
immigration countries where the transition is to be completed in the twenty-first 
century. 
Common trends and country and area distinctive dynamics and underlying factors are 
pointed out in different contributions from authors representing various European 
academic centres using original empirical evidence. These include some sub-regional 
and country case studies that highlight Southern and Eastern European perspectives 
focusing on the making of immigration model in the Mediterranean new immigration 
countries and in the post-enlargement Europe.  
The concluding chapters propose insights into migration visions and policies, comparing 
forecasts and different prospects regarding possible development and policy options. 
 
Maurizio Ambrosini (ed.), Europe: No Migrant's Land?, Edizioni Epoké (2017) 
 
The book focuses on the recent sudden upsurge of migrants reaching Europe’s shores as 
a consequence of the political instability and conflicts in the Middle East and North 
African countries, demographic and economic trends.  
While international cooperation is urgently needed, national responses are prevailing. 
Coordination is insufficient and the European response has been slow and fragmented 
and migration remains mainly a matter of national governments.  
Hassan and Mazzali 





The raising attention of a nervous public opinion has been contributing to the volatility 
of national policies and diminished the capacity of finding shared solutions to address a 
long-trend migration challenge of this magnitude.  
The volume aims at providing a better analysis of the national approaches of the last two 
decades, investigating the structural factors of the European political slow response and 
its inability to agree a common strategy.  
The first two of the five contributions included in the book deal with the ongoing debate 
on the management of the refugee crisis, mixed migration, profiles and needs of asylum 
seekers, relationships among transnational problems and national priorities, focusing on 
the above mentioned European shortcoming capacity to coordinate to tackle 
emergencies and seize opportunities.  
The third contribution concentrates on the role of immigrants in the European labour 
markets which need to address the European demographic transition, while the fourth 
one analyses the integration policies between multiculturalism and assimilation trends.  
The last closing contribution introduces the questions about citizenship in the changing 














Palestinian Household Willingness and Ability to Pay for Public Utilities in 
The West Bank: The Case of Electricity and Water 
 
Mahmoud K. El-Jafari * 
 




In spite of the fact that demand for water and electricity in the West Bank (WB) had increased 
sharply over the past decade, local providers of those services are suffering from continuous 
fiscal deficits. However, the collection efficiency of bills paid for water and electricity 
consumption is still below international standards. The main objective of this study is to assess 
the main factors behind the willingness and ability of Palestinian households to pay the bills for 
the two public utilities: Water and Electricity in the WB.  
To achieve this objective, the degree of willingness and ability model have both been developed 
and estimated in a two equation model. 
The empirical results suggest that both providers and consumers should be adopt and implement 
several areas of cooperation to improve the collection efficiency of bills. Furthermore, certain 
types of support packages should be carried out by the providers of water and electricity services 
in order to increase the area of efficiency in running public utilities in the WB . 
 







This study investigates the determinants behind the Palestinian household 
expenditure on the two major public utilities: Water and Electricity. Data, 
available from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), indicate that 
while household consumption of those commodities tends to increase over time, 
household expenditure on those utilities shows a declining trend, particularly 
since 2002. Concurrently, data available from suppliers of those utilities indicate 
that they suffer from accumulated huge fiscal deficits (PCBS, Standard of Living 
Reports, Several, Issues; PCBS, Water and Energy Statistics, Several Issues).  
 
Suppliers of public utilities, Water and Electricity attribute the acceleration of 
fiscal deficits to abstention of many customers from paying bills. In fact, it has 
become obvious that while consumption of those utilities increased over time, 
revenues received by providers of public utilities showed a shrinking trend 
through focus on demand side. Due to unavailability of data on administrative, 
                                                          
 
El-Jafari 





operational and rehabilitation costs, the role of the supply side of public utilities 
providers will be examined indirectly (PCBS, Water and Energy Statistics, Several 
Issues 2010, 2011). 
  
Although annual household income rose rapidly from $10,000 in 1996 to 
$12,000 in 1999, it showed a reverse trend in the years from 2000 until 2006. In 
2002, this annual income dropped to $9,000, a decrease of 25% from its reported 
level in 1999. However, by the year 2007, household income showed a recovery; 
its level rose almost to that of 1996. Since then, annual household income rose to 
$ 12,726 in the years 2010 and 2011 (PCBS: National Accounts, Several Issues).  
 
On the other hand, household consumption expenditures showed a similar trend 
to that of household annual income. It increased from $7,000 in 1996 and 
reached a peak of $9,122 in 2011. However, it showed some variation from one 
year to another in the period between 1999 and 2007. During the period 2000-
2007, household   consumption expenditures were below their level in 1999. 
Since the year 2008, household consumption expenditures tended to increase 
compared to their level in 1996-1999. Household consumption expenditures 
increased from $8412 in 2008 to $9122 in 2011; it constituted an annual 
increase of 15%. The reduction in household income and consumption 
expenditures during the period 2000-2007, compared to its levels, during 1996-
1999 and 2008-2011, could be attributed to several factors as listed below: 
 
i. Israeli restrictions imposed on Palestinian labor mobility. Since the 
outbreak of the Second Uprising in the WB, the number of Palestinians 
working in Israeli economic sectors had dropped by 70%. It went 
down from 200,000 in 1999 to less than 80,000 during 2008-2011. As 
a result, many workers lost their jobs during 2000-2007; the rate of 
unemployment tripled and reached (36%), compared to its level of 
(10%) in 1999. 
ii. Transfer payments showed a significant drop since the year 2000, for 
most of the donor aids were allocated to humanitarian relief. 
 
As a result, proportions of household expenditures on public utilities to 
household income have increased. Over the past decade, it rose from 8% in the 
year 1996 to 13% in 2004 and it rose up to 9% by the year 2011. Since water and 
electricity are considered life necessities, a decrease in household income 
exerted pressure on its consumption expenditures. Figure 1 shows an increasing 
trend of average monthly expenditures on water and electricity over the period 
1996-2011, with some variations. In the year 2011, average monthly 
expenditures were $45 and $23 for water and electricity, respectively (PCBS, 
National Accounts, Several Issues). 
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Fig. 1 - Average monthly household expenditures on water and electricity in the West Bank 
(Jordanian  Dinar. Jordan Dinar = 1.42 U.S Dollar) 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Standard of Living, Several Issues. 
 
 
Fig. 2 - Proportion of electricity and water expenditure to total household expenditures in 
percentages (%) 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Standard of Living, Several Issues. 
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Since 2007, in Figure 1, sharp increases in average monthly expenditures on 
water and electricity services have been attributed to increases in the prices of 
these two services. In contrast, Figure 2, the proportion of average monthly 
expenditures on water and electricity services to average monthly household 
consumption expenditures showed a slight increase particularly in the years 
2007-2011. This trend followed a decrease trend in the proportion of water and 
electricity expenditures to total household consumption expenditures, between 
2003 and 2007. The green line, in Figure 2, shows the total proportion of 
household expenditures of electricity and water to total household consumption 
expenditures. 
 
However, average monthly household expenditures (bills paid by customers) 
were on the decrease.  Consequently, it was not surprising to find out that the 
gap between the value of consumption of public utilities and that of the bills paid 
by customers has widened over time. As a result, the fiscal deficit tended to 
increase. For example, the fiscal deficit of Jerusalem District Electricity Company 
went up from $30 million in the year 2000 to $100 million in the year 2011; an 
increase of 233%; with an annual growth rate of 13%. Similarly, the fiscal deficit 
of Palestinian Water Authority has doubled 15 times over the period 1996-2011. 
It had increased dramatically from $5 million in 1996 to $85 million in 2011 
(PCBS, Standard of Living Reports, Several Issues; PCBS, Water and Energy 
Reports, Several Issues). 
 
Data available on collection efficiency indicate that this ratio ranged between 
69% in Tulkarem Governorate and 90% in Qalqilia. Collection efficiency is 
defined by the ratio of revenues received by Water Authority from customers to 
that of the current annual year billing. An increase of this ratio indicates an 
efficiency of collection in the value of bills issued by the Water Authority to 
customers. In Qalqilia and Ramallah, granting promotional discounts to 
customers is one of the policies practiced by water authorities to collect 
payments. (Palestinian Water Authority; Annual Regulation Report, Various 
Issues).  
 
In addition, the administrations of public utilities have intensified investment in 
the public utilities, mainly water and electricity. Performance and efficiency 
improvement of  infrastructure of both electricity and water sectors, through a 
decrease in loss rates, has been considered as the main reason behind 
intensification of investments in those sectors. The inefficiency has been 
manifested by increases in loss rates which reached over 30% of total utilities 
distributed from original supplier to final customers. In general, the value of loss 
rates is considered as a cost which is covered through an increase in the final 
price paid by customers. In addition, loss rates in water and electricity have been 
perceived as the major source for accumulation of debts for both Palestinian 
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Water Authorities and Electricity Companies. Over the period, 2000-2011, gross 
investments exceeded one billion U.S dollars (World Bank Reports, Several 
Issues).   
 
Despite intensification of investments in water and electricity utilities toward  
rehabilitation  and upgrade of their quality, fiscal deficits showed a persistent 
and continuous trend. Palestinian Water Authorities received loans to invest in 
upgrading and rehabilitation of their networks. However, loss rates remained 
above normal level (PCBS, Performance of the Palestinian Economy, Various 
Issues). 
 
The main objective of this study is to assess the key factors behind Palestinian 
household willingness and ability to pay bills for these two public utilities: water 
and electricity. In particular, the gap between the value of actual consumption of 
these utilities and that of household expenditures on them, through payment of 
bills, calls for analysis of  household behavior. Therefore, the imbalance, between 
the actual consumption of the utilities and bills paid by customers, has led to an 
increase in fiscal deficits which eventually led to an accumulation of debits of 
Public Utilities Authorities. However, the specific objectives of this study are 
intended to determine the factors behind household willingness and ability to 
pay bills received after one to two months following actual consumption of 
electricity and water. To achieve this objective, an ordered probit model of 
willingness and ability has been developed and estimated. It is expected that the 
empirical model would indicate the variables that most likely have an impact on 
decision making by the household to pay bills for water and electricity 
consumption. Based on empirical results, several recommendations and policies 
are formulated to decision makers in both Electricity and Water Authorities, 
separately and jointly. It is anticipated that these recommendations would  be 
very helpful to enable them to mitigate their fiscal deficits, on one hand, and to 








In this section, performance and function of the WB public utilities: electricity 
and water are outlined below. The performance of water public services is 
mentioned followed by an analysis of the electricity sector. 
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 (i) Water authorities in the West Bank 
 
  
Currently, there are six water authorities which provide services in the WB. They 
include: 
 
i. Jerusalem Water Undertaking. It is a public and independent water 
supply utility. It provides services to northern areas of Jerusalem, 
Ramallah, Albeera, Betonia and several villages and camps located in 
the governorate. 
 
ii. Water Authority of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour. It is non-
governmental body. It provides services to a population of  180,000 in 
the governorate, and it is located in four cities, three camps, and 
fifteen villages. 
 
iii. Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilia, Salfeet Water Departments; each city has a 
water department, directed by municipality. They are classified as 
public providers and non-profit organizations. 
  
The performance and function of each water authority or/and provider varies 
from one to another. While the average selling price per cubic meter to the end 
users (households and industry) is $1.5 in Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramallah and 
Nablus, it approximates $1 in Tulkarem and Salfeet and less than $0.5 in Qalqilia. 
In general, determination of sale price to end users depends mainly on operating 
costs per cubic meter of water. While it is the highest in Jerusalem, Ramallah, 
Bethlehem and Salfeet, the ratio of operating costs per m³ of water to the selling 
price approximates 110%. In contrast, it accounts for less than 80% in Qalqilia 
(Palestinian Water Authority, Annual Reports). 
  
Each provider supplies water from wells, springs located in each governorate 
and purchased water through WB Water Department (WBWD) from different 
sources such as Israeli Water Company (Mekorot) to cover shortages in water 
supply in the West Bank. WBWD is a governmental body. It plays the major role 
in regulating the function of water providers in terms of sale prices and volume 
of water in cubic meters pumped to end users. Also, WBWD, as a regulator, 
approves and monitors water prices to each water supplier located in the 
governorate. This policy aims to make this commodity reachable and attainable 
to each consumer (final user) on one hand and to ensure financial viability and 
sustainability of water services providers (Palestinian Water Authority, Annual 
Reports). 
Due to the unique situation of the Palestinian economy, the determination of 
household expenditures for electricity and water depends, not only on the 
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economic situation in Palestine, but also on macroeconomic variables in Israel. 
While 60% of the WB water needs are imported from Israel, imports of 
electricity and energy account for more than 20% of total merchandise imports. 
In many WB governorates, 100% of electricity needs is imported by Palestinian 
Electricity Authorities to be distributed through them to the end-user in the 
Palestinian districts (PCBS, Foreign Trade, Statistics, Goods and Services, Several 
Issues).    
 
In northern areas such as Tulkarem, Jenin and Salfeet, Water Authorities produce 
the total quantities of  water distributed to end users. In contrast, Nablus, and 
Southern areas : Ramallah , Jerusalem , Bethlehem , and Hebron , their purchases  
from Israel water companies account for more than 60% of total water supplied 
to end users (Palestinian Water Authority , Annual Reports). 
  
 
 (ii) Palestinian electricity sector 
 
  
Although the Electricity sector in Palestine depends on external energy sources, 
its role in determining tariffs and prices is highly considered. This sector consists 
of four major companies. They have a single source of power from Israeli 
Electricity Corporation; they are listed below:  
 
i. Jerusalem District Electricity Company Limited. This is the largest 
company specialized in distributing electricity to concession areas 
located in the four central governorates: Jerusalem, Ramallah, 
Bethlehem and Jericho.  
ii. Southern Electricity Company. It provides services to three major 
cities. Yatta, Dahriya and Dura.  
iii. Hebron Electric Power Company.  It provides services to Hebron and 
Hahoul cities.  
iv. North Electricity Distribution Company. It provides services to only 
40% of the population in the Northern districts of Nablus, Tulkarm, 
Jenin, Salfeat, Qalqilia, Tubas. 
 
Currently, a specific tariff has been proposed for each electricity company by 
Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council (PERC). Tariff rates are determined 
based on operating costs to enable companies to provide services through 
reducing technical and nontechnical losses (Palestinian Electricity Regulatory 
Council, Annual Reports).    
While household consumption of water reaches peak levels during summer 
season (June, July, August, September), it tends to reach lower levels   between 
November to March. It is obvious to find out that values of water bills show an 
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increasing trend during summer season compared to other months of the year. 
In contrast, electricity bills are usually greater during winter season compared to 
their levels in other months of the year. 
 
Due to high values of electricity bills compared to low value of water bills in 
winter months, households’ willingness and ability to pay bills for water are 
more than those for electricity. In the same manner, during the summer season, 
the values of electricity bills are relatively lower than those of the water bills. 
Consequently, households have more willingness and ability to pay electricity 
bills than water bills in summer seasons. 
 
The evaluation of water depends on volume of cubic meters received by 
household and the number of days; water services are provided to end users 
monthly. Therefore, any decrease in service days or/and volume of cubic meters 
of water would push consumers to buy water from private companies. Usually, 
the price of selling water from private companies to end users is four times more 
than that charged by Water Authorities during the summer season. 
Consequently, water bills have become very high particularly, when consumers 
pay for water needs purchased from private sources. 
  
By the same token, while a consumer would pay in advance to private companies 
in order to receive water services,   he/she may not pay water bill received from 
public authority. However, although household demand for water is very latent 
and water consumption depends on household needs, particularly in summer, 
household purchases of water from private sources are largely dependent on 
price level and household income.   
 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
 
  
Household affordability and ability to pay for water and electricity consumption 
have been extensively discussed, particularly over the last decade (Ahmad, 
Goldba and Misra 2005; Merrett 2002). While research on those issues had been 
conducted at micro levels, several methodologies are employed. Although 
research on affordability and ability to pay is multidisciplinary (Sociology, 
Economics and Political Sciences) and a major concern for decision makers, at 
this stage, only applied Economics research studies are reviewed. 
 
At the micro level, Fankhauser (Fankhauser 2005, 2006, and 2008) investigated 
the affordability and ability concepts on household expenditures for public 
utilities in transitional economies in Eastern Europe. Also, Pavlova (Pavlova 
2004) discussed willingness and ability to pay for health care services in 
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Bulgaria. The impact of socio-demographic and economic factors on the 
responses to willingness to pay was examined. Also Snowball (Snowball et al. 
2008) examined willingness to pay and preferences for water in South Africa. 
The empirical results indicate that prices have a direct and significant effect on 
determining preferences. The paper suggests that lower income and educational 
levels can be used in the model to state household choices. In this study, ordered 
probit model has been employed to investigate factors affecting household 
behavior toward payment of bills for electricity and water public utilities. This 
technique has been extensively used to determine the degree of household 
willingness and ability to pay bills for electricity and water consumption. On the 
other hand, AlGhuraiz and Enshasi (AlGhuraiz and Enshasi 2005) examined how 
water pricing could be integrated with socio-economic objectives to effectively 
meet cost   and  make water prices affordable to consumers (Greene 2012; 
Haghjou et al. 2013; Teker et al. 2013; Sukant et al. 1991). 
 
For the analytical framework, the model specified and estimated in this study is 
based on research works done by Yang and Raehsler (Yang and Raehsler 2005), 
Raehsler (Raehsler et al. 2012), Duncan (Duncan et al. 2005), Chan, Miller and 
Tcha (Chan, Miller and Tcha 2005). 
In this study, willingness and ability to pay for water and electricity services are 
considered in formulating the model.  Due to unsystematic payment of bills, 
degree of willingness and ability to pay are investigated. The gap between 
payment of bills and actual value of electricity and water consumption is 
attributed  to the following reasons: 
 
1) Although tariff rates for electricity and water services are constant for all 
users, the level of actual payment by households varies from one month to 
another. Therefore, total or partial payment of bills  or even non-payment 
at all depends on the WTP and ATP.   
2) Consequently, the analysis focuses on the degree of WTP and / or of ATP.       
While previous research work used binary variables (1, 0) to quantify the 
WTP and ATP toward a change in tariff rates and selling prices to end 
users, in this study, a range of values is employed to quantify WTP and 
ATP. For example, WTP=5, if the household shows a very high degree of 
willingness to pay the full bill of the service (electricity or water). 
Similarly, WTP=4, if the household has high degree of willingness to pay 
the whole bill of the service; he or she may pay a portion of the bill. The 
third degree, WTP=3, is when the household has a reasonable willingness 
to pay the bill of the service.  However, the scale of willingness to pay 
could be represented as follows: 
 
WTP=5, Household shows a very high degree of willingness to pay the full 
bill. 
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WTP=4, Household shows a high degree of willingness to pay the bill. 
WTP=3, Household shows a reasonable degree of willingness to pay more 
than 50% of the bill. 
WTP=2, Household shows a low degree of willingness to pay small 
portion of the bill. 
WTP=1, Household shows a very low degree of willingness to pay the bill. 
WTP=0, When the household lacks   willingness to pay the bill totally. 
 
Similarly, ATP could be scaled following the same manner of measuring WTP, 
which can be represented as follows: 
 
ATP=5, Household shows  a very high degree of ability to pay the bill. 
ATP=4, Household shows  a high degree of ability to pay the bill. 
ATP=3, Household shows a reasonable degree of ability to pay the bill. 
ATP=2, Household shows a low degree of ability to pay the bill. 
ATP=1, Household  shows a very low degree of ability to pay the bill. 
ATP=0, When the household lacks the ability to pay the bill. 
 
Based on the above considerations, an economic model will be utilized to analyze 
the expected impact of the economic, social and political factors on the degrees of 
WTP versus ATP which causes the gap between actual consumption and 
household payment of bills for public utilities namely, electricity and water. In 
other words, through analyzing the determination of collection inefficiency of 
bills, a better billing and collection mechanism is proposed.    
This study has identified the major elements behind household expenditures on 
public utilities within the context of the following factors: 
 
(1)  Economic factors, 
(2)  Social factors, 
(3)  Legal factors. 
 
Investigation of factors behind widening the gap between actual value of 
household consumption of water and electricity and household expenditures for 
these utilities represents the key issue in this study. Therefore, this study will 
provide a better understanding of the extent that Palestinian households can 
afford and/or be able to pay bills when she/he receives them separately or 
jointly at the end of the month. The impact of factors behind the decision made 
by customers to pay bills totally, partially or abstain from doing so, is the most 
significant subject matter of this study.  
  
In the case of water and electricity, the customer consumes and/or utilizes the 
service and then she/he pays for consumption. This case is different from other 
goods and services when payments are made before acquiring the services such 
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as health and education. However, payment of water and electricity bills is made 
at the end of the month, households set up priorities for their payments for 
services such as transportation, health and education. In such situations, 
household payments become subject to various degrees of willingness and 
ability to pay when he or she succeeds in allocating the budget to finance 
household needs.   
 
It seems that the degree of WTP is determined based on his/ her degree of ATP 
and other socio-economic factors. ATP reflects the level of consumption 
expenditures allocated by the household on commodity sets.  It is expected that 
someone (a household) may show one of the thirty six options towards paying 




Tab. 1 - Cross-Tabulation of possible options of the degree of willingness and ability to pay 
 Degree of Willingness to Pay 































































































Each cell presents the interaction between the degree of willingness and ability 
to pay bills. For example, cell number 1 indicates the highest level of willingness 
and ability to pay. The value of cell 1 is calculated by multiplying   the degree of 
willingness to pay in the first column (Very high =5) by the degree of ability to 
pay in the first row (Very high =5). Consequently, the value of cell 1 equals 25. In 
the same manner, the value of cell number 7 equals 20.  However, the value of 
cell 36 is the lowest; it equals zero. On the other hand, Table 1 shows the 
interaction and compensation between willingness and ability to pay, and 
                                                          
1 The value of the cell  that  indicates  the interaction between the degree of willingness and ability to pay bills. 
2 The number of the cell. 
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consequently the rank or the index of payment bills. For example ,  the value of  
cell 2 , indicates that degree of ATP is greater than the degree of WTP. On the 
other hand , the value of cell 7 equal cell 2, but it shows that the that degree of 
WTP is greater than the degree of ATP. 
 
Moreover, Table 1 shows 36 outcomes that would represent the probabilities of 
household behavior toward payment of bills for water and electricity. Each cell 
contains the number of respondents, showing their attitudes toward willingness 
and ability to pay bills. It is obvious that the relationships between the degree of 
WTP and the degree ATP is indeterminate. In other words, the relationship 
between the degree of WTP and ATP could be complementary or independent. 
The horizontal axis shows scale measures of potential willingness to install 
payment for bills of consuming and/or utilizing electricity and / or water 
services.  The vertical axis shows potential ability to pay bills for consuming 
water and electricity services.  Each cell in Table 1 shows the interaction 
between various degrees of willingness and ability to pay bills for water and 
electricity consumption. As the degree of WTP increases, it becomes closer to 5.   
 
 
4. Specification of the model and methodology 
 
  
The decision made by a household who has willingness and/or the ability to pay 
his/her bills following  the elapse of a certain period of time of consumption of 
water or electricity can be expressed by the following model. 
 
 
 (i) Equations of Degree of willingness to pay (DWTP) 
 
The following equation represents the degree of willingness to pay the bills after 
consumption of water and electricity services; it could be represented as follows: 
 




DWTPij = Degree of willingness to pay bills for water or electricity consumption 
by the jth household. The value of the variable DWTPi   ranges between 0 and 5. 
If the value equals zero, the WTP does not exist.  On the other hand, if DWTP=5, 
the household has the highest degree of willingness to pay the bills for water and 
/ or electricity consumption. i=1 for water; i=2 for electricity. Bo, B1k, B2l, B3m, 
B4h are parameters to be estimated. K, l, m, h, are set of   parameters to be 
estimated with respect to   variables included in each group of variables. 
El-Jafari 






The value of DWTPij or /and DATPij   for paying bills for water and /or electricity  
was estimated  from data obtained by questionnaires filled by Palestinian 
families in the West Bank, see section 2 in the questionnaire attached as 
appendix . In this regard, the values of  DWTPij or /and DATPij   were constructed 
based on  the  perceptions of the Palestinian families ( respondents) as 
demonstrated in the questionnaires. Although Table 1 shows that there is a 
trade-off between DWTPij and DATPij on one hand , there is a positive  and 
mutual relationship  between them . Variables included in the right hand have 
selected based on economic theory. Therefore, it is not expected to have 
inconsistency in the specification of the model. 
 
DATPij = Degree of ability to pay bills for water or electricity consumption by the 
jth household. The value of the variable DATPij is coded between 0 and 5. If the 
value equals zero, the ATP does not exist. On the hand, if DATP=5, the household 
has the highest degree of ability to pay bills for water and / or electricity 
consumption (Cooper and Schindler 2011).    
 
PRFij = Group of personal factors related to household respondents. They include 
age, marital status, family size, education. 
 
EConij = Group of economic factors such as  incomes received by the household, 
family  members who received incomes; number of appliances owned by the 
household; household debts of unpaid bills for electricity and water 
consumption; proportion of bills value to household consumption expenditures; 
exemptions and discounts; debts accumulations; debts interest rates.  
 
LAWij = Group of legislative factors related to law enforcement such as notice 
sent by Water Authorities and Electricity Companies to households to pay debts.   
 
Uij= Disturbance terms, normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
 
Variables included in equation (1) above were based on the empirical models 
specified and estimated in the empirical work  (Haghjou et al. 2013;Teker et al. 
2013; Sukant et al. 1991).  
While certain variables are quantitatively classified, others are considered 
qualitative. Following Cooper and Schindler, 2011, qualitative variables were 
quantitatively transformed to evaluate the attitudes and behaviors of consumers 
when they decide to pay bills for water and electricity consumption. In this 
regard, measurements of qualitative variables were developed based on Likert 
scale, for more details see Appendix 1. 
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 (ii) Equations of Degree of ability to pay (DATP) 
  
The following model represents the degree of ability to pay the bills of electricity 
and water consumption by household.  It could be represented as follows: 
 
DATPij = Bo+B1kECOnij + B2lPRFij +B3mLAWij +B4hDWTPij +Uij           (2) 
 
Where variables are defined as above in equation 1. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) represent households’ behavior toward their payment for 
actual demand for public utilities: water and electricity. In the WB, consumption 
of water and electricity precedes paying bills. They include the price and the 
amount of money that a household should pay as a result of his/her consumption 
of those services.  In this model, the degree of WTP has been considered to range 
from 0 to 5. When the degree of WTP equals 0, it indicates that the household 
lacks interests and willingness to pay bills for consumption of electricity and 
water, regardless of his/her ability to pay (income).  If the degree of WTP 
approaches 5, customer proceeding to pay the bill is subject to his / her ATP 
(income) and other socio-economic and legal factors.  On the other hand, ATP is 
subject to WTP. It implies that when ATP approaches 5, the household has a high 
degree of ability (income) to pay bills, and this is subject to the degree of WTP. 
The relationship between the DATP and DWTP is expected to be positive. As  
mentioned above, several possibilities could be stated regarding interactions or 
combinations of relationships between ATP and WTP.  
As income increases, standard of living could rise and acquisition of electrical 
appliances that use water and electricity would increase. Therefore, it is 
expected that ATP and WTP would move jointly.  On the other hand, ATP reflects 
the allocation of consumption expenditure to a different set of commodities. In 
the real world, each household allocates consumption expenditures to a set of 
commodities to maximize his/her utility. This is called “multistage 
maximization”. While priorities are given to food, housing and clothes, 
consumption expenditure on water and electricity services usually comes in the 
lowest rank. However, as household income increases the DATP would increase. 
Similarly, DWTP would be positively associated with the level of education, age, 
and location in the city and so on.  In the case of a high degree of WTP customers 
are satisfied with the quality of services (water or /and electricity). 
 
 
5. Data sources and sample characteristics 
 
Primary data were gathered on household expenditures and consumption of 
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water and electricity in the WB. Moreover, a questionnaire was designed to 
gather data on the variables related to household decision to pay for 
consumption of public utilities. More data were gathered on the economic, social 
and academic variables related to the customers. The model examined how a 
payment decision is made after the consumption of public utilities. In addition, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior personnel in the 
Palestinian Water Authority and Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council 
during the years 2011 and 2012. 
The field work for the study was undertaken in the period between July 2011to 
February 2012. Field workers, who helped us in collecting the data, are highly 
trained and qualified. They gathered data from the head of the family, by handing 
questionnaires to him/or her directly. Although gathering data was relatively 
expensive with respect to average cost rate, the approach followed by the field 
workers to collect the questionnaires was very rewarding. To meet the objectives 
of the study, the data for this study were collected via a face-to-face 
questionnaire. The survey was conducted among Palestinian households in the 
WB cities, villages and camps. Household distribution of the sample was based 
on secondary data published by Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). 
The questionnaire was distributed on a sample of 500 households across the WB 
governorates using random sampling.  The sample (N= 500) indicates that the 
response rate was 100%. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of four parts. Data gathered on personal and social 
demographic variables were in the first part. The second part was designed to 
collect information on electrical appliances used by households and whether 
their use depends on water and electricity. Also, it included information on 
household loans used to pay for water authorities and electricity companies. 
 
The third part of the questionnaire dealt with data on household satisfaction 
with consumption of water and electricity services. The reasons and factors that 
push households to pay or abstain from paying electricity bills were included. 
Those factors include proportion of expenditures to income, receiving bills on 
time, receiving exemptions, receiving water, electricity and other bills at the 
same time.  
 
Policies and incentives that were provided by water authorities and electricity 
companies to encourage households to pay their bills regularly were presented 
in part four. An empirical analysis of the degree of willingness and ability to pay 
was conducted based on the primary data collected during 2011 and early 2012. 
For more details, see appendix A. 
 
Table 2 shows the main indicators of the sample of Palestinian household 
expenditures on public utilities (Electricity & Water) in the WB during 2011 and 
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early 2012. They are outlined below as follows: 
 
1) 87.4% and 88.6% of the households respondents were males and 
married, respectively.  These indicators are consistent  with statistics 
published by PCBS . They indicate that that for more than 85% of 
Palestinian families are headed by men. 
2) The age distribution was dominated by customers at the age of 45 or 
less. They accounted for more than 80%. 
3) On the other hand, family size with more than 5 members accounted 
for more than 60%.  
4) The highest level of education of the respondents was high school 
50%. However,  
5) heads of households who hold B.Sc. degree and above accounted for 
33%. 
6) Regarding ownership of houses, 84% of respondents owned houses.  
7) Monthly household income averaged $600 for 46% of the 
respondents3. 
8) 96% of the income is generated by the father.  
Table 3 summarizes  the expected outcomes of the attitudes of households in the 
WB toward bill payments for water and electricity consumption. Due to the lag 
period from one to two months between consumption and expenditures of 
electricity and water services, household behavior toward payments and 
appreciation of the services could be outlined as follows: 
 
1) 31% of the households appreciate the quality of water services, and 
they pay bills on time. 
2) On the other hand, around 62% of the households do not appreciate 
the quality of water services. In fact the demand for water is very 
latent due to high shortages in fresh water supply in the WB. While 
31% of the respondents have the ATP, 31% are unwilling to pay their 
bills; they do not recognize the quality of water services which makes 
them declare that they are unwilling to pay. 
3) While only 15% of the respondents realize the quality of water 
services (willingness to pay) they do not have the ATP. This segment 
of customers should be treated positively to help them pay their bills. 
4) For electricity, around 78% of the respondents disregarded the quality 
of these services. 
5) While 37% of the households have the ability to pay, 41% are 
unwilling and unable to pay. 
6) Only 4% of the respondents ignore the quality of electricity, regardless 
of their inability to pay for the bills of this service. 
7) It is obvious, in Table 2, that households in the WB are willing to pay 
                                                          
3 U.S dollar= 3.9  new Israeli Shekel( NIS). 
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bills for water consumption more than their willingness to pay for 
electricity consumption bills. Around 78% of the respondents 
underestimated the quality of electricity services. In contrast, 62% of 
the respondents ignored the quality of water.  
 
 
Tab. 2 - Sample Characteristics of Palestinian Household Expenditures on Public Utilities 
(Electricity & Water) in the West Bank, 2011 
Variables  Categories N. % 










































Academic Qualification  High school and less 
Intermediate Diploma 







Family Income  Less than $599 
$600-800 
$900-1,499 






























































Tab. 3 - Distribution of Household Expenditures for Water and Electricity in the West Bank 
with respect to their WTP/UWTP and ATP/ IATP 
I: Water services4 
Attitudes IATP ATP Total 
 23.0% (115) 15% (75) 38.6% (190) 
 31% (155) 31% (155) 62% (310) 
 54.6% (270) 46% (230) 500 
 
II: Electricity services 
Attitudes IATP ATP Total 
WTP 18% (90) 3.9% (20) 21.9% (110) 
UWTP 37% (185) 41% (205) 78% (390) 
Total 55% (275) 44.9 (225) 500 
 
1-percentage of the sample in that option  
Numbers in parenthesis are absolute values 
WTP= Willingness to pay. 
UWTP= Unwillingness to pay.  
ATP=Ability to pay. 
IATP= Inability to pay. 
 
Around these three dimensions, a new perspective on integration, through 




6. Empirical results 
 
  
In this section, the empirical results of the estimated equations are presented 
and discussed. The estimated equations, presented in Table 4, concerning the 
degree of willingness and ability to pay water bills are discussed. Then, the 
estimated equations of the willingness and ability to pay electricity bills, shown 
in Table 5, are also analyzed. 
 
Given that primary data utilized to estimate the model, the first consideration for 
estimation procedure is the statistical specification of the equations and 
selection of the appropriate estimation technique. Since DWTP and DATP are 
                                                          
4 Numbers in parenthesis are the subset of the sample in that option. 
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polychotomous variables and in natural order, they reflect only ranking where, 
the dependent variable is coded from 0 to 5, as shown in Table 1. 
Equations (1) and (2) are classified ordered probit model. In this case, estimation 
is undertaken by maximum likelihood, where DWTP or DATP is an unobserved 
index of satisfaction of willingness and ability to pay by the household 
consumption of water and electricity services j=1 electricity; 2= water (Yang and 
Raehsler 2005; Kennedy 2003; Kutner Nachtsheim Neter 2005; Greene 2003). 
With the ordered probit model, a positive coefficient indicates higher probability 
of degree of willingness and / or ability to pay for bills. However, since most of 
the independent and dependent variables are qualitative variables, they have 
been transformed into quantitative variables. The discussion of the estimated 
coefficient is kept general. Therefore, the effects of the explanatory variables are 
computed at the sample average of the variables.    
  
 Significant and insignificant variables in the estimated equations are presented 
in Tables (4) to (5). The coefficient estimates with standard error of estimates for 
each estimated coefficient are shown as well as F- test and R2 to show the degree 
of significance of each estimated equation. Most of the coefficient estimates of 
those variables are highly significant at .01 percent level. The coefficient 
estimates measure the degree or level of impact of each explanatory variable 
with respect to the endogenous variable on one hand and the other explanatory 
variable in each estimated equation on the other. 
 
 
 (i) The estimated model of the willingness and ability to pay water bills 
 
The empirical results indicate that DWTP is more likely to increase with respect 
to changes in the following variables: 
 
Personal variables: Household respondents aged above 31, married, with a large 
family size, living in the city; households with university qualifications affect 
positively household attitudes towards willingness to pay bills. These results 
explain that the degree of willingness to pay would increase when the household 
respondents acquire those characteristics. Therefore, households, who acquire 
those characteristics have a positive attitude toward water services. On the 
contrary, for a given income, large families may have a lower willingness to pay 
their bills.  Similarly, large families would reduce the household ability to pay 
water bills, particularly, when one of the parents is the major source of income. 
   
Economic variables: It is expected that the DWTP would rise as the level of 
households with higher income classes’ increases, particularly when more than 
one person generates   income in the family. In addition, a coefficient estimate of 
the number of electrical appliances denotes that this factor is highly correlated 
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with income and standard of living.  As a result, the households will spend more 
money on their prosperity through acquiring electrical appliances, which require 
more utilization of water and electricity. Also, the empirical results showed that 
the DWTP would increase when households feel that they pay a fair tariff to 
water authority. These variables appeared to be highly significant. On the other 
hand, DWTP would decrease gradually with respect to the following variables.  
 
• When proportion of bill values to total consumption expenditures 
increases over time.  
• When the value of debts per household becomes larger for Water 
Authority, DWTP would decrease.  
 
From the customer side, abstention from paying water bills would lead to 
accumulation of debts. Therefore, when the law is not enforced, Water Authority 
usually lacks the power to force households to pay their bills. The only measures 
used by Water Authority were to impose fines on household debts. 
 
The coefficient determination implies that 89% of variations in the DWTP are 
attributed to changes in personal and economic variables in the right hand side 
of the model. The empirical results of the estimated model of the DATP are 
similar to those discussed with DWTP. With respect to personal and 
demographic variables, the coefficient estimates signify that households aged 
above 45 were more highly significant than those with respect DATP compared 
to those variables with respect to DWTP.  In addition, DATP was highly sensitive 
and significant with respect to economic variables, particularly, income classes 
above 3000 NIS and number of workers in the family. However, DATP would 
decrease if the level of debts to Water Authority increases.  
 
Coordination and cooperation between water authorities and other public utility 
providers would enable households to pay these bills. It implies that DATP would 
increase. For example, when households receive a number of bills at the same 
time, DATP would decrease. Therefore, receiving the electricity or water bills 
month by month would  enable the household to pay the bill on time. 
 
The absence of law enforcement remains one of the major factors behind the 
decline in DATP. Therefore, enforcement of law has a positive impact on DATP 
and leads to an improvement of collection efficiency. In this regard, one could 
conclude that the gap between DWTAP and DATP would be bridged through 
approval of a set of legislations and eventually transfer them into law 
enforcement.  
 
The existence of a law with other measures could increase the degree of DWTP 
and DATP. Households would pay bills when they are granted exemptions and 
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discounts along with a waiver on debts interest rates. 
Based on the empirical results in Table 4, households with high degree of ability 
to pay were highly greater than those with a high degree of willingness to pay; 
therefore, several measures should be applied to improve collection efficiency of 
DWP and DATP jointly since households recognize that they consume a high 
quality service.  
 
 
 (ii) The estimated model of the willingness and ability to pay electricity bills 
 
Table 5 indicates that DATP were more highly sensitive than DWTP to personal, 
economic and legal factors. These results could be attributed to the fact that 
electricity companies and authorities can apply several measures and practices 
toward household users. Households, aged above 20 have DATP greater than 
DWTP. These results indicate that households aged between 20 and 60 years 
olod are more likely able to pay bills than households who are above 60 and less 
than 20. In addition, households with income ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 NIS, 
living in their own houses and do consider prices, are more able to pay electricity 
bills. 
 
Similar to those results discussed about DATP and DWTP for water, the increases 
in the proportion of bills value to total consumption expenditures would increase 
household debts to Electricity Company. Therefore, increasing debts has a 
negative impact on the DATP. On the other hand, household debts above 2,000 
and increase in proportion of bill value to total consumption expenditures, 
receiving more than one bill at the same time and absence of law enforcement 
have a negative impact on the ability to pay electricity bills. Consequently, it was 
not surprising to find out that only 37% of household respondents have high 
degree of WTP and ATP to pay electricity bills. However, around 18% of the 
respondents showed a very low degree of WTP. 41% expressed inability to pay 
and unwillingness to pay electricity bills. 
 
The empirical results signify that DWTP and DATP are highly sensitive to law 
enforcement. Over the past three years, law enforcement in the WB has been 
enhanced. Payment in advance is a new mechanism that has been applied by 
electricity companies. When the customers’ debts increase over time, the 
electricity company would cease the services and then he/she must pay in 
advance before consumption. This measure has pushed many household users to 
pay electricity bills on time. However, this case is not applicable on water 
services. According to domestic laws and regulations no one can prevent 
households from receiving water services. 
 
The regression results presented in Table (5) show that the academic 
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qualifications (Bachelor Degree), households owning houses, households 
receiving incomes above NIS 2,000, price satisfaction, households aged above 45, 
bills received on time, households with debts less than NIS 1,000  and granted 
exemptions, appeared to be the most significant factors behind enhancement of  
the DWTP. These results imply that households are concerned about economic 
variables. In contrast, family size, income with less than NIS 1,000, increase in 
debts values, absence of law enforcement and receiving more than one bill at the 
same time are the main factors that would have negative impacts on the DWTP. 
However, adjustment of those variables would be very helpful to increase DWTP.  
It is obvious that few factors have impacted the attitudes of the households 
toward the DWTP. In this regard, the degree of DWTP requires an enhancement 










Tab. 4 - Estimated Model Based on the Degree of Willingness and Ability to Pay for Water Bills 
Independent  DWTP DATP 
variables Coefficient 
estimates 




Standard error of 
estimates 
Constant 0.543 0.86 0.343 0.55 
DWTP5 4.412  1.69*   
DWTP4 2.397  0.85**   
DWTP3  1.195 0.34*   
DWTP2 0.98 0.26*   
DWTP1 0.69 0.16*   
DATP5   4.56 0.15* 
DATP4   2.451 0.061* 
DATP3   1.299 0.084* 
DATP2   0.66 0.096 
DATP1   0.45 0.16* 
DATP/ DWTP DATP/0.35 0.12* DWTP/0.65 0.26* 
Personal variables 









- Age  









           31-44 0.39 0.17** 0.49 0.22** 
           45-60    0.2 0.008* 0.3 0.006* 
           60 and above   0.1 0.002* 0.15 0.02* 
- Marital Status (Married) 0.5 0.0113* 0.65 .0006* 
- Family Size  0.35 0.11* 0.55 0.022* 
- Housing Style (Owner) 0.6 0.06* 0.7 0.336* 
- Residence     
              City  0.7 0.4** 0.8 0.22* 
              Village 0.39 0.33 0.49 0.33** 
- Education  









             Bachelor Degree  0.45 0.15** 0.35 0.03* 
- Income      
           Less than 2,000 NIS  -0.09 -0.005* -0.19 -0.02* 
           2,000-3,000 0.65 0.335** 0.55 0.22** 
           3,000-5,000 0.55 0.005* 0.45 0.033 
           5,000 and above  0.2 0.001* 0.3 0.009* 
- Family provider (father)  0.22 0.005* 0.42 0.05* 
- Mother (worker)  0.27 0.02* 0.17 0.06** 
- N. of electrical appliances 0.55 0.3** 0.75 0.33* 
- Debt to Water Authority   
















Tab. 4 - continue 
Independent  DWTP DATP 
variables Coefficient 
estimates 




Standard error of 
estimates 
1,000-2,000 0.23 0.020** 0.43  
2,000-5,000 -0.19 0.003* -0.29 -0.055* 
More than 5,000  -0.12 -0.0042* -0.25 0.0321* 
- Quality Satisfaction  0.05 0.03 0.1 0.003* 
- Price Satisfaction 0.09 0.004** 0.09 0.004* 
- Service Continuity  0.11 0.045 0.16 0.0365* 
Economic variables  










- Bills received on time   -0.15 -0.005* -0.15 -0.009* 
- Granted exemptions 0.21 0.005* 0.28 0.12** 
- Increase of debts values -0.13 -0.06** -0.17 -0.05* 
- Encouragement to pay  0.15 1.006 0.13 0.069** 
- Received > 1 bill at the 
same time of  other services 
(Electricity and Telephone) 
-0.6 0.004* -0.8 -0.006* 
- Absence of law  -0.7 0.005* -0.5 0.002* 
- Imposing investor debtor  
Authorities and Companies 
request customers to pay 
back debts 
-0.2 -0.005* -0.3 -0.0045* 
R²= 0.0.91  0.85  
F=  30.3  45.5  
Df = 454  454  
  
El-Jafari 





Tab. 5 - Ordinal Probit Model Based on the Degree of Willingness and Ability to Pay for 
Electricity Bills 
Independent  DWTP DATP 
variables Coefficient 
estimates 




Standard error of 
estimates 
Constant 0.65 0.85 0.59 0.1.5 
DWTP5 2.96 0.74   
DWTP4 1.19 0.23   
DWTP3 1.62 0.27   
DWTP2 3.18 1.06   
DWTP1 2.2 0.44   
DATP5   3.55 0.88 
DATP4   2.36  0.59 
DATP3   1.84 0.23 
DATP2   2.06 0.34 
DATP1   1.5 0.3 
DATP/ DWTP DATP=0.36 0.15 DWTP=0.55 0.22 
Personal variables 
- Sex (Male) 
0.46 0.18 0.66 035 
- Age  









           31-44 0.3 0.1 0.35 0.095 
           45-60    0.25 0.105 0.4 0.162 
           60 and above   0.20 0.05 0.3 0.06 
- Marital Status (Married) 0.37 0.21 0.47 0.33 
- Family Size  -0.21 -0.11 -0.31 -0.15 
- Housing Style (Owner) 0.6 0.33 0.7 0.54 
- Residence     
              City  0.105 0.05 0.116 0.007 
              Village 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.09 
- Education  









             Bachelor Degree  0.2 0.012 0.25 0.036 
- Income      
           Less than 2,000 NIS  -0.66 0.22 -0.56 -0.35 
           2,000-3,000 0.33 0.18 0.77 0.64 
           3,000-5,000 0.66 0.135 0.52 0.235 
           5,000 and above  0.33 0.16 0.25 0.17 
- Family provider (father)  0.27 0.14 0.37 0.19 
- Mother (worker)  0.05 0.007 0.08 0.005 
- N. of electrical appliances 0.3 0.23 0.32 0.123 
- Debt to Water Authority   
  (500-1,000) NIS  
0.08 0.009 0.16 0.1 
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Tab. 5 - continue 
Independent  DWTP DATP 
variables Coefficient 
estimates 




Standard error of 
estimates 
1,000-2,000 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.156 
2,000-5,000 -0.43 0.13 -0.45 -0.16 
More than 5,000  -0.5 -0.03 -0.6 -0.04 
- Quality Satisfaction  0.05 0.02 0.1 0.027 
- Price Satisfaction 0.25 0.032 0.41 0.232 
- Service Continuity  0.1 0.003 0.16 0.006 
Economic variables  














- Bills received on time   -0.19 -0.08 -0.27 -0.864 
- Granted exemptions 0.31 0.07 0.43 0.16 
- Increase of debts values -0.12 0.18 -0.4 -0.65 
- Encouragement to pay  0.11 0.06 0.13 0.07 
- Received > 1 bill at the 
same time of  other services 
(Electricity and Telephone) 
-0.18 -0.015 -0.31 -0.13 
- Absence of law  -0.8 -0.25 -0.95 -0.45 
- Imposing investor debtor  
Authorities and Companies 
request customers to pay 
back debts 
-0.15 -0.098 -0.28 -0.09 
R²= 0.85  0.90  
F=  113.0  144.0  
Df = 455  455  
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7. Policy implications and conclusions 
 
  
This paper has highlighted the major determinants behind the DWTP and DATP 
bills for water and electricity consumption. The empirical results of the 
estimated model indicate a set of personal, economic, social and legislative 
variables as the major determinants behind households’ behavior toward 
payments of bills. Advance payment for water and electricity is an inefficient and 
insufficient mechanism to improve collection efficiency. Instead, areas of 
cooperation, between providers of water and electricity on one hand and 
customers on the other hand, should be enhanced to improve the DWTP and 
DATP jointly. Furthermore, certain types of support packages should be carried 
out by providers of water and electricity services to widen the scope of efficiency 
in running public utilities in the WB. Therefore, they should count on economic 
factors such as incomes, prices and tariffs to enable customers to pay their bills. 
 
In order to make use of enhancing DWTP and DATP and pushing them to be 
associated positively, a number of measures must be taken by the water and 
electricity authorities and companies. Empirical results indicated that coefficient 
estimates of personal factors showed differences between customers’ attitudes 
that should be taken into account in collecting water bills from those of 
electricity.  Therefore, several areas of cooperation between provider side and 
demand side should be applied by both in order to improve  collection efficiency 
of bills.  
 
The study concluded that enhancement of DWTP and DATP could be achieved 
through different mechanisms and behavioral directions. In this study, only 23% 
and 18% of the households showed that they have high DWTP and DATP to pay 
bills for water and electricity consumption, respectively. The next in importance 
were 31% and 37% of the respondents who have high DATP but UWTP to pay 
bills for water and electricity consumption. 
 
It is expected that applying the following  measures would lead to an increase of 
payments and settlement for water and electricity bills. Therefore, based on 
empirical results, water authorities and electricity companies should work with 
their customers on the following levels:   
 
1. Enhancing the DWTP through applying several measures to make 
water and electricity services more attractive to households. At the 
same time, the DATP would increase not only as a result of increase in 
income but also with the introduction of a set of arrangements to ease 
payment of bills for water and electricity consumption.  
2. It is obvious that collection efficiency would improve and 
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consequently the gap would be narrowed down between revenues and 
expenditures of water authorities and electricity companies. This 
could be achieved through investigation of the positive factors that 
could mobilize households’ willingness and ability to pay bills.  
3. Water Authorities and Electricity Companies should discuss their 
plans with household and private sectors and the government to 
promote their willingness and ability to pay bills for water and 
electricity consumption. In fact, each sector is interested in a certain 
type of mechanism to be carried out directly or indirectly, totally or 
partially to convince customers of those parties, in particular the 
household sector, to settle their debts. Patterns of payment by 
households could be applied to promote their willingness and /or 
ability to pay should be implemented.   
4. The empirical results indicate that cooperation between the 
government and water and electricity authorities and companies 
should focus mainly on advancement of main legislations and law 
enforcement. Therefore, they should work jointly to develop laws that 
aim to regulate and protect their rights particularly with households 
who have high DATP and low DWTP. Around 31% and 37% of the 
households have high DATP and low DWTP to pay bills for water and 
electricity consumption, respectively. Unfortunately, households 
which lack high DATP, but acquire a high DWTP for water and 
electricity were 15% and 4%, respectively. For the case of high DATP 
and low DWTP, law enforcement is required to push customers to pay 
bills for consumption of water and electricity. Also, a package of 
incentives and subsidies should be set-up to deal with the segment of 
households who lack ATP, but own a high DWTP. 
5. On the other hand, establishment of support programs that have the 
potential subsidies to households with low DWTP and low DATP to 
isolate interaction between them. This segment of households should 
be persuaded to pay bills once their ATP is improved. Consequently, 
DDWTP would increase. It is concluded that the increase in 
unemployment rates among households and those receiving low 
incomes are is the main reason behind the increase in this segment of 
customers.  These segments of customers are waiting to receive a 
package of assistance through price support and a rescheduling of 
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This research aims to evaluate the current water and electricity practices by 
households in the West Bank. Most of the questions focus on whether the head of 
the household and /or spouse is able and willing to pay bills of water and 
electricity after one month from consumption. Answers will only be used for the 
purposes of this study .They will be kept very confidential.   
 
I. First Part: Personal Data 
Please put an X mark in the provided box for the answer that you see is suitable for the following 
questions: 
1-Sex: Male               Female 
 
2-Age:  1- From 17 to 30 2- From 31 to 44 3- From 44 to 58  
              4- More than 58 
 
3- Marital status: 
1- Single             2- Divorced    3- Widowed      4- Separated      
 
       5- Married  
 
4- Family size: 
1- Two                    2- Three                 3- Four                    4- Five              
 
5- More than five 
 
5- Housing Style:   
1- Owned                 2- Rented 
 
6- Place of residency:  1- City                 2- Countryside                  3. Camp                   
 
7-Name of your Governorate   : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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8-  Educational qualifications of the head of family: 
1- Illiterate                2- Primary               3-  Lower secondary               4- Secondary              
 
5- Institute                6- University 
 
9- Breadwinner of the family:  1-  Father                       2-   Mother         
 
10- The sector in which the breadwinner works: 
1- Private                   2- Public                 3-  Has own work                   4- Non-governmental 
 
  5- Jobless                  6- House keeper 
 
11- Income of head of family: 
1-Less than 1,000 NIS                                        2- Between 1,001 and 2,000 NIS           
3- Between 2,001 and 3,000 NIS                     4- Between 3,001 and 5,000 NIS               
5- More than 5,000 NIS   
     
12- Career of wife (if the father is the head of family): 
1- The wife works                        2- She is a housewife  
If the wife works, she works at: 
1- Private sector                     2- Public sector                  3-Has own work 
4- NGO 
13-Number of workers in the family, including parents: 











II-Second Part: Socio-Economic Data 
1- Does the family has? 
 
       NO             YES                Single meter              Multi- meter                   The number 
  
Water meter       
Electricity meter      
  
2- Source of receiving electricity: 
i-Jerusalem  District Electricity Company                           ii-  Israel                    iii-private meter 
 
3- The source of getting water: 
i-Municipality                       ii-Water Authority                  iii-Other 
 
4- Electrical appliances owned by the family (please tick X in the appropriate box): 
Appliances No Yes Number 
Television    
Computer    
Electrical iron    
Washing machine    
Dishwasher     
Water Heater (electric)    
Electric oven    
Electric fan    
Microwave    
Blender    
Air condition    









5- If you are subscribed one of the following services please tick X in the appropriate box 
-Do you have debts to? 
 Subscriber 
Less than     
100 NIS 
Between 100 
to 500 NIS 
Between 500 
to 1,000 NIS 
Between 1,000 
& 2,000 NIS 
Between 2,000 
& 5,000 NIS 
More than 
5,000 NIS 
1 Water       
2 Electricity       
 
 
Third Part: Economic and Financial Decisions  
This section identifies the participant’s point of view about the decision of spending on public services 
(Research topic) 
 
1- Select the appropriate answer for each of the following questions (The degree of satisfaction) 
 
Satisfied with     
quality 
Satisfied with the 
price of the service 
Satisfied with continuity      
of the service 
Water excellent 














Electricity  excellent 





















2- Select the appropriate answer for each of the following questions (The degree of approval of 
each of the five proposed reasons) 
If you pay an invoice for one of the following services (water or electricity) or do not pay, it is because of:  
 Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree Strongly disagree 
You pay the value of the 












You pay the value of the 
invoice (every two 
months)because it is 
affordable 
     
You pay the invoice 
regardless of its  value 
constantly 
     
You pay the invoice when you 
have the required sum  









3-There are many accumulated debts on the customers of water and electricity   services, from your 
point of view, what is the actual reason for these non-payment debts. Is it? 










water 1-The value of invoice is 
higher than my  income    
     
2-The invoices are not 
received  on time 
     
3-Expect to receive 
exemptions 
     
4-There are a lot of 
accumulated debts   
     
5-Others encourage           
non-payment  
     
6-Unwillingness to pay      
7-Several  invoices received  
at the same time 
     
 8-Absence of Law      
9-The company does not  
claim payment  
     
10-Impose  delay fines  on 
past debts  
     
Electricity  1-Value of invoice is higher 
than income    
     
2-Invoices are not received on 
time  
     
3-Expect to receive 
exemptions 
     
4-There are a lot of 
accumulated debts   
     
5-Others encourage             
non –payment 
     
6-Unwillingness to pay      
7-Several  invoices received at 
the same time 
     
8-Absence of law      
9-Company does not  claim 
payment 
     
10-Impose  delay fines on 
past debts 
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Way of payment of debts for water and electricity (Please determine the degree of approval to 
each of them). 
1- The way that you suggest to be adopted by the Electricity Company and Water Authority and 
expect it will give better results in paying water and electricity invoices. 
 
 Strongly  
agree 





Discount on  imposed  
interests on debts  
    
Discount on debts     
Debt rescheduling  
(Installment only)  
    
Debt rescheduling and 
discount interests 
    
Reduced pricing     
Electricity  
Discount on imposed 
interests on debts 
     
Discount on debt      
Debt rescheduling 
(Installment only) 
     
Debt rescheduling and 
discount interests 
     









Dear participant, what are the appropriate ways for paying invoices regularly? 
Initiation of the next months, to avoid cutting off electricity or water and legal liability, what are 








Disagree Strongly  
disagree 
Budget allocation of monthly 
invoices (Distribution of 
spending) 
     
Urge others to pay the invoices 
(Awareness) 
     
Design a system for   volume of 
consumption (when the  
consumption increases the price 
will increase)  
     
Activation of collection of 
follow-up by suppliers 
     
Start to pay debts  by 
installments 
     
 
2- Please determine the degree of acceptance to each of the proposed ways that could 
lead to a facilitation of payments of Debts. 
Do you think this is achieved by? 
The way Strongly 
agree 




Reduce the use of 
unnecessary hardware 
     
Use of lighting when 
needed 
     
Create behavior in 
family members about   
savings 
     
Reduce spending on 
other goods and 
services 
















Beyond traditional measures of productivity. The challenge of defining, 
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Abstract 
This paper outlines the meaning and role of productivity, in terms of its definition and 
conceptualization, presents some debated points on the various components of productivity 
(labour, capital and total factor productivity) and underlines the importance of contextual 
conditions (political context, institutions, geography and market integration).  
To go beyond the narrow GDP measurement should mean to rethink productivity as a measure of 
the developmental process of production. Development is conceived as a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the nested concept of sustainable development: 
economic growth, social development, environmental sustainability, conducive to political 
transformation. Al that implies a critique extended to economic productivity as the very and 
narrow principle and process of translating inputs into outputs and results. 
Some key questions are specifically presented and discussed with reference to agriculture and, 
adding usual caveat, general concluding remarks can be deducted from the HDI, DEA and 
MuSIASEM measures as possible sources of inspiration on sustainable productivity. 
 








Far more than at any previous point in the last decades, the search for a new, 
different and better measure of progress, development and quality of life seems 
to be at the top of the international political agenda. Academic, international civil 
society organizations, business and political communities share a common 
interest in measuring progress beyond GDP.  
But "Our words are never neutral", to cite the title of a paper written by Sana 
Nawaz and her colleagues (Nawaz et al., 2013). To cut a long literature review 
very short, one of the most influential scholars of the Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA), Teun Adrianus van Dijk, recommends helpful precautions in using 
keywords, as political ideologies are largely reproduced by discourse and words 









(van Dijk, 2006). Therefore, we should be very careful in using and confounding 
progress, development and quality of life: not only according to the Pasolinian 
specific vocabulary there is a clear distinction between (the Marxian term of) 
"progress" and (the bourgeois term of modernization called) "development" 
(Pasolini, 1999), but the so called post-development critique is a loose term 
describing an heterogeneous and wide-spread corpus of theories that existed 
prior to current epigones, influenced by Ivan Illich and post-colonial literature 
(Ziai, 2011). 
However, even if the importance of rethinking synthetic indicators and batteries 
of disaggregated indicators on economic growth, development and performance 
measurement was underlined in the past, as on the eve of the 1995 World 
Summit for Social Development (UNESCO, 1995), it is undoubtedly true that 
criticism of the GDP (and, by extension, GNP, GNI and disposable GNI) measure 
has multiplied over the past ten years. Again, there is abundant theoretical and 
empirical literature exploring this issue, so that we can simply refer the readers 
to an article written by Enrico Giovannini - who did relevant work during his 
term as OECD Chief Statistician - for further information (Giovannini, 2013).  
We now have a broad consensus on going beyond GDP. At international level, the 
new 2030 – so called universality and transformative – United Nations Agenda 
for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was agreed on September 2015. On 
March 2016, the United Nations Statistical Commission’s Interagency and Expert 
Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) agreed on some preliminary 230 
individual indicators to monitor the 17 goals and 169 targets of the SDGs 
(UNECOSOC, 2016).    
Around half of the 230 indicators lack acceptable country coverage, agreed-upon 
methodologies, or both. In any case, such a wide SDG agenda to “Leave No One 
Behind” includes targets relating to broader systems of capital accounting, 
looking beyond GDP and incorporating social, human, and environmental capital 
in viewing poverty and development. 
In the light of this debate, we start from the premise that the expected output of 
the developmental process of production is more than just GDP. The 
conventional causal chain of mainstream economic theory (mainly, the 
marginalist theory of value and neo-classical economics, still prevailing at level 
of micro-economics) is built on very strong assumptions: over time, production 
or output of final goods and services leads to a virtuous cycle of employment, 
capital accumulation and economic growth and, by virtue of a trickle-down effect 
percolating through the social fabric, the engine of growth is automatically 
transformed into the improvement of living conditions for the whole population, 
and this is conceived as the best practical means to promote the favorable 









Fig. 1 - The conventional causal diagram expected to promote development through GDP 
 
There is no escape from two critical points - related to the topic of this paper - in 
the belief behind such a conventional causal chain. First, the causal relationships 
depicted in the graph of Fig. 1 considers that the variable of primary interest is 
the output (=Y) and that the causal effect to be estimated is the effect of 
resources or inputs on Y through the conversion process represented by the 
"miracle" linked to higher productivity. Even in such a narrow and linear 
mechanism, productivity is a rather elusive concept. Better than anything else, 
we can cite two famous quotes: "… the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution is all bosh" (Robinson, 1961) and that the (large) residual usually 
called Multi-Factor Productivity (MFP) or Total-Factor Productivity (TFP) is at 
best "a measure of our ignorance" (Abramowitz, 1956).  
In practice, after many decades of empirical work economists are still none the 
wiser as to what causes growth (Easterly 2002). Recent empirical studies, 
conducted through cross-country regression models, have investigated no fewer 
than 145 variables and most were found to matter (Durlauf, Johnson, Temple, 
2005). Xavier Sala-i-Martin found that at least 62 different variables have been 
included in the production function to explain growth, in addition to the growth 
of capital and labor (Sala-i-Martin, 1997). William Easterly and Ross Levine 
pointed out that TFP refers to the something else besides physical factor 
accumulation, so that it does not provide a clear guidance (Easterly and Levine, 
2001). 
Second critical point on the conventional causal chain, in wider terms change 
always has its own environmental, social, political, cultural and historic 
dimensions which go beyond the narrow GDP measurement that incorporates 
the monetary value of final goods and service – that is, those that are bought in 
the market by the final user –, without including, for example, unpaid work (such 
as that performed in the home or by volunteers). Therefore, if the Beyond-GDP 
approach holds true, then we have to move from the idea of productivity as the 
key engine to more (and - only implicitly - better) output and lower prices as a 
boon to consumers (as cost per unit decreases and elastic demand leads to an 
increase in employment) to productivity as a measure of the developmental (in 
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terms of a combination of quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the nested - 
rather than additive - concept of sustainable development: economic growth, 
social development, environmental sustainability, conducive to political 
transformation) process of production as a boon to empower all the citizens, 
without exception (in particular the disadvantaged and vulnerable ones). 
This implies a critique extended to productivity as the very principle that induces 
the ongoing commodification of nature and social relations (Rist, 2011). 
GDP is just the result of the mode of production. The key technical mechanism of 
such a mode of production is productivity.  If the idea of sustainable 
development is not just lip service, then a new paradigm for development is 
needed. Managing the interlinkages among rural and urban areas, natural 
resource conservation and the environment must be an integral part of a 
transformative agenda. According to economist Alain de Janvry (A. de Janvry, 
2010), until now land expansion has been the main source of growth in cereal 
production in Africa, contrary to other developing regions where rising yields 
have been the main source. Land expansion is not a long-term sustainable 
strategy, and land scarcity is already on the rise. And the cost in terms of 
contamination of soil and water due to the (ab)use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides is just a negative externality, which is not taken into account in the 
productivity calculation. 
This is the main idea of the paper. If we recognize that economic growth is 
instrumental in character and welcomed only if social, environmental and 
economic objectives are harmonized and made favorable for the most vulnerable 
groups in order to become politically transformative and environmentally 
sustainable, then it is difficult to continue arguing the relevance of productivity 
per se as a measure of economic efficiency. Rather, productivity has to be 
conceived as the measure of the critical transformative and comprehensive 
process of inputs in a given context into progress in the political, social, economic 
and eco-system spheres, combining individual and collective well-being and 
regarded as the very objective of development reconciled with progress.  
The implications of this for re-conceptualizing and measuring sustainable 
productivity in terms of developmental relevance, impact, effectiveness and 
sustainability rather than efficiency will be great, and oriented to be translated 
into operative terms both at macro level (to revise national accounts) and micro 
level (to identify and evaluate small scale initiatives) of indicators. These 
implications require a note of caution: although micro- and macro-levels are 
interrelated, the fallacy of composition - what is true for micro-level is 
automatically true for macro-level - is a common pitfall to be avoided and the 
micro and macro analysis must proceed in parallel; this holds particularly true in 
the case of production function (Felipe, McCombie, 2013). 
All this is a very sensitive topic, politically speaking. The interactions between 
long-term processes of transformations and short-term changes both at national 
and international levels bring to the surface persisting structural difficulties and, 
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at the same time, new opportunities to be seized. National development and 
international policies are grappling with a highly vexing conundrum: an urgent 
focus on short-term crisis responses tends to be detached from the 
medium/long-term socioeconomic dimensions of development. This despite the 
fact that it is essential to define emergency policy solutions with long-term 
prospects, looking towards sustainable development. Otherwise, any solution we 
may find is doomed to fail. 
We are all living through a crisis period following the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change and the agreement on the SDGs. From one side, the planetary 
future is at risk, at different scales, from localized deforestation to air pollution 
from cars, hits the planetary ceiling (WWF, 2016).  
From another side, in 2015, the number of unemployed people reached almost 
200 million (at the same time, 244 million people, or 3.3 per cent of the world’s 
population of 7.4 billion people, lived outside their country of origin). Based on 
the most recent growth projections, global unemployment is expected to rise by 
nearly 2.3 million in 2016 and by a further 1.1 million in 2017. Vulnerable 
employment – the share of own-account work and contributing family 
employment, categories of work typically subject to high levels of precariousness 
– accounts for 1.5 billion people, or over 46 per cent of total employment. In both 
Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, over 70 per cent of workers are in 
vulnerable employment. And there are also significant gender gaps in job quality: 
women face a 25 to 35 per cent higher risk of being in vulnerable employment 
than men in certain countries in Northern Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Arab States. In 2015, an estimated 327 million employed people were living in 
extreme poverty (those living on less than US$1.90 a day in PPP terms) and 967 
million in moderate or near poverty (between US$1.90 and US$5 a day in PPP 
terms) (ILO, 2016). 
In 2015, the number of working-age individuals who did not participate in the 
labor market increased by some 26 million to reach over 2 billion. Falls in the 
working-age population and labor force participation rates as well as rising 
inequality, vulnerable employment and poor job quality do not appear to be 
cyclically induced. In China itself, unemployment remains relatively steady but it 
reflects state-sector dominance and prevalence of low-end, “low-productivity” 
activities, with a considerable hidden unemployment in China’s state sector and 
many informal jobs characterized by high turnover. If government will continue 
to be under great pressure to pursue state-sector restructuring, unemployment 
will rise. 
In the last five years, sustained and rapid economic growth in many African 
economies has generated a debate led by the IMF on the persistence of a so-
called 'African growth miracle'.  But if we look at the World Bank dataset on per 
capita income level and compare 1990 and 2014, there was no miracle. Twenty-
five countries languished and still languishes in poverty (that is, they were and 
still are low income economies); one country (Zimbabwe) has fallen into 
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poverty; seven countries have been lifted from poverty but still live around the 
poverty line; three Western African countries are now above the poverty line; 
eight countries have been lifted out of poverty and are now in the upper-middle 
income brackets; eight countries have always been middle-income countries; and 
there is just one country that moved from the middle-income to the high-income 
group (Seychelles). If we look at the twelve countries with an average growth 
rate above 3% in the 2011-14 period, the underlying structure is not new. 
Valuable natural resources – oil, minerals and commodities – provide the bulk of 
wealth, without distribution and employment. Informal economy and under-
employment still prevail. Between- and within- countries inequality are dealing 
with these problems all the time. 
The key political challenge that world policy must face up to is that short-term 
emergencies and long-term issues are not aligned and they may look like 
alternative options. It should be obvious that 'business-as-usual' is not the 
recommended option for policies. 
If decent employment for all is considered a key goal (is it really feasible and 
sustainable in the long run? What about the 'gig economy' on a global scale?) and 
biodiversity conservation another unquestionable goal, we should recognize that 
increased value of labor productivity may be translated into fewer hours worked 
(more unemployment to get the same output value) and not necessarily into 
increased wages for workers. And the same thing happens to an increase of 
cultivated land: each worker produces more outputs as each one has more land 
to cultivate and the value of the marginal product of labor rises at any given level 
of employment. Here we should also consider the issue of environmental 
degradation and resource depletion as a concrete trade-off between more 
quantity of output and worse quality of environment. 
But a dethronement of productivity in the name of conceptualizing (and, much 
more difficult, measuring) a new sustainable productivity destroys the 
overarching paradigm for mainstream growth at global level. This means 
rethinking economies so as to reflect new societies and territories, as well as the 
challenges and opportunities represented by new technologies and automation. 
It is also a way to reconsider the trade-off between labor, capital and natural 
resources, to determine whether and how economic growth is embedded into 
development, without the simple shortcut of de-growth. However, when you 
think about it, if there is no war at home, it is much easier for development 
policies to be led by emergencies, and to looking at short-term reactions and at 
ways to and think how to reduce migration flows as a goal in itself (like in 
Europe right now). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the meaning and role of 
productivity, in terms of its definition and conceptualization. Section 3 presents 
some debated points on the various components of productivity and Section 4 
underlines the importance of contextual conditions. Section 5 details some 
stylized facts and key questions applied to agriculture, as a practical example. 
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Section 6 offers a brief description and discusses sustainable productivity in 




2. Productivity: definition and conceptualization 
 
  
During the last decades, the micro-foundation approach to economic theory and 
modeling has become dominant. A tendency toward the reconciliation of 
opposites seemed to prevail as a consequence of a net dominance of the 
associated concepts and assumptions of rational agents, uncertainty, the removal 
of “Walrasian auctioneer” that instantaneously finds the wages (and prices) that 
clear all markets, contestable markets (rather than pure or perfect competition), 
market failure (transaction cost, information asymmetry, externalities, public 
goods), policy ineffectiveness. Notwithstanding this dominance, it can be argued 
that two alternative approaches to economic growth and productivity have 
continued to fight in conceptual terms as alternative ways to think about the 
market relationships (exchange values or prices) between commodities 
produced for sale.  
The mainstream marginalist or neoclassical theory (Mankiw, 2012) argues that a 
country’s standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services 
and productivity refers to the quantity of goods and services produced for each 
unit of a given input, called factor of production or resource.  
In the classical political economy - in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth - 
the factors of production were labor, capital and land, corresponding to the 
labourers (wage-earners), the capitalists and entrepreneurs who own the stock 
or capital (profits-earners) and the land owners (rent-earners). Today the 
neoclassical inputs are the following:  
i. labor,  
ii. capital, divided into physical capital (or simply capital, consisting of 
manufactured resources such as equipment, buildings, and machines), 
human capital (education and knowledge embodied in the workforce), 
and natural capital,  
iii. technological knowledge.  
 
Following this conceptualization, a nation’s standard of living is determined by 
the productivity of its inputs, because the factors of production directly 
determine productivity: output per worker (Y/L), which is the typical measure of 
productivity (i.e., the quantity of goods and services that a worker can produce 
from each hour of work), depending on physical capital per worker (K/L), human 
capital per worker (H/L), natural resources per worker (N/L), and the state of 
technology (A). 
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It is a set of crucial assumptions that forms the foundation of the marginalist 
theory:  
1) production is considered as a purely technical process within which 
factors of production are employed in certain technically determined 
proportions to produce goods; 
2) the factor of production prices correspond to marginal productivities 
(productivity at the margin), and marginal productivity is a 
diminishing function of factor supply: the law of diminishing returns 
(diminishing marginal returns or increasing relative cost) states that 
in all productive processes, adding more of one factor of production 
while holding all others constant (the so called ceteris paribus 
assumption), will at some point yield lower per-unit returns;  
3) the presence of a negative association, or inverse relationship, 
between the rate of profit and the capital labor ratio (and the capital-
output ratio); 
4) as a consequence, the re-allocation of factors can only reduce the total 
product, measured at current prices, and so the total utility (the 
disutility of additional effort is the other side of the principle of 
productivity at the margin). Thus any intervention in the pricing or 
allocation of factors or products that disturbs the attainment of 
competitive equilibrium is bound to reduce (or at least cannot 
increase) total utility;  
5) competitive forces operate through variation in relative prices and 
factor substitution (considering the so called Marginal rate of technical 
substitution or MRTS, that is the rate at which one factor can be 
substituted for another while holding the level of output constant), 
that is, in response to variations in demand prices rise and fall, as they 
are flexible in both directions and an inverse relation between the 
quantity of factors of production employed and their relative rates of 
remuneration is ensured by a regular substitutability between the 
factors of production; 
6) in equilibrium, if the price of the factors of production corresponds to 
their marginal productivity (with downward-sloping marginal 
productivity curves) and to their utility cost or marginal disutility, 
then market solution is considered socially satisfactory and morally 
and legally correct (optimal allocation), and the general price is found 
also to be the just, or equitable, price;  
7) the sum of wages, rent and profit exhausts the total product and the 
theory of distribution is simply derived from the initial distribution of 
resources and the correlated analysis of prices, by explaining the 
returns to the various factors of production without any consideration 
of historically specific frameworks of conflictual social relations or 
ecosystems and social systems interactions.  
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It was mainly during the 1960s and 1970s that a radical critique of the marginal 
productivity theory of distribution acquired an important place in discussions of 
economic theory. Much was written by Piero Sraffa, and then by Richard Kahn, 
Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, Luigi Pasinetti and Pierangelo Garegnani. They 
developed the so called Sraffian and Post-Keynesian theory of growth and 
distribution, and even if they did not comprise a unified body of theory, it is also 
useful to mention Kaleckian, Marxian and radical views (including the bio-
economy model) as alternative views to the mainstream marginalist school.  
Basically, they represent a radical departure from neoclassical theory, because of 
the importance of changes in the social relations of production (that is, power 
relations) and in technology, rather than in factor substitution. In 1966, the 
validity of the famous Sraffian critique on capital theory and on the full Arrow-
Debreu general equilibrium model was acknowledged by an important 
neoclassical economist - Paul Samuelson - who admitted the inconsistency of the 
traditional belief according to which, by virtue of the substitution principle, 
production techniques that are more capital intensive will become optimal as the 
rate of interest is lowered, and accepted the so called general case of occurrence 
of capital-reversing (the fact that a less productive, less capital intensive 
technique may be associated with a lower value of the rate of profits or interest 
rates) and reswitching (there is no simple monotonic relationship between the 
nature of the techniques of production used and the rate of profit) results.  
It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that Cambridge capital controversy 
was conclusive on the impossibility to conceive a single capital magnitude in the 
required terms of independence of distribution and prices, and on the necessity 
to include both demand and supply and not just supply to measure economic 
performance, the mainstream theory has proceeded since the 1980s as if this 
critique never existed, rather than opening the space for the alternative 
conflictual and surplus-founded classical theory of distribution of the classical 
political economists, by contesting a direct relationship between capital intensity 
and real-wage rates and a theory of distribution completely absorbed in a 
general theory of prices (Garegnani, 2010 and Finn, 2013).  
In practice, there are two opposite views, summarized by the nineteenth-century 
classical conflictual analyses of Ricardo and Marx from one side, and the 
twentieth century optimistic analyses of Simon Kuznets and Robert Solow of a 
“balanced growth path”, according to which output, incomes, profits, wages, 
capital, asset prices progress at the same pace, so that every social group would 
benefit from growth to the same degree (Piketty, 2014). 
We must admit that this oversimplification of two alternative views ignores the 
more complex reality of different paradigms such as those showed in the 
graphical representation (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, the reader may be surprised by 
the fact that if the standard methods for measuring (total factor) productivity 
were invalidated by the above mentioned critiques, then it did not affect 
mainstream theoretical and empirical works on aggregate production function, 
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as clearly demonstrated by the endogenous growth theory, the new generation 
of contemporary short period or neo-Walrasian inter-temporal and temporary 
general equilibrium models and the fact that neoclassical economics is still 
dominant. 
 
Fig. 2 - Alternative views on growth accounting 
 
If Keynes suggested that productivity growth, in the absence of sufficient 
aggregate demand, may become a social problem and lead to long-term 
unemployment, an additional radical critique to the narrow vision on 
development based on productivity growth comes from a bio-economy 
perspective, according to which labor productivity growth has historically been 
supported  by an increase in the proportion of material and energy inputs to 
labor inputs (N/L and, more specifically, the energy labor ratio E/L), leading to 
an increased environmental degradation (Harris, 2009).  
A broader view of productivity and production should reframe them by adopting 
a nested concept, combining various goals, including environmental 
sustainability, social mobility, economic redistribution and political 
empowerment of the most vulnerable groups, in particular women.  
To concentrate on environmental sustainability component, the fact that rising 
labor productivity (and per capita income) has been usually correlated to an 
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increasing use of energy (with fossil fuel and biomass being the larger fraction 
and the most responsible source of carbon dioxide - CO2 - emissions per unit of 
energy) implies that the production-environment trade off has to be investigated 
and structurally incorporated into analysis.  
One implication may be that lower carbon dioxide emission levels - the main 
driver of global warming - may be due to a more efficient utilization of energy 
sources, but also to a shift to a massive usage of renewable hydro, solar and wind 
power, and to a drastic cut on per capita and per unit of economic output energy 
use, that is through a really transformative Green mode of production (coupled 
with increasing resilience and biodiversity preservation), with a lower intensity 
of resource use (Taylor, 2009). Adopting the so called "planetary boundaries" 
analysis, nine Earth-system processes must be included:  
(1) climate change,  
(2) rate of biodiversity loss,  
(3) interference with the nitrogen and phosphorous cycles,  
(4) stratospheric ozone depletion,  
(5) ocean acidification,  
(6) global freshwater use,  
(7) change in land use,  
(8) chemical pollution, and  
(9) atmospheric aerosol loading (Griggs et al., 2013). 
 
If the neoclassical idea to accept the Say's Law, which states that supply creates 
its own demand, is wrong and the Post-Keynesian Kaldor-Thirlwall growth 
model of effective aggregate demand is correct (i.e., the increase of investment is 
an injections of new demand for goods and services into the circular flow of 
income stimulating further rounds of spending - a multiplier effect - and this 
accelerates capital accumulation), then it is not true that from higher marginal 
productivity we can automatically earn more output or product (Y), which 
determines more sell and more export, that is a solution or vent for surplus 
(products are paid for with products and "general gluts or excess  cannot exist"). 
What really occurs is quite the opposite: the so called Thirlwall’s Law (1979) 
says that output growth depends on sell and trade (i.e. on effective demand) and 
Verdoorn’s Law (1949) says that growth in output increases productivity due to 
increasing returns. This is the basic idea of the so called cumulative causation 
models of growth, in which demand (and structural change) rather than supply 
leads the pace of accumulation (Thirlwall, 2006). Therefore, a key question is: 
what type of demand has to be encouraged to promote long-term development 
and not just short-term economic growth?  
A broader view of productivity and production should imply the importance of 
cultural values, beliefs and attitudes that motivate citizens behaviors (including 
when they behave like savers and consumers) to pay attention to environmental 
sustainability, social mobility, economic redistribution, political empowerment 
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and agency of the most vulnerable groups (according to which individuals and 
groups should decide what matters for themselves as active participants in 
change, rather than passive recipients of aid: D. Crocker and I. Robeyns, 2009). 
Governments and public policy can do many things to orient society, State, 
market and the agents (by introducing sanctions, incentives and rules) and to 
disseminate and promote a culture of sustainability and solidarity, in order to 
raise a sustainable productivity-led rather than just productivity-led perspective. 
If the above mentioned assumptions hold true, we should move from the idea of 
productivity as the key engine to more output (and lower prices) to productivity 
as a measure of the complex and nested developmental process of production, 
considering the various inputs and the specific context (at least in terms of 
market integration, geography, political and institutional dimensions) as part of 
the residual. This idea has direct implications on both macro and micro levels, 
leading to dethronization of efficiency from the economic development throne.  
 
 
Fig. 3 - The sustainable causal diagram expected to promote development through GDP 
 
The  dethronization argument presented here can remind the reader somewhat 
similar to the words used some twenty years ago by Paul Krugman (1994) 
against the rhetoric and obsession of competitiveness diffused by Michael Porter 
(1990) and Lester Thurow (1993), according to which to maintain or increase 
the standard of living a country has to learn to compete in an ever tougher world 
marketplace and high productivity, product quality have become essential and 
the high-value sectors are those that will generate jobs for the future: "The only 
meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national level is national 
productivity" and "A new theory must move beyond comparative advantage to 
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the competitive advantage" (Porter, 1990). Krugman reacted by saying that 
"competitiveness would turn out to be a funny way to saying “productivity” and 
would have nothing to do with international competition" (Krugman, 1994). 
Here, our attempt is to demystify economic productivity conceptually.  
As Krugman once said, "productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is 
almost everything" (Krugman, 1990). In practice, the limitation encountered in 
the definition and conceptualization of productivity is coupled with 
measurement difficulties. 
We can briefly summarize some points, considering that output growth 
accounting by definition is decomposed into its sources: changes of quantity as 
well as of productivity of labor, capital, and the residual (the TFP or MFP 
dynamics). And as the same holds true for many basic economic concepts, both 
productivity growth and productivity levels (that is, the value of output per hour 




3. Debatable and debated points on partial and total productivity 
 
  
Product is a key concept, but it is extremely difficult to define it and agree upon. 
It can be a service or a good, in physical or in a virtual form, based on different 
production technologies. As well, productivity is a key concept, causally linked to 
product and difficult to measure. 
Technically, there are different components, factors, resources or inputs, to be 
considered as determinants of final product, and their productivity is determined 
by the available know-how and a complex interaction of key ingredients for 
converting resources into outputs. 
Such a multifactor productivity is commonly estimated using growth accounting. 
In mainstream economics, labor and capital are the key inputs, intermediate 
products are the outputs and the multifactor or total factor productivity is the 
measure to assess the residual output growth that cannot be explained by the 
rate of change in the key inputs. 
 
  
 (i) Labor productivity 
  
At aggregate level, the first productivity component to be considered is labor 
productivity, which is often called productivity and equals the output per worker 
(Y/L). It is (or should be) measured by dividing output by the total number of 
hours worked in a year by all the employees. In such a way, productivity is 
conceived as the amount of output produced by the average work (the unit 
input) or the efficiency and intensity with which resources (labor in this case) 
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are utilized. As the output is a proxy of the effectiveness of the results achieved in 
terms of quantity of market value of goods and services produced in a given 
period, then labor productivity (Y/L) can be perceived as the arithmetic ratio 
between the effectiveness (Y) and the resources utilized (L), that is the level of 
performance or efficiency reached by using the given amount of resources. 
A key concept in economic theory is the extra value of output (Y) that is 
generated by employing one more unit of labor (L); this concept is known as the 
marginal product of labor, and its value is obtained by multiplying the marginal 
product of labor by the price per unit of output (P). The general rule is that a 
profit-maximizing price-taking producer employs each factor of production up to 
the point at which the value of the marginal product of the last unit of the factor 
employed - even if we should know that there is heterogeneity among workers - 
is equal to that factor’s price (Krugman, Wells, 2013). 
If the price of the good that is produced with labor changes, then the value of the 
marginal product of labor - that is a linked but different concept from marginal 
productivity - changes as well: when the price of strawberries grown in Burkina 
Faso increases, then the value of the marginal product of agricultural labor in 
Burkina Faso rises at any given level of employment and this increase implies 
that the profit-maximizing level of employment rises when agricultural wage 
rate remains unchanged. As a consequence, increased value of the labor 
productivity may be translated into more profits or fewer hours worked (more 
unemployment, in case of lower production of strawberries to get the same 
output value) and not necessarily into increased wages for workers (that is labor 
cost, by considering that in a perfectly competitive economy each worker - and 
not only the last worker - should be paid its equilibrium value of the marginal 
product). And the same thing happens to an increase of cultivated land: each 
worker produces more strawberries as each one has more land to cultivate and 
the value of the marginal product of labor rises at any given level of employment. 
However, the latter increase of the value of marginal productivity should be 
attributed to land rather than labor, as the value of the additional output will be 
generated by employing an additional unit of land. Here one should also consider 
the issue of environmental degradation and resource depletion as a concrete 
trade-off between more quantity of output and worse quality of environment. 
But, in terms of single factor productivity, the key element to measure is whether 
a change of output (ideally, an improvement of quality and quantity at the same 
time) per labor hour, output per single machine, or output per unit of land 
occurs.  
In theory and practice, we know that non-marketed (or non-traded) goods and 
services, which do not go through a market, are not counted as part of GDP (or 
GNP or GNI), even if they can be a significant part of what is produced and 
consumed by the given country's total population. Moreover, most of those 
working on the land in poor countries are either subsistence farmers (producing 
only for themselves), tenant farmers (with no land rights and no incentive to 
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increase output), or landless laborers (selling their labor in a daily labor market). 
As a consequence, much of what is produced is never be counted as part of 
output if one follows the rule and labor productivity is inferred from limited 
historical information available to help evaluate labor performance.  
Even more so, much of what is called labor compensation (such as wages) is 
really a return on human capital, so that the distinction between labor and 
human capital is rather fuzzy; huge wage differences among men and women or 
ethnic groups don't reflect real differences in marginal productivity and if these 
differences arise from differences in human capital they are not necessarily fair, 
as they simply reflect different opportunities, capabilities, contextual 
environments. 
We should also take into account that developmental implications of increased or 
decreased labor productivity are not obvious, even if we don't consider the broad 
notion of sustainable development. Labor productivity can increase by reducing 
labor cost. But if real wages are neither determined by the level of the marginal 
productivity of labor (neoclassical assumption) nor by the technology of 
production and if labor and capital remuneration as well as their productivity are 
inseparable and determined by a political conflict, then the reduction of labor 
cost is not necessarily an objective to be reached.   
This is particularly true in a context in which income and wealth unequal 
distribution has worsened and polarized between and within most countries. As 
output per capita equals productivity times hours per capita, if output increases 
with workers who work fewer hours, then labor productivity rises more rapidly 
than output, but an hour not worked because of longer vacations or a shorter 
work week has different developmental implication from an hour not worked 
because higher unemployment or lower labor-force participation (Fitoussi ed., 
2013). The entry of females and of marginalized groups (such as migrants) into 
the labor force can induce an increase of output per capita faster than 
productivity, but it does not automatically create the same developmental effect 
as the entry of children of forced labor into the labor force, even if the effect on 
output per capita and on productivity may be the same. The assumption 
according to which the various factors of production are viewed in the abstract 
as homogeneous entities is a serious pitfall.  
In the light of the classical-Marxian theory of value and surplus value in the 
exploitation of productive labor (Foley, 2013), as well as of the need to re-
conceptualize productive labor in terms of environmentally sustainable 
productive labor, the quality and quantity of jobs is the key factor to be 
considered and assessed:  
i. to create decent jobs and improve the quality of existing jobs in line 
with the pillars of the decent work agenda (that is to guarantee access 
to full and productive employment with rights at work, social 
protection and the promotion of social dialogue),  
ii. to bring inequality down to nationally and internationally defined 
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levels (that is to reduce the widening gap between the top class and 
the most vulnerable groups - women, but also migrants and refugees, 
small-holder farmers, ethnic and national minorities, indigenous 
peoples, children and young people, elderly persons,  disabled persons 
- by transferring income, wealth and power),  
iii. to promote structural transformation of the economy and enabling 
business environment (by supporting an economic, business and 
political empowering process to enable the most vulnerable people’s 
active involvement in self-determined development of their lives and 
environment),  
iv. to end all forms of legal discrimination against women and girls and 
improve their economic and social opportunities (by prioritizing 
gender equality and women’s rights to land, property, inheritance and 
control of natural resources and business activities). 
v. to develop a society in harmony with nature, shifting from a merely 
environmental approach to one that is genuinely ecological (Kovel, 
2007), avoiding a narrow economistic interpretation of environmental 
resources or inputs and talking in terms of ecosystems conservation. 
 
 
 (ii) Capital productivity 
  
The second single factor to be considered is capital productivity. Capital is often 
conceived in its narrow sense of as the sum total of non-human assets that can be 
owned and exchanged on some markets: all forms of real property (including 
residential real estate) as well as financial assets (including bank accounts, 
mutual funds, bonds, stocks, financial investments of all kinds) and non-financial 
assets (land, dwellings, buildings, machinery, plants, infrastructure, patents, and 
other directly owned professional assets), physical and immaterial, used by firms 
and government agencies.  
Capital is also conceived as an input into the production process that in the past 
was an output from the production process (a produced factor of production). It 
is defined as the stock of equipment and structures that are used to produce final 
goods and services (physical capital), the knowledge and skills that workers 
acquire through education, training, and experience (human capital, that is an 
individual’s labor power, skills, training, and abilities) and renewable and non-
renewable environmental resources used in production that are provided by 
nature, such as land, rivers and mineral deposits (natural capital, by using a 
narrow economistic interpretation of environmental resources or inputs). 
In practice, if land per person dominated income determination before the XIX 
century, land rents have fallen to a minimum share of total output in modern 
OECD economies (Clark, 2007), so that natural resources are not considered 
anymore necessary per se for an economy to be highly productive in producing 
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goods and services, whereas technological knowledge is the understanding of the 
best ways to produce goods and services (and this understanding is transmitted 
to the labor force through human capital). Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the value of virgin land and the value of improvements due to human 
intervention or between the value of dwellings and the value of the land on 
which they are built. Thereafter the concrete and practical measurement of 
factor productivity is rather difficult at both micro and macro levels. 
Post-Keynesians and neoclassical economists share the view according to which 
growth is basically driven by capital investment, but the former considers 
investment endogenous to aggregate demand and assume that growth may itself 
generate forces making for oscillation. 
In particular, at the end of the 1930s Roy Harrod defined the Incremental capital-
output ratio (ICOR) as the reciprocal of the marginal productivity of capital (the 
output-capital or output-investment ratio). The higher the ICOR, that is the 
higher the amount of capital required to produce a single unit of output in the 
economy (K/Y or ∆K/∆Y) the lower the productivity of capital, so that the ICOR 
can be thought of as a measure of the inefficiency with which capital is used 
(Harrod, 1939).  
Following the Harrod model, which assumes no substitution between labor and 
capital and also shows constant returns to scale, the rate of growth of GDP 
(∆Y/Y) is determined jointly by the national saving ratio (s) and the national 
capital-output ratio: the more an economy save and invest out of a given GDP, the 
greater the growth of that GDP will be. By multiplying the rate of new 
investments (I/Y) by its productivity, the rate by which national income will 
increase is obtained. The demand for investment is given by the accelerator 
principle, that is the required amount of extra capital (or investment) to produce 
a unit flow of output at a given rate of interest, determined by technological 
conditions. This model has both descriptive and prescriptive value and this is 
why it is a topic still and widely discussed and cited in economic growth and 
economic development theory, even if this early Post-Keynesian model was 
replaced by new generations of growth models such as those presented in Fig. 2.  
Some examples include the widely cited estimates of a $50 billion need in 
additional annual aid to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
were largely based on two studies, one by a group known as the Ernesto Zedillo 
Commission (Zedillo Commission, 2001) and another by Shanta Devarajan and 
his co-authors at the World Bank (Devarajan, Miller and Swanson, 2002). They 
were both based on another study (UNCTAD, 2000), which adopted the Harrod 
model by assuming that, if capital flows were to somehow be sufficient to raise 
investment to 22 percent of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, real GDP growth in that 
region would necessarily be 6 percent per year. Based on some simplistic 
assumptions, without any empirical support, such as that in Africa all aid 
becomes investment and all investment becomes growth, this model estimated 
roughly a $10 billion capital ‘need’ for Africa, which the Zedillo report simply 
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doubled to account for other developing regions and then, it settled on $30 
billion for the rest of the goals, for a total of $50 billion, and used this final figure 
throughout its text. 
Jeffrey Sachs and the UN Millennium Development Project also anchored the 
MDG framework to the need of increasing investment in development, by 
assuming that the poorest countries save too little to achieve economic growth, 
and aid is too low to compensate for the low domestic saving rates. Detailed data 
on actual saving, investment, aid, and growth rates differ greatly by region and 
by income level, but the authors presented a report with specific policy 
recommendations, which were based on the adoption of the Harrod model (UN 
Millennium Project, 2005). 
In general, the capital coefficient in the process of economic growth has been the 
pivotal parameter. A fundamental property of the aggregate production function 
is that there are diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital. Given the 
ceteris paribus assumption, that is holding all other factors of production 
constant, in general an additional unit of capital has difficulty in "cooperating" 
with the other inputs. For example, the use of inorganic or synthetic fertilizer 
improves crop production on farms, but if one continues to equip farmers with 
more and more of the same fertilizer without adopting new uses for it, then a 
point will be reached where the extra-capital goods become redundant and 
additional fertilizer improves the yield less per unit of fertilizer (the marginal 
product of capital is negligible), and excessive quantities can even reduce the 
yield, so that fertilizer pollution should be treated as an environmentally 
detrimental input. In formalized terms, the marginal product of capital is 
decreasing in the stock of capital: F'(K) > 0 and F''(K) < 0 for all K (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998).  
Overall, excessive quantities of fertilizer tend to be negative particularly in the 
long-run, so that one should also take into account the discrepancy between the 
(positive) short-term effects of capital on output and the (negative) effects in the 
long run. 
One should also consider the law of diminishing marginal utility, meaning that 
the first unit of consumption of a good or service such as a strawberry yields 
more utility than the second and subsequent units, with a continuing reduction 
for greater amounts. Both diminishing (marginal) returns and diminishing 
(marginal) utility of capital are expected to be taken into account in planning 
development strategies.  
At the same time, costs of capital projects are known to be subject to economies 
of scale: the cost of a unit of capacity of many types of equipment, such as electric 
motors, pumps and gasoline engines, decreases as size increases; therefore, also 
the efficiency increases with size, leading to lower variable cost as well, because 
cost per unit of output generally decrease with increasing scale as fixed costs are 
spread out over more units of output.  
From a demand side perspective, also positive network externalities are 
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becoming more and more important, in the case of network technologies, such as 
the sitting of mobile phone masts: the more masts are installed and the more 
valuable the masts already installed are, as the value of the technology is 
determined by the dimension of the network, by creating a so called bandwagon 
effect among the customers. 
A comprehensive understanding of the complex and dynamic interaction across 
diminishing (marginal) returns, diminishing (marginal) utility, economies of 
scale and positive network externalities is judged as a pre-requisite for analyzing 
capital productivity. 
Moreover, one should also consider the effect of an increase of all inputs and not 
only of capital in the long run. In mainstream micro-economics, the long-run 
returns to scale are purely technologically imposed and are not influenced by 
economic decisions or by market conditions. This is why a firm's production 
function could exhibit different types of returns to scale in different ranges of 
output at different stages of development: there could be increasing returns 
(with output increasing by more than that proportional change in inputs) at 
relatively low output levels, decreasing returns (with output increasing by less 
than that proportional change in inputs) at relatively high output levels, and 
constant returns at one output level between those ranges. 
In general, the mainstream economics' assumptions – according to which 
financial and real capital are identical, the return to the first is the return to the 
second, all resources are fully employed and the economy is on its production 
possibility frontier – are not realistic hypotheses. From a Marxian perspective, 
the neoclassical idea of capital as an agglomeration of physical objects has to be 
rejected in favor of the theory of capital as the means of control of the means of 
production, the dominant class power and authority to extract surplus from the 
worker class, that is to make decisions.  
From this point of view, capital is conceived by Marx as a social, political, and 
legal category, rather than a physical or financial one. However, the confusing 
neoclassical view is still dominant and the famous economist Thomas Piketty 
persists in such a neoclassical approach to capital, too. As emphasized by James 
Galbraith, in his book entitled "Capital in the Twenty-First Century" Piketty 
adopts a financial measurement and valuation of capital rather than physical 
quantity. He measures physical capital equipment with all forms of money-
valued wealth, excluding human capital, and estimates the market value of that 
wealth, so that he still repeats the neoclassical fallacy - made clear by the 
Cambridge critique in the 1960s - to deploy an empirical measure to calculate a 
capital input in the growth model that is unrelated to productive physical capital 
and is based on the assumption that a the technological return on capital, 
depending on its marginal productivity, has usually averaged a certain value 
(Galbraith, 2014). 
At aggregate level, more than fifty years ago Simon Kuznets analyzed the 
proportions of gross capital formation to GDP (K/Y). He found that such a 
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marginal ratio of K/Y registers a sequential evolution, passing through an initial 
stage of low level, a second stage of rapid increase, and a final maturity stage 
with an intermediate level (Kuznets, 1961). Interpretations abounded: the 
common view is that K/Y declines with the transformation of productive 
structure (that is with sector with a lower K/Y ratio that gain weight) and when 
the economy moves to the more efficient threshold or take-off stage, but then 
declines after having reached high efficiency, in the maturity stage, when scale 
economies are fully exploited and product reaches market saturation. 
 
 
 (iii) Technological progress (and TFP in general) 
  
A third crucial component, additional to labor and capital (which absorbs 
environmental inputs as well), is technological progress, which means more 
output produced from the same level of K (including natural capital and energy) 
and L inputs. Following mainstream theory, we can measure technological 
progress indirectly by observing increases in capital, labor, and output; that is, 
through the residual, which can be conceived as a measure of technological 
progress, but also of the role of externalities, the change in sectoral composition 
of production and so on. 
A reductionist view on that “something else”, which is commonly considered as 
the most important factor in  explaining GDP growth (much more than 
diminishing returns, factor accumulation, and constant returns to scale), 
emphasizes the role of technological progress as the key component of  that 
“something else”.  
Recent growth-accounting analyses consider the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT, that is technology linked to Computers and 
Internet) as the main source of the OECD productivity growth. According to a 
Schumpeterian view, ICT applications have been characterized by high growth of 
patenting activity, high rate of entry of new innovators, high concentration of 
technological activity across firms, a diversified knowledge base in terms of 
technological domains and actors involved (Corrocher et al, 2007). 
Innovation and the exploitation of inventions are crucial for economic growth 
and for catching up, as the technological frontier provides developing countries 
with technologies that should be copied. 
Automation and digitization are directly contributing to the diffusion of part-
time and temporary jobs, with an increasingly mobile workforce around the 
world, and to a decrease in jobs by replacing some types of work (the so-called 
gig economy). This may also question the idea that a society is built on the 
concept of employment, pushing us to think about a future with new forms of 
work (not necessarily paid jobs). Some people may think that such a scenario 
might even lead to development and a better life for all; but the key question 
always remains the same: is this an agenda for action to start delivering on the 
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promise ‘to leave no one behind’, that is what about the lives of the poorest and 
most discriminated? 
However technology as well as capital and labor is not homogenous in terms of 
quality. For example, short-lived capital goods like PC have much faster 
depreciation rates than long-lived capital goods like structures. Therefore, they 
earn higher profits per dollar of investment and, as a consequence, it should be 
better to give more weight to short-lived capital, as recommended by Jorgenson 
and his colleagues (Jorgenson, 2008).  
Technology is rarely neutral in terms of implications on other inputs: 
productivity impact of computers tends to involve a substitution of capital for 
labor. The problem of potential non neutrality of technology might be 
undermined by changing business models associated with the use of new 
technologies, in terms of imposing some conditionalities of  sustainable process 
of production (in terms of productive, decent, inclusive and sustainable jobs, 
conducive to political transformation), but in practice it is extremely unlikely. 
A puzzle in the growth accounting derives from the fact that the marginal 
productivity is assumed while holding other inputs constant in quantity (and 
quality): in practice, this assumption is not realistic, as the marginal productivity 
of an input depends on how much of the other inputs are used. In other terms, 
the marginal productivity generally depends on all the inputs, that depend on 
changes in other inputs. We should thus consider contextual conditions as well, 
given the importance of holistic and nested view. 
For example, labor productivity and work hours are inseparable: what makes 
labor more expensive reduces also the demand for labor. In theory, as if we had 
gender equality, workers who lose their jobs are presumed to be those who are 
least productive and those who are not fired are more productive, and so average 
labor productivity is artificially raised. The shrinking demand for labor may be 
accompanied by a rapid increase in the capital-labor ratio, as the rise in the cost 
of labor created an incentive to substitute capital for labor. 
But also the assumption of labor and capital productivity occurring 
independently of innovation and context does not hold. Rather, the various 
sources of growth accounting are complementary and not mutually exclusive 
(Fitoussi ed., 2013).  
From this perspective, there is nothing new in it: Kaldor stressed that capital 
accumulation and technical progress go together, as most technical progress 
requires capital accumulation for its embodiment and new capital accumulation 
depends on more technical progress (Thirlwall, 2003). 
One should also split the quantity and quality of different inputs (and context): 
the level of skilled labor, the quality of raw materials, intermediate products, but 
also other inputs (land, water, energy, infrastructure, technology…) and context.  
It is difficult to separate the contribution of factor inputs to growth from the 
contribution of increases in output per unit of inputs (increases in TFP) and 
there are other factors (such as economies of scale) which are due both to 
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technical change and to increases in factor supplies. 
It is also difficult to distinguish between some factors that may contribute to 
increases in the productivity of factors, such as education, improvement in the 
quality of capital and economies of scale. 
Basic principles of mainstream economic theory say that increases in factor 
supplies, increasing returns (technological economies of scale, with which output 
rises more than proportionately to the increased in combined inputs), and 
technical progress (anything that increases the productivity of factors other than 
increasing returns) are three broad sources of growth. Technical progress is also 
artificially divided into exogenous (not dependent on capital accumulation) and 
endogenous (introduced by new investment). 
Traditionally, technical change was viewed as factor-neutral. For example, 
Robert Solow - as well as the pioneering Roy Harrod - defined TFP advancement 
as an increase in output without changing marginal rates of transformations for 
L and K inputs (Solow, 1957). In practice, the proportion of K/L is constant after 
technology progress is realized, but technology progress can also be seen as 
transformation of production function: it is capital-saving when the proportion 
of K/L is lower after technology progress is realized to produce a given output 
level under the same factor price vector;  it is labor-saving when the proportion 
of K/L is higher than before. 
In theory, as stressed by Nicholas Kaldor, a higher K/L ratio will not 
automatically lead to higher unemployment rates (with negative impacts on later 
wages), if higher output growth brought about by technological progress 
embodied in new capital investments generates greater employment 
opportunities (Kaldor, 1960). In practice, the idea that the higher the rate of 
capital investment, the greater will be technological progress, which in turn will 
lead to higher aggregate output growth, resulting in additional demand for labor, 
has to be empirically verified.  
Ranald Taylor found that unemployment rates declined significantly in Malaysia 
when the country switched from a labor-intensive production technique to a 
capital-intensive and labor-saving one, because the addition of new capital 
equipment to the existing stock of equipment accelerated technical progress, 
which in turn induced higher labor productivity, resulting in increases in 
demand (in terms of higher quality and lower prices), and drove production and 
employment upwards (Taylor, 2004). This means that new technical changes 
made in terms of improved technology can be embodied in investment (the so 
called embodied technological progress), but it is also possible that improved 
technology, which allows increase in the output, is produced from given inputs 
without investing in new equipment. Hence, technological progress may or may 
not be sufficient to generate additional employment growth; and this is also true 
in terms of total energy consumption, use of resources and environmental 
impact in general. 
To sum up, conceptually growth accounting is a straightforward decomposition, 
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and it has given rise to a large literature. But one has to be very careful in 
interpreting such decompositions because accumulation and productivity 
growth are themselves endogenous. The relationship is expressed  with a 
questionable economy-wide production function, with the residual factor that 
should captures the technical efficiency level of the economy due to unmeasured 
inputs or human capital (the stock of knowledge and expertise measured 
through education and Research and Development) and inducing factor 
productivity increases, that is output growth not due to inputs increases - 
efficiency or quality combination and use of inputs rather than quantity of inputs 
-, or a measure of allocative efficiency with which resource are distributed, 




4. The importance of context 
 
  
It is impossible to measure and aggregate heterogeneous capital goods in 
physical units. In practice, aggregate models are rough tools. 
As a consequence, almost all the key terms of current glossary of development 
studies can be placed on the intersections of the three sets representing the 
developmental objectives areas (economic, social and environmental ones), with 
the afore-mentioned risk to have the night in which all cows are black: what 
dimension comes first in the conundrum of these multiple capital puzzles to 
promote development? 
Contexts shape values and opportunities, whereas autonomy is an individual 
capability (feasible to be exercised). Capability is determined by three main 
factors: entitlements (= access to resources), agency (=competences and pro-
active and empowered participation) and multilevel structural contexts, which 
are to be studied individually and in interaction. 
We can identify four contextual dimensions of interest at least: geography, 
market integration, institutions and political context. They are the inescapable 
and interrelated prerequisites influencing the attainment of the three 
interlocked goals via various ways. 
Geography (and climate) relates to the advantages and disadvantages posed by a 
zone or country’s physical location (latitude, proximity to navigable waters, 
climate, presence of important disease vectors, and so on).  To recognize 
geography as determining the limits of economic growth is not a new 
phenomenon: classical economists did it. More recently, Jared Diamond 
explained how climate differences, geographical advantages and economies of 
scale have long played a powerful role in the differences in worldwide income 
(Diamond, 1998). Disease environments and agricultural productivity are 
directly dependent on geographic conditions: only three tropical economies – 
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Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan – are classified as high-income by the World 
Bank, while all countries within regions zoned as temperate had either middle- 
or high-income economies. Geography is also the only exogenous contextual 
factor, not co-evolving with economic performance, influencing growth. 
However, the interaction between geography, labor and technology abound: 
when population is very small and there is a lot of fertile land for each person to 
work with, new technology is not required and used as it does not take 
advantage of the abundant factor. Geography matters a lot for identifying 
investment needs; however, any attempt to apply general rules of thumb, despite 
the relevance of heterogeneity across cases and countries, risk to be 
counterproductive. 
Institutions refer to the quality of formal and informal socio-political 
arrangements – ranging from the legal system (including  the extent of legal 
protection of property and how well such laws are enforced) to broader political 
institutions (including the limits placed on political leaders) – that play an 
important role in promoting or hindering economic performance. Almost fifteen 
years ago, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson reacted to 
geography determinism, by arguing that geography affected growth in a indirect 
way, through institutions, which play a crucial role: countries in which the 
European settlers faced greater mortality are the countries in which they chose 
not to settle and adopted extractive institution, whereas when colonizers could 
adapt to local climate and geography, they chose to settle and adopted good rule 
of law and institutions created during the colonization period persist after 
independence (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001). Following a Post-Keynesian 
view, institutions develop as a result of a specific cultural framework, that is, 
social experience and social norms, and by local characteristics, so that 
institutions should be conceived as a path-dependent process that necessitates 
readjusting existing institutions to the changing economic framework since 
institutions are both outgrows and reinforcers of routinised thought, and they 
impose form and consistency on the activities of human beings (Hodgson, 1993). 
Market integration relates to market size, and the benefits (as well as costs) of 
participation in international trade in goods, services, capital, and possibly labor. 
This is another channel by which a specific type of institution (the linking of 
capital, labor, and goods markets within wider markets) can change the 
dynamics and behavior of required investment: the promotion of economic 
integration as well as market concentration could orient investors towards 
different strategies. The study of the economics of international trade in 
agricultural and food products, under imperfect competitive setting dominated 
by multinational corporations and agribusiness, is perhaps one of the biggest 
challenges facing agricultural investment in developing countries and demanding 
governmental interventions, but this topic would clearly require much more 
space than a short mention. 
Political context refers to the conditions of (political and macroeconomic) 
Zupi 





stability and absence of violence (revolutions, coups). Overall effects of political 
violence are much higher than just the direct capital destruction: the risk of civil 
war and violent conflicts, social and ethnic radical fractionalization are 
frequently associated with rough geographical terrain and have negative and 
direct effect on economic growth and institutions, mediated by democracy. Sub-
Saharan Africa is highly affected by risk of civil war and experienced widening 




Fig. 4 - The conundrum of different areas of investment in the three pillars of sustainable 

































The importance of context makes the story more complex, also because small 
changes in the background environment (the planetary boundaries) can yield a 
significant increase in economic activity (Rodrik, 2007). And the linkages 
between the investment context and investment are many: for example, human 
and social capital can be conceived as the on-farm human elements that mediate 
how policy, institutions, but also technology and infrastructure affect input and 
physical capital use. Basically, the linkages are uncertain.  
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5. Some stylized facts and key question on productivity in agriculture 
 
  
Trying to go beyond GDP is challenging and may be a frustrating task at the 
macro level, due to the lack of reliable data on regular basis and troubles 
unraveling variables’ complex connections and causal links. Going beyond 
traditional productivity measures is even more difficult – by combining many 
dimensions embedded in the specific context – and it has attracted a much more 
limited interest, if not “no interest” we should say. 
Nevertheless, its relevance as a prerequisite for going beyond GDP cannot be 
circumvented: the (developmental and multidimensional) output, alternative to 
GDP, depends on the process of conversion of inputs into such a 
multidimensional output, and identifying critical assumptions and causal links is 
crucial for specifying appropriate indicators to monitor and evaluate it.   
Let us take productivity in agriculture as a practical example. 
According to the UN statistics, in the coming years rural population will still 
represent the majority of the world population and will peak at around 3.2 
billion by 2020. So far, increasing outputs have been achieved also by eroding 
genetic diversity: FAO estimated that 30 plant and 13 animal species provide 
90% of our food.  
Globally, we have about two billion malnourished people: one million of 
undernourished and a similar figure of over-nourished. While we struggle to 
yield more food, often with a negative impact on our ecosystems, almost one 
third of the total production is lost or wasted.  
Given this contextual premise, a reduced version of agricultural productivity is 
found crucial across alternative theories of economic development. If we defined 
agricultural “productivity” not as dollar or cereal yield per acre of harvested 
land, but as the number of people fed (in a proper qualitative and quantitative 
way as food security and food safety) per that same area (employing vulnerable 
people on decent and equal conditions, and dynamic ecosystem conservation, 
including  healthy soils, water and air), we would find that the US - the world’s 
third largest agricultural producer - ranks behind the world average, because 
much goes to animals and biofuels and a capital intensive business model is 
dominant, with agrochemicals being responsible for the vast majority of the eco-
toxicity of freshwater sources (with cotton alone accounting for 40% of the 
damage), according to a study released by UNEP (UNEP, 2010). 
Conventional definitions of agricultural productivity measure the quantity of 
output relative to the quantity of inputs. Be they yields per hectare for individual 
crops, global data average productivity measures for land, labor or capital across 
all agricultural production provide strong evidence of a decline in agricultural 
productivity for the most recent twenty years. Moreover, productivity growth 
should be produced by minimising water loss (this is particularly true in 
developing countries, starting from North Africa and South Asia) and this 
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situation is likely to worsen as a result of climate change. Natural resource 
degradation interlinked to climate change accelerates the use/abuse of resources 
(in particular, demand for energy), while the food imports of developing 
countries will increase. 
Investment on natural resources is considered vital to avoid a drastic fall of land 
productivity and to guarantee long-term sustainability of the mode of production 
(the well functioning of capital accumulation). At the same time, it is considered 
important to invest in the quality of human and social factors (and institutions) 
as a way to contribute to the increase of labor productivity (against diminishing 
returns on labor), by focusing on the empowerment of the most vulnerable 
groups. 
Additional problems derive from the fact that the data on factor inputs is most 
readily available for the non-farm private business sector and Arthur Lewis's 
assumption of disguised unemployment labor is questionable (as informal sector 
has expanded), and the number of agriculture workers is not clear (due to the 
overwhelming role played by the informal sector). As mentioned before, land as 
a separate factor of production tends to be subsumed into capital, on the basis of 
the fact that the notion of land as a fixed factor of production (assumed true in 
the long run, not in the short-run in developing countries) and land without the 
application of capital is judged of little use, but the consequence is the adoption 
of an unrealistic homogeneity of capital. 
Empirical evidence showed that high-productivity commercial agriculture is a 
small proportion of total agriculture activity in poor countries, and is unable to 
contribute to fight effectively against mass unemployment, growing inequality 
and to promote a sustainable and inclusive mode of production. Nevertheless, 
high-productivity commercial agriculture and increased agriculture production 
are quite often defined as specific targets of public policies.  Agriculture is also 
defined as a diminishing returns activity: land is a fixed factor of production and 
the law of diminishing returns dominates (if a variable factor is added to a fixed 
factor its marginally product will fall). By adding labor to the land, the marginal 
product of labor first of all rises (because it requires a certain amount of labor for 
each unit of labor to work with maximum efficiency), but then declines and could 
become zero (or even negative).  
Another stylized fact in economics is that the demand for most agricultural 
products and other primary products derived from the land is income inelastic. 
The rise in demand is proportionately less than the rise in income and less than 
the growth of supply potential determined by the growth of the labor force plus 
the growth of labor productivity.  
Not surprisingly, if we observe African statistics, despite the impressive 
economic growth on the continent in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, most of African people live in rural areas, agriculture is still a relevant 
part of GNI (on average it is 25.5 percent, compared to 3 percent of OCED) and 
agricultural income is relatively low compared to urban income. Thus 
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urbanization and migration are two main options: by 15 years the number of 
urbanized people will double and migration will increase. As a consequence of 
such shocking pressure, environmental degradation is increasing. 
Producing food and increasing agricultural productivity is important but it is 
only part of the challenge. The struggle for food security and sustainable 
agriculture must address the disparities that often marginalize rural people – 
and especially smallholder households, women and rural workers– excluding 
them from national and even local political, economic, social and cultural 
developments. 
If sustainable agriculture is to be the main way to preserve fertile soil, fresh 
water, biodiversity and preventing land degradation, desertification, mitigate 
climate change by preventing deforestation and reforestation, then this can be 
achieved only through the empowerment of rural people who can preserve the 
main basis of their livelihoods through climate resilient farming. The discussion 
on an innovative measurement of productivity should consider the necessity of 
including a computation of ecosystems’ restoration and the provision of services. 
Local governance and common resources management depend on adaptation to 
local agro-ecological and social conditions. 
If productivity must be sustainable, in agriculture emphasis should go on food 
(eco-) systems and labor, rather than merely on agricultural or production 
systems, because sustainability goes beyond the farming or production systems. 
Sustainability takes into consideration the whole value chain and implies a 
clearer focus on nutritional, public health, community development and cultural 
issues in order to achieve broader and longer-lasting results in development.   
But the amount of output as well as of labor productivity, even if conceived in 
conventional terms, is not properly measured in small-holder agriculture. A key 
question is whether increased average labor productivity decreases agriculture 
jobs. The most frequent answer is yes, in the long run; no, in the short run if 
compensated by an expanding market. Therefore, two alternative scenarios can 
be associated to the integration into the global value chain or to an adherence to 
the so-called "Km. Zero" or "Farm-to-Table" movement, according to which 
consumers buy local products directly from the farmer’s market, which means 
that food is produced, distributed and eaten in and around a very limited area. 
The FAO estimates on cumulative gross investment requirements make no 
distinction and have been made without any direct respect to the potential 
source of the required capital. A clear definition, conceptualization and 
measurement of sustainable productivity in agriculture is not only a 
methodological issue, but it becomes also a key means to political and normative 
judgements.  
A first important key question is the following: 
 
A. More sustainable investment in agriculture for food production? By 
whom? And production of what (quantity and quality), for whom?  
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The premise may be to recognize that there is an international polarized debate, 
a matter of intense controversy with, at the opposite extremes:  
i. those - including the agribusiness sector, many government agencies 
and private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation - who think that the answer is mainly (or uniquely) 
through the integration of poor agricultural economies into the world 
economy (through global value chains and links between TNCs and 
domestic producers);  
ii. those - such as Via Campesina (an international movement of peasant 
organizations of small-scale producers, agricultural workers, rural 
women, and indigenous communities), but also International NGOs 
such as  Oxfam (Oxfam, 2011) - who think that the only sustainable 
and fair solution is by reorienting economies toward a local ecosystem 
and family-farm-based sustainable agriculture and pastoralism, to 
encourage farming of plants, seeds and livestock characteristic of the 
local tradition, guaranteeing the right to produce food on one's own 
territory (food sovereignty).   
 
FAO is not embracing just one of these views, and the same holds true for IFAD 
that has a strong propensity to consider smallholder agriculture development as 
the key core mission (IFAD, 2013). In any case, an important key question is to 
explore the implications (opportunities and threats) faced by small farmers in 
the context of a scenario dominated by the renewed interest in the global value 
chains. 
The question of “more investment” itself has to be presented on the basis of a 
given framework based on a definition of sustainable productivity. As the FAO 
and IFAD have repeatedly declared, the volume of food production cannot 
explain the persistence of hunger, and it is important to combine three objectives 
associated to (more) agricultural investment for food production:   
i. to reduce poverty and food insecurity (and the fact that poverty is 
changing geographical profile is relevant),  
ii. to improve sustainability and resilience (and there is the risk that an 
increasing food production will worsen the problem if the mode of 
production is as always, that is "more of the same"),  
iii. to increase productivity and growth in food-crop agriculture, but 
adopting a broader definition and conceptualization of productivity. 
 
Another element to be considered is that FAO and IFAD are also recognizing that 
the question is not just to increase agricultural investment for food production, 
as “one of the first mean to fight imbalances and reduce tensions between the 
necessary increase in consumption and the challenging increase in production, 
but it is also to promote food loss reduction which alone has a considerable 
potential to increase the efficiency of the whole food chain. In a world with 
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limited natural resources (land, water, energy, fertilizer), and where cost-
effective solutions are to be found to produce enough safe and nutritious food for 
all, reducing food losses should not be a forgotten priority as roughly one-third 
of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted globally, which 
amounts to about 1.3 billion tons per year. This inevitably also means that huge 
amounts of the resources used in food production are used in vain, and that the 
greenhouse gas emissions caused by production of food that gets lost or wasted 
are also emissions in vain” (FAO, 2011). 
A correlated contextual element is to recognize that an accelerated change in the 
worldwide geography of poverty and development, together with the urgency of 
climate change challenges, pose the question of adequate investment strategy in 
the globalized world under such a new environment with direct consequences in 
terms of new market opportunities and threats and associated specific strengths 
and weaknesses for different developing countries.  
Moreover, the jurisdictional and geographical coverage gap (as well as legitimate 
difference of interests) between the main agents of agricultural investment 
(multinational corporations, governments, domestic firms, households) implies 
the need to clarify this point, if we recognize the importance of different and 
conflictual interest among actors.   
A sub-question related to the previous point is to explain what type of countries 
and within-country territorial systems are or can be integrated into high value 
market chains and what about the rest of the world (marginalized economies 
and marginal agricultural sectors in integrated economies). 
Descending from and correlated to the previous key question is the fact that 
“agricultural investment for food production does not mean only investment 
going into agricultural production itself, but into a wide range of small and large 
scale activities along value chains that involve supplying farm inputs, and 
processing, storing, distributing, wholesaling, retailing and exporting farm 
products” (Hazell, Syed, Zupi, Miyazako, 2011).  Therefore a correlated question 
is the following:  
 
B. More sustainable investment by different agents for what type of capital 
accumulation into this range of value chain activities? And, consequently, 
where should FAO and IFAD, as well as other national and international 
organizations, public and private entities, place their focus?  
 
The multi-faceted dimensions of capital means that capital accumulation may be 
focused on fixed or physical capital, financial capital, human capital, social 
capital, knowledge capital, institutional capital and, above all, natural capital. 
 
By focusing in terms of investment results, that is food production (in terms of its 
quantity and quality), it is important to analyze, for a given type of investment: 
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C. What are the most appropriate business models (in terms of different 
arrangements involving large-scale and small-scale farmers into an 
international or national value chain: see L. Cotula and R. Leonard, 2010) to 
be encouraged in order to create the appropriate value chains, facilitate 
integration in local, national or world economy, stimulate sustainable 
productivity?  
 
Corporate financial structure, technology and innovation, efficiency, labor and 
land implications (in terms of quality and quantity) affect core productivity 
measurement. 
For what concerns the financial structure of firms’ investment, based on a World 
Bank’s survey conducted in 2008, UNCTAD (2009) showed that retained 
earnings, that is self-funding, is the main financial source for each type of firm 
(small-, medium- and big-sized) in every country, representing between 60 and 
70 percent of total funding. This confirms what “Pecking order theory” (Myers 
1984) says: there is a precise hierarchy according to a strategy of financial self-
sufficiency. Companies prioritize their sources of financing (from internal 
financing to equity) according to the principle of least effort, preferring to raise 
equity as a financing means of last resort. Hence, internal funds are used first, 
and when that is depleted, debt is issued, and when it is not sensible to issue any 
more debt, equity is issued. Therefore, another key question to address 
agricultural productivity is: 
 
D. What are the public policy conditions and reforms  necessary to enhance 
farm-level savings and to mobilize (more and different types of) sustainable 
agricultural investment and encourage companies to be oriented towards 
sustainable productivity improvements? 
 
In terms of favorable conditions, it is also important to analyze: 
 
E. What are the institutional conditions and institutional reforms 
necessary to mobilize a trigger (more and different types of) sustainable 
agricultural investment?  
 
Institutions mean procedural devices and regulatory frameworks, formal and 
informal rules governing human interactions: property rights and legally binding 
contracts, market-regulating institutions, institutions for macroeconomic 
stability, social insurance institutions and institutions of conflict management. 
Another important contextual dimension to analyze is the following: 
 
F. What type of market integration has to be considered as an essential 
prerequisite to earn the expected gains on sustainable food production by 
promoting (more and different types of) agricultural investment in the value 
chain? 
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And, in terms of favorable contextual conditions to create a competitive 
advantage that ultimately results in superior value creation, a question is: 
 
G. Is it possible and relevant to classify different types of country’s physical 
location or territories (latitude, proximity to navigable waters, climate, 
presence of important disease vectors, and so on) to be related to different 
recommendations?  
 
This may be important against pretensions to have general rules to be always 
applied. 
Finally, in terms of favorable contextual conditions to create a proper 
environment: 
 
H. What about effectiveness of efforts launched to establish international 
principles for responsible investment in agriculture – such as the UNCTAD-
FAO-IFAD-WB initiative (Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment 
that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, now called the “RAI 
Principles”), the preparation of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources, led by FAO, 
IFAD in a broad partnership with member nations, civil society, and other 
United Nations agencies, the Santiago Principles adopted by SWFs to 
improve transparency, and the more general OECD guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises – to enhance the benefits of FDI in agriculture 
while mitigating its potential downsides?   
 
I. What is the practical ways to promote coherence and complementarity 
between sustainable agricultural investment by international and national 
private firms, farmers and public sector, and what are the key policy 
implications?  
 
This is based on the assumption that "private sector investments along value 
chains are highly complementary to public and private investments made in 
agricultural production, often enhancing the returns to farmers’ own on-farm 
investments and to public investments in agriculture, making both more 
attractive". 
According to the Committee on World Food Security hosted by FAO, new interest 
in agro-investment has to match country food security strategies, minimize risks 
and maximize positive outcomes for local populations; therefore land and 
natural resource rights of local land users have to be protected and expanded. 
Public investment in agriculture and rural development, the quality of 
governance of land tenure (i.e. land tenure policy), the choice of incentive 
framework (including market and trade policy), together with the level of 
organization of local farmers in producer groups and cooperatives and the 
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degree of social responsibility of foreign investors can bring very different 
patterns of investment in the agricultural sector. 
For all the above mentioned questions, the adoption of a more comprehensive 
measure of sustainable productivity may be essential to avoid an 
overproliferation of just rhetorical, vague, ambiguous and even contradictory 




6. Difficulties in measuring what we would like to measure 
 
  
An appropriate definition and conceptualization of sustainable productivity is 
critical to address the next point concerning the adoption of a precise set of 
measures, which are needed to translate the key idea into policy and operative 
terms. 
The choice of measure depends certainly on the conceptualization, but not only 
that. By definition, measurement of “reality” is very difficult, perhaps impossible. 
There are a lot of methodological and technical problems to consider in 
measuring social, economic, environmental, political and cultural phenomena, in 
addition to conceptual problems and to the scarcity of the information available. 
Measurement of sustainable productivity is a core empirical challenge at both 
micro and macro levels, and it should be strictly linked to and reflect what the 
concept and measure of sustainable product implies. 
Looked at from this point of view, there is a lesson to be learned from the GDP 
and beyond-GDP debate and measurement. 
GDP (and GNI) is the most important evidence in debates on poor countries 
economic development and it has a strong political power. Measurement 
problems affect all countries, but there are particular problems of measuring 
GDP in poor countries: GDP growth estimates are misleading where informal 
economy prevails, because only parts of the economy are recorded. In particular 
some important sectors such as food production often remain unobserved and 
few individuals, households and farms record or report income, production and 
expenditure. For example, few African countries have recently conducted a 
household survey, some of them have never conducted it. Undoubtedly, as 
reliable statistics are crucial for improving knowledge and  policy-making a new 
agenda for data development is needed (Jerven, 2013). 
Developing countries face many challenges to improve data quality for achieving 
and monitoring sustainable development, as underlined by the UN Secretary-
General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group (IEAG) on a Data Revolution for 
Sustainable Development (IEAG, 2014). And the last decade has produced new 
ambitious demands, from poverty statistics to MDGs and now to a new 
generation of so called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on weak statistical 
Zupi 





offices in developing countries. 
In general, the selection and adoption of development goals and targets should 
take into account (in practice, depend on) a set of existing and available 
indicators to diagnose the situation and measure the improvement. At any point 
in time and for any country the goals, targets and indicators are interrelated. 
Finally, the choice of goals and targets is determined and influenced by existing 
indicators, affected and being in turn affected by development priorities. If we do 
not consider the list of available indicators, then the risk is to have an interesting 
conceptualization of goals and targets that cannot be translated into indicators in 
a coherent way. 
A new SDGs framework should be both simple and comprehensive at the same 
time. The MDGs, as well as GDP, have been a particularly attractive tool for 
development policies because of their inherent clarity and associated simplicity: 
clear about what one should try to achieve (a few social goals: fight against 
poverty and hunger, equal opportunity - with equality associated to gender 
issues - and human development in the MDGs case) and how it will be achieved 
(specific targets and put in place a monitoring system with measurable 
indicators). 
The post-2015 SDGs should still be simple in terms of clarity (effective in 
communication), but comprehensive (combining three intertwined dimensions: 
social, environmental and political economic ones). 
Viewed over such a perspective, it can be said that today the main objective of 
development policies must be clear and, in this sense, simple in a complex world 
of rapid transformations: poverty eradication, well-being and security for all 
people, communities and countries within the planetary boundaries as an 
effective slogan and a practical way to promote prosperity and well-being, and in 
particular to strengthen or empower individual and collective capabilities of the 
more vulnerable groups and, to this manner, be transformative; to enhance 
adaptive capacity and resilience of social-ecological systems.  
As a consequence, we should recognize that development goals have to increase 
in complexity rather than in number: the world is not complicated - adding more 
and more goals, without giving any indication of their priority -, it is complex. 
This means to reject the idea of an expansion of the goals area and correlated 
indicators for development cooperation and to insist on the importance of 
intertwined dimensions: environmental goals have to be clarified and detailed, 
but then translated into operative terms as cross-cutting issues. 
At the same it is important to reduce the risk of overburdening weak statistical 
offices in developing countries. The over-proliferation of SDGs can become an 
unsustainable challenge to be accomplished, being very expensive in terms of 
time, finance, human resources, institutional capacity. 
On the other hand, good indicators have to have several qualities, being an 
appropriate - rather than a misleading - measurement of the phenomenon under 
study based on reliable data, having a cost-efficiency ratio, yielding clear 
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interpretations and being relevant to the formulation of policies (Sachs, 1994). 
We do not need to (re-)invent anything, just (re-) design goals. Based on the 
point 2, what was the idea of RIO MARKERS (expanded to include what, over the 
course of time, has been given more emphasis) is still convincing if we are able to 
transform them from a ritualistic to a substantial and cogent prerequisite to 
development. This can be a practical, simple and effective way to make the work 
on SDGs convergent with the review of the MDGs. At European level, we have a 
common framework and this implies Strategic environmental assessment (SEA), 
that is a "structured, rigorous, participative, open and transparent environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) based process, applied particularly to plans, 
programmes and projects": this can be a significant and cogent way to adopt a 
comprehensive approach to combine the three intertwined dimensions of 
development. 
The combination of SDGs should not be conceived as a sum of different factors 
defined as uncorrelated components (the silo approach). There is a clear 
overlapping among interlinked factors: if we consider the geographical maps of 
conflicts, violence, extreme poverty, environmental vulnerability and 
degradation, hunger, institutional fragility, immediately we discover a strong 
overlapping in geographical terms. A holistic and integrated approach is the key 
paradigm to face the challenge of development in an effective way. 
Definitely, food security and nutrition is a priority area of action. It combines 
local, national and global dimensions, territorial perspective, environmental 
priority, vulnerability, new dimensions of human security, gender and 
development, markets and states, focus on extreme poverty, inequality and 
decent jobs, sustainable consumption and production patterns (involving 
cultural aspects) and resource efficiency, food and energy prices volatility, mass 
migrations. The intertwined connection among many economic, social and 
environmental dimension is clear and also the complexity of development 
process and its specific political relevance. 
Sustainable agriculture is a universal challenge. Water scarcity, over-nutrition 
and food waste imply that the Minority and the Majority worlds, and all the 
citizens (poor and rich) in a given country have mutual but differentiated 
responsibilities, which means goals and targets to accomplish.   
Necessarily, sustainable agriculture has to be associated to health, education, 
children, gender (the main social dimensions of development, summarized 
within the framework of the MDGs), as well as to SDGs and to a more sustainable 
mode of production and consumption (linked to the urbanization process), that 
is a new economic development paradigm. This is the most critical world-wide 
challenge in an inter-generational perspective and based on the projected world 
population dynamics with a population expected to rise to 9.1 billion by 2050.  
Considering the OWG-SDG proposed process of clustering objectives (crucial and 
welcome: it represents a critical enduring understanding of development), it is 
arguable: it seems to be responding more to a need of assigning separated 
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operating fields to the different institutions involved in discussing and 
developing the process rather than to the need of better clarifying (Depth of 
Knowledge - DOK - problem) the whole Millennium Goal architecture in terms of 
three intertwined and nested pillars (social, economic and environmental) for a 
unified framework (to promote transformative and sustainable political process 
of empowerment of the poor). 
The weaknesses showed by the two processes above mentioned go back over 
some of the weaknesses of the setting up of the post MDGs discussion. The focus 
areas and targets articulation mix general goals (such as poverty eradication, 
equality, climate, above all, which can also be viewed as conditions without 
which the other main goals cannot be achieved), and means to achieve them 
(MoI, but also sustainable consumption and production, for example).  
Unfortunately, the integration of sustainability and equality into the SDGs as well 
as into the consolidated MDGs structure still resembles more an addition of some 
questions rather than a real change of paradigm. The persistence of focus areas 
denominated economic growth, industrialization, energy and infrastructure 
(instead of sustainable human development affecting economic growth, 
sustainable industrialization, etc.) testifies that it is still conceivable that an 
unsustainable and unequal economic growth could be a progress for humanity.  
The concrete risk is to lose an opportunity to make a really transformative and 
effective (in terms of empowerment of the poor) new post-2015 development 
agenda, addressing three dimensions of sustainable development – economic 
growth, social equality and environmental sustainability, with a more rapid 
move toward the low-carbon transition and inclusive development (New Climate 
Economy, 2016). 
In such a perspective, it is useful an in–depth analysis and assessment of the 
SDGs indicators as well as various alternatives and complements to GDP that 
have been used successfully in various levels of planning and evaluation to 
measure progress and impact of public policies. In the EU context, reflection on 
the post-2020 cohesion policy framework has re-ignited the ‘Beyond GDP’ 
debate and a European Parliament’s policy briefing provides a synthetic and 
updated review of current literature (European Parliament, 2016). In practice, 
Eurostat battery of indicators as well as national composite indicators, such as 
the Equitable and Sustainable Well-being (Benessere equo e sostenibile, BES) 
measurement in Italy, are useful tools to think about an innovative measurement 
of human wellbeing, looking at development in an effective multidimensional 
perspective. In the case of BES, that would mean choosing some indicators 
between the 134 that are proposed and that refer to 12 different sectors or 
domains of human well-being (ISTAT-CNEL, 2013), in order to individuate some 
possible indicators suitable for the measurement of the goals and targets and the 
impact evaluation of public policies that Italy would like to recommend. 
In parallel with this ‘Beyond GDP’ debate, there are other areas of theoretical and 
measurement debates related to development. The Bejing Platform for Action 
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(PfA) adopted in 1995 clearly recognized gender equality as the main goal for 
achieving sustainable development and defined it as equal rights, opportunities 
and obligations of women and men. The challenge of proper women’s 
empowerment measurement and indices is a concrete example of on-going 
debates on conceptualizing multi-dimensional issues, with different indices 




7. Some general concluding remarks. A few leads and suggestions for 
measuring sustainable productivity 
 
  
There is an urgent need for a change of approach where the measurement of 
(sustainable) production and correlated productivity is concerned. One cannot 
be expected to go beyond GDP without conceptualizing productivity beyond 
current definition. 
The reality is that statistical indicators and measures are just imperfect attempts 
to translate into operative terms definitions and correlated conceptualizations, 
and both measures and definitions contribute to confusion (R. Lister, 2015). 
On approaches to innovative productivity measurement, here, we are merely 
reporting some practical suggestions and ideas as possible sources of inspiration. 
Ideally, the requirements for this kind of measures are simple (G. Dijkstra, 2006): 
(i) a proper measurement should cover a limited number of indicators, but (ii) 
these indicators together should cover as many dimensions as possible; (iii) data 
should be available at micro and macro levels; (iv) it should be simple to 
calculate and to understand; (v) it should allow comparisons between firms and 
territories but also over time. 
Above all, and this is very important, we are not starting from scratch. 
In this respect, we can benefit from the interesting experience of innovative 
productivity measurement.  Here, among other examples, the HDI, DEA and 
MuSIASEM provide us with some practical suggestions and ideas as possible 
sources of inspiration.  
  
  
 (i) Human development index 
  
Human development index (HDI) is the first and key source of inspiration, 
because of its simplicity. HDI a composite index calculated based on three 
criteria of social- economic indices: Longevity, Educational attainment and 
Standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth. Educational 
attainment is the measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 
years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering 
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age. Standard of living is measured by Gross national income (GNI) per capita 
and a non-linear transformation is applied – by using a logarithmically 
transformed variable – to take into account diminishing returns of higher 
incomes (utility adjustment) (UNDP, 2015). 
The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three 
dimensions, measuring achievements in each dimension. The adoption of the 
geometric mean as functional form provides indicators that are more 
discriminating and rewards balanced performance: countries cannot fully 
compensate for poor performance in one dimension by another. This is 
important if we conceive sustainable productivity as a nested concept, rather 
than additive and silo concept, because poor performance in any dimension 
(economic growth, social development, environmental sustainability) is directly 
reflected in the geometric mean. A low achievement in one dimension is not 
linearly compensated for by high achievement in another dimension, as the 
geometric mean reduces the level of substitutability between dimensions and at 
the same time ensures that a given percent decline in index of one dimension has 
the same impact on the index as the same percent decline in another dimension. 
Thus, as a basis for comparisons of achievements, this method is also more 
respectful of the intrinsic differences across the dimensions than a simple 
average. 
Indices are calculated according to the general linear transformation: 
 
index = (V −	MINV)/(MAXV	−	MINV), 
 
where V is the country’s actual value for the specific indicator and MINV and 
MAXV are fixed minimum and maximum values, respectively, set for the 
indicator. 
The HDI captures these basic dimensions of human development, not all the 
important dimensions of development, so that it is not a comprehensive measure 
of human development. It cannot provide a complete picture of human 
development and it has to be supplemented with other useful indicators in order 
to get a comprehensive view. Moreover, it shares all the limitations of composite 
measures. 
From the perspective of human development, GNI is not the best measurement of 
real economic gains, but a traditional measure of economic growth is included as 
a key dimension of HDI. We can think of sustainable productivity in exactly the 
same way: departing from the standard approach to productivity measurement 
focusing solely on the amount of output produced by the unit inputs, the 
efficiency and intensity with which resources are utilized can be considered a 
component of a comprehensive measure of sustainable productivity. A more 
comprehensive measure cannot leave out important factors which are 
increasingly more important to sustainable development. A conventional 
measure of productivity does not reveal whether that output translates to better 
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human development outcomes in terms of social and environmental dimensions 
and cannot be considered as proper means for sustainable development. 
Therefore, the same approach as in the HDI can be used for sustainable 
productivity. 
It is apparent that equity and sustainability raise complex and difficult questions 
and that the concept of human development is much wider and richer than what 
can be caught in the HDI. But the HDI is useful in focusing attention and 
simplifying the problem, by showing up the inadequacies of GNI (P. Streeten, 
1995) and it can be considered the simplest and most suitable index to use for 
our purpose as well. 
 
  
 (ii) Data Envelopment Analysis 
  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can offer some other ideas in support of a 
sustainable productivity direct measurement, by testing its development. DEA is 
a “data-oriented” approach and a technique of mathematical programming for 
evaluating the performance of a set of entities called decision-making units 
(DMUs) whose performance is categorized by multiple metrics. These 
performance metrics are classified as inputs and outputs under DEA, with DMUs 
that convert multiple inputs into multiple outputs, by assessing the relative 
efficiency of a number of entities using a common set of incommensurate inputs 
to generate a common set of incommensurate outputs (J. Zhu, 2016). From this 
point of view, DEA has a strong link to what we mean by “efficiency”.  
In particular, there is a particular kind of efficiency, referred to as “technical 
efficiency” in economics, on the basis of which a DMU is to be rated as fully 
efficient if and only if the performances of other DMUs does not show that some 
of its inputs or outputs can be improved without worsening some of its other 
inputs or outputs. This definition avoids the need for explicitly specifying the 
formal relations that are supposed to exist between inputs and outputs. It also 
avoids the need for recourse to assumptions of weights, which are selected a 
priori and are supposed to reflect the relative importance of the different inputs 
or outputs. Moreover, DEA is a methodology directed to frontiers rather than 
central tendencies and it proves particularly adept at uncovering relationships 
that would remain hidden from other methodologies. (W. W. Cooper, L. M. 
Seiford, and J. Zhu, 2011).  
In practice, limiting our coverage to the first and basic model introduced in 1978 
(A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, E. Rhodes, 1978), one assumes that there are n DMUs 
to be evaluated and each DMU consumes varying amounts of m different inputs 
to produce s different outputs. We can interpret the basic DEA construction as 
the reduction of the multiple-output/multiple-input situation (for each DMU) to 
that of a single “virtual” output and “virtual” input, so that we can compare the 
ratio of outputs to inputs to measure the relative efficiency of each DMU. For a 
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particular DMU the ratio of this single virtual output to single virtual input 
provides a measure of efficiency that is a function of the multipliers. In 
mathematical programming terms, this ratio, which is to be maximized, forms 
the objective function for the particular DMU being evaluated and the efficiency 




 (iii) Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism 
  
What is known today as the Jevons Paradox simply means that an action taken to 
conserve resources (i.e. the economical use of fuel) reduces the cost of it to such 
an extent that entirely different kinds of environmental damage become 
affordable and new modes of economy will lead to an increase of consumption 
(i.e. the quantity of coal used will diminish in comparison with the yield, the 
profits will increase, so that the demand for it will increase). It suggests that 
efficiency, conservation and technological improvement, the very things urged by 
those concerned for future energy supplies, may actually worsen our energy 
prospects (John M. Polimeni, Kozo Mayumi, Mario Giampietro and Blake Alcott, 
2008). 
The same thing applies to doubt the environmental and social efficacy of the 
economic efficiency standards. Efficiency increases trigger some additional input 
consumption, known by the technical term rebound. Using innovative concepts 
derived from Complex Systems Theory, Mario Giampietro developed an 
innovative scientific approach called Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal 
and Ecosystem Metabolism (MuSIASEM) to integrate different narratives used in 
quantitative analysis. This approach makes it possible to generate quantitative 
representations of the viability and desirability of the metabolic pattern of 
modern societies using simultaneously technical, economic, demographic, social 
and ecological variables defined on different hierarchical levels and scales (M. 
Giampietro, 2003). 
Originally developed for analyzing the metabolic pattern of energy, MuSIASEM 
was subsequently adopted as an integrated accounting method to analyze 
simultaneously the energy-food-water nexus (M. Giampietro et al., 2013). 
In practice and differently from input /output analysis, the MuSIASEM approach 
defines the nature and the size of a given system in terms of flows (e.g., 
consumption and production of food, energy, water, money) in relation to fund 
elements (e.g., human beings, cropland, rivers), defined in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms. For example, the relation between water flow and human 
beings is qualitatively defined as drinking water (flow) for human beings (fund). 
The approach involves the following six steps:  
(i) definition of the socio-economic system as a set of functional 
compartments essential to guarantee its survival, reproduction and 
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(ii) selection of relevant fund elements and their quantification across the 
various functional compartments of the system; 
(iii) definition and quantification of the various flows (included the losses) 
used by the selected fund elements associated with the various 
functional compartments at different levels; 
(iv) description of the metabolic pattern across different hierarchical 
levels and dimensions (e.g. demographic, economic, biophysical 
dimensions) of analysis; 
(v) definition of the internal constraints of sustainability (check of the 
viability and desirability domain for the metabolic pattern); 
(vi) definition of the external constraints of sustainability (check of 
resource requirement and environmental loading). 
 
  
The HDI, DEA and MuSIASEM can be some useful and interesting sources of 
inspiration. 
But, based on the above, it is clear that the delivery of a proper measurement of 
sustainable productivity is far from easy.  
One important reason is that a measurement which aims at being comprehensive 
and fully and detailed representative of the sophisticated and complex reality is 
likely to be ineffective, too abstract and unfeasible in practical terms. In other 
terms, there is a potential trade-off between being ambitiously comprehensive 
and being of little or no practical use (D. Rodrik, 2015).  
Ideally, the overarching principles must be that of simplicity (a needed virtue), 
multi-dimensionality (a proper representation of the complex reality), data 
availability (the contextual constraint) at micro-level and macro-level, 
understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability across time and space.  
All these principles show how difficult it is to have a practical and ambitious 
measurement to be translated into operative terms. 
By definition, each and every measurement is powerful and useful if it is a 
stylized abstraction and simplification of the reality. 
However, as long as current productivity and output indicators are inadequate to 
achieve a proper measure of sustainability, we cannot give up our principle of 
going beyond GDP, which we consider to be fundamental. 
These criteria must be met for making planning, monitoring and evaluation 
feasible, even though we know that the effective capability to evaluate the impact 
of policies would be very difficult in any case, particularly when the complexity 
of multi-level and multi-dimensionality accounting is adopted. 
At present, there is no perfect measure, but there is no doubt that current 
measures can and must be improved to reflect new views, principles and political 
priorities. 
And if there were even merely a provocative preliminary proposal, a new trail to 
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follow, offering a starting point to advance the debate and open to critique, we 
should accept the challenge and pursue the quest for right and relevant paths. It 
is necessary, in such a context, to navigate across different alternatives and to 
figure out which one captures the most relevant features of the reality and 
principles that allow us to define targets, such as sustainability, and try to 
reconcile and close the gap between current indicators and ideal examples of 
measures that fit in with the ideas behind current political principles and 
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